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Brian J. McFillen 
SHADOW BOXING: 
HOW THE RISK OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION SHAPES TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
For a non-state terrorist group, internal communication and coordination are necessary to 
maintain organizational control and implement the group’s strategy; but this need for 
interpersonal contact also makes the group vulnerable to disruption by government authorities.  
How then might these competing demands shape a group’s organizational structure?  This 
dissertation will examine how the presence or absence of a safe haven can interact with a group’s 
choice of organizational structure to determine its ability to survive, conduct attacks, and 
mobilize supporters.  Furthermore, it will look at whether and how groups change their 
organizational structures to adapt to their political environments. To this end, process tracing, the 
congruence procedure type 2, and cross-case comparison will applied to the cases of four 
Western, Cold War-era groups (The Provisional Irish Republican Army, The Red Army Faction, 
The Red Brigades and The Weather Underground) to both identify the critical factors that impact 
group organizational structure and to explain how these factors exert their influence. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Research Question and Theory 
In 1977, with the arrest of Provisional Irish Republic Army Chief of Staff Seamus 
Twomey, an extraordinary document came into the hands of Irish and British authorities.1  This 
internal PIRA “Staff Report” revealed that, in reaction to mounting losses within the group 
brought on by successful infiltration by government informants, it would be reorganizing itself 
from its hierarchical, military-like structure to a structure of cells, kept independent from one 
another and only connected to the central leadership through anonymous contacts.2  This 
reorganization was part of a larger strategic change for PIRA:  since the loss of its Northern Irish 
safe havens in 1972, its ability to mount large numbers of attacks had been curtailed, and it had 
lost any hope of driving out the British soldiers through violence alone.  But now with a cellular 
system, it hoped that it could survive for long enough to build up a broad-based popular 
movement in support of its goal.3  The end result would never come to fully meet PIRA’s 
ambitions – but thanks to the reorganization, the group would go on to survive for another 20 
years, until it voluntarily disbanded as a condition for implementing the new Northern Irish 
power-sharing system laid out in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.4 
                                                 
1
 Kevin Kelley. The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA (Dingle, Co. Kerry, 
Ireland: Brandon Book Publishers, Ltd., 1982) 284. 
2
 M.L.R. Smith. Fighting For Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican 
Movement (London: Routledge, 1995) 145. 
3
 Smith, 110, 145-147. 
4
 Brendan O’Brien.The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin, 2nd ed (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1999) 385. 
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In organizing a terrorist group, terrorists face a critical dilemma:  to advance one’s 
political agenda and maintain group cohesion, one must carry out attacks, and to carry out 
attacks there must be communication and coordination between members of the group.  
However, this same communication and coordination increases the risk that the group’s activities 
will be uncovered and disrupted by government authorities.5  How then does a group both 
maximize their effectiveness and minimize their risk?  And as the balance between these two 
requirements varies, how might it affect the organizational structures that terrorist movements 
take?  
This dissertation tests whether conditions in the political environments surrounding 
terrorist groups interact with their organizational structures to affect their ability to carry out 
attacks, mobilize supporters, or simply survive.6  In short, its central question is: are different 
organizational forms “better fits” for the political environments that terrorists are acting under?   
Drawing from the literature of a school of organizational theory known as “contingency 
theory,” this study posits that hierarchical groups, with clearer lines of command and divisions of 
labor, will be more efficient and effective at carrying out attacks, but will also be more 
vulnerable to infiltration and disruption by government authorities.  Meanwhile, cellular groups, 
with small circles of operatives holding flexible roles and which are arranged around central 
leaders who may or may not be linked to other cells, will be less efficient and effective, but more 
difficult to infiltrate or disrupt.  Thus, hierarchical groups that are protected from government 
interference by factors in the political environment will be able to more effectively pursue their 
                                                 
5
 Carlo Morselli, Cynthia Giguère, and Katia Petit, “The Efficiency/Security Trade-Off in 
Criminal Networks,” Social Networks 29 (2007): 144. 
6
 Terrorism is herein defined as per Title 22 of the United States Code:  “…premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”  Source: “Annual Country 
Reports on Terrorism,” Title 22, U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d), 1983. 
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goals than cellular groups; but in conditions where groups are not protected from government 
interference, cellular groups will be better able to survive due to their lower penetrability.  Such 
environmental factors include the availability of a foreign or domestic safe haven – that is, 
terrorist bases inaccessible to the government due to geographic barriers or political autonomy.  
These predicted outcomes are summarized and illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Predicted Effectiveness of Terrorist Groups based on Organizational Structure 
relative to Presence of a Safe Haven 
 Safe Haven No Safe Haven 
Hierarchical Good Fit Bad Fit 
Cellular Bad Fit Good Fit 
 
Methodology and Results 
To test this theory, four historical case studies have been analyzed using three different 
qualitative methodologies.  The four cases selected were the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA) of Northern Ireland, the Red Army Faction (RAF) of West Germany, the Red Brigades 
of Italy, and the Weathermen/Weather Underground of the United States.  In order to control for 
possible intervening variables, and due to the constraints on information about the internal 
organizational behavior of terrorist groups, these four cases are all Western, Marxist groups from 
the late Cold War period.  They do, however, differ according to their respective combinations of 
organizational structure and possession of a safe haven, with PIRA having a hierarchical 
organization and a safe haven, the RAF having a cellular-network structure and a safe haven, the 
  
 
4
Red Brigades having a cellular-network structure and no safe haven, and the Weather 
Underground having a hierarchical structure and no safe haven (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Selected Terrorist Groups by Organizational Structures and Safe Haven Status 
Terrorist Group 
Organizational 
Structure Safe Haven 
Provisional Irish Republican 
Army Hierarchical 
Republic of Ireland, Catholic Enclaves 
in Northern Ireland 
Baader-Meinhof Gang/Red 
Army Faction Cellular/Network East Germany 
Weathermen/Weather 
Underground Hierarchical None 
Red Brigades Cellular/Network None 
 
The three methodologies employed in this dissertation are process-tracing, the 
congruence procedure type-2, and controlled comparison.7  First, process tracing has been used 
to establish that causal linkages do indeed exist between the interaction of organization-type and 
presence of a safe haven (as the independent variable), and group effectiveness (as the dependent 
variable), as well as to uncover possible intervening variables and take into account other real-
world complexities (such as changes in the group’s organizational structure and/or political 
environment).  Second, each individual case has been tested according to the congruence 
                                                 
7
 Stephen Van Evera. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1997) 56-58, 61-63. 
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procedure type 2 in terms of whether variance in its organizational structure (independent 
variable) or presence of a safe haven (condition variable) results in variance on the measures of 
effectiveness (dependent variable).8  And third, with the cases grouped into two dyads that match 
according to the presence of a safe haven (the condition variable) and differ according to the type 
of organizational structure (the independent variable), controlled comparisons have been made 
for whether the cases exhibit the predicted differences in terms of effectiveness in carrying out 
attacks, mobilizing supporters, and survival (dependent variable).9  These two dyads, 
respectively, are PIRA and the RAF, and the Red Brigades and the Weather Underground. 
The results from these analyses show that terrorists groups’ organizational structures do 
indeed interact with their environments to influence their effectiveness.  Of dyad with access to 
safe havens (PIRA and the RAF), both groups demonstrated the same longevity – but PIRA, with 
its hierarchical structure, showed a much greater ability to mobilize supporters and carry out 
attacks.  Meanwhile, of dyad without safe havens (the Red Brigades and the Weather 
Underground), the Red Brigades, with its cellular-network structure, demonstrated greater 
longevity, and a superior ability to mobilize supporters and carry out attacks.  Also, in the 
individual case studies, PIRA and the Weather Underground both responded to a higher risk of 
government intervention by shifting their organizational structures to more cellular forms – while 
the Red Brigades was brought down by the fact that it had responded to higher risk by shifting to 
a more hierarchical form, and the RAF became isolated due to its combined possession of a safe 
haven and inability to mobilize supporters.   
 
                                                 
8
 Van Evera. 61-63. 
9
 A “method of difference” comparison, see Van Evera, 56-58. 
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The Study of Terrorist Organizations: Bringing 
Environment Back In 
Although a series of April 2013 Pew Research surveys showed that concern about 
terrorist attacks among the American public has hit its lowest point since the events of 
September 11, 2001, the most recent available data maintain that the annual number of incidents 
has continued to rise since 2004 (see Figure 3 below).10  And this trend has emerged in spite of a 
general decrease in the frequencies of incidents of both interstate war and civil war over the same 
period.11 
In contrast to the response from the general public, the academic community has 
produced a boom in terrorism research over the past decade – albeit with recurrent criticisms that 
the field of terrorism research remains underdeveloped in a wide variety of ways.12  In the 
literature on the organization of terrorist groups, the vast majority of research has focused simply 
on how a given group is organized – with far less attention paid to why they are organized the 
way they are, to comparisons in organizational forms between groups and over time, or to how 
their organizational form might influence their behavior.  Much too often, when the question has 
been asked as to why a group has a particular organizational structure, it has been brushed away 
                                                 
10
 Pew Research Center, Most Expect ‘Occasional Acts of Terrorism’ in the Future, April 
23, 2013. Online: http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/23/most-expect-occasional-acts-of-
terrorism-in-the-future/  
11
 For data on the decline of interstate war and civil war, see “Figure 3: Global Trends in 
Armed Conflict, 1946-2011” from the Center for Systemic Peace’s Global Conflict Trends: 
http://systemicpeace.org/conflict.htm.   
12
 Joseph K. Young and Michael G. Findley, “Promise and Pitfalls of Terrorism 
Research,” International Studies Review, 13 (2011): 411-414. 
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with a superficial answer unsupported by further investigation (such as by saying that the group’s 
structure was simply a re-creation of the structures of the groups that preceded it).13 
 
Figure 3: Frequency of Terrorism Incidents, 1970-2011 
 
Source: University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
Even the works on terrorist organization that have drawn most extensively on empirical 
evidence – such as Marc Sageman’s Understanding Terror Networks (2004) and Leaderless 
Jihad (2008), and Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger’s studies on Jewish and Palestinian terrorist 
networks in Israel – have tightly limited themselves to dealing only with recent organizational 
forms undertaken by select subsets of terrorist groups.14 
                                                 
13
 Manus I. Midlarsky, Martha Crenshaw, and Fumihiko Yoshida, “Why Violence 
Spreads: The Contagion of International Terrorism,” International Studies Quarterly 24.2 (Jun. 
1980): 263. 
14
 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-
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While restricted to a particular time period (the latter half of the Cold War) and a 
particular region (Western Europe and the United States), this dissertation nevertheless makes a 
unique contribution to the literature on terrorist organizations by treating organizational form as 
a variable rather than fixed phenomenon.  As seen in this study, organizational form is a strategic 
decision taken on the part of a group’s leadership (with at least tacit support of its members), and 
which is subject to alteration as estimates regarding its security and utility change.  Like many 
other such decisions, it affects the group’s ability to achieve its short- to medium-term goals 
(long-term goals such as, say, overthrowing capitalism worldwide, are very unlikely to be 
achieved no matter what organizational form a group takes).   
Furthermore, this dissertation represents a rare effort to apply the ideas of contingency 
theory to international political actors.  Contingency theory claims that, given a community of 
groups in competition, environment will determine organizational structure through natural 
selection – and while it has been employed in the fields of business and public policy, it has been 
little-used for examining political violence, or even non-violent contention.15  While actors in 
conflicts may not find themselves in precisely the same sort of market-based competition as 
firms do, they are in a situation where a failure to adapt can lead to their demise in much more 
literal terms. 
As will be seen in the case studies and the cross-case analyses that follow, the demands 
of contingency theory indeed hold true for terrorist groups – with some groups adapting to their 
                                                                                                                                                             
First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Ami Pedahzur and Arie 
Perliger, “The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective,” Social 
Forces 84.4 (Jun. 2006) 1987-2008; Arie Perliger and Ami Pedahzur, “Social Network Analysis 
in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence,” PS (January 2011) 45-50. 
15
 Danny Miller, “The Genesis of Configuration,” Academy of Management Review 12.4 
(1987, October): 688-689 
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environments to survive and pursue their goals, while others fail to adapt and suffer the 
consequences.   
 
Chapter Structure 
This dissertation is divided into two parts with a combined total of eight chapters.  The 
first part is concerned with the theoretical underpinnings of this study and its methodology.  
Thus, besides providing an introduction, Chapter One examines the research to date on the 
organizational structures of terrorist groups, provides an overview of the academic literature on 
contingency theory, and more thoroughly explains the theory that organizational structure and 
environmental risk interact to determine group effectiveness.  Chapter Two, meanwhile, defines 
and operationalizes this study’s variables, more clearly details its hypotheses, provides greater 
depth on its case selection, and explains the methodologies that have been employed. 
The second part of this dissertation presents its results and conclusions.  Chapters Three 
through Six provide analytical case studies for each of the four terrorist groups under 
examination, with information on their historical backgrounds, their organizational structures, 
their political environments, the interaction of these factors over time, and possible intervening 
variables (Chapter Three examines PIRA, Chapter Four examines the Red Army Faction, 
Chapter Five examines the Red Brigades, and Chapter Six examines the Weather Underground).  
These four, individual cases perform their analyses through process tracing and the congruence 
procedure type-2.  Chapter Seven provides controlled comparisons of the cases, organized into 
two dyads according to the security of their political environments (that is, whether they possess 
safe havens or not) and examined on the measures of their effectiveness.  Finally, Chapter Eight 
summarizes the conclusions of this dissertation, explains their significance for the study of 
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terrorism, explores their policy implications, and provides suggested avenues for further 
research. 
 
Literature & Theory  
While earlier decades saw scattered profiles on the organizational structures of terrorist 
groups, it has only been in the past decade that the subject has come under comparative study – 
and only in the last half-decade that scholars have begun a serious examination of why groups 
assume the structures that they do.  This section will provide an overview of the path of research 
on terrorist organizational structures, charting the field’s transition from attempts to describe a 
universal organizational structure for terrorist groups, to the recognition that structural 
heterogeneity exists across groups; and from the explanation of these structural forms through 
supposition and anecdotal evidence, to their investigation through empirical testing. The section 
will also address the newly emerging research on terrorist group organizational change.  This 
will then be followed by a description of the contingency theory school of organizational theory 
and an explanation of how it can provide an alternative (and empirically-testable) explanation for 
both why terrorist groups assume the organizational structures that they do, and why this 
structure might change over time.   
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Describing the Organization of Terrorist Groups: The 
Hierarchical vs. Cellular-Network Debate 
In regards to how terrorist groups are organized, the initial literature was divided between 
two camps: those who asserted that terrorist groups are hierarchically-organized, and those who 
claimed that terrorist groups consist of cells (whether as individual cells, or as loosely-connected 
networks of cells). 
For example, in Jonathan R. White's Terrorism: An Introduction, 2nd Ed., James Fraser 
and Ian Fulton describe terrorist groups as being organized in pyramidal hierarchies. This 
structure "is divided into four levels. The smallest group is at the top and is responsible for 
command. [It] makes policy and plans while providing general direction.”16 The next largest 
level "contains the active cadre" which "is responsible for carrying out the mission of the 
terrorist organization. Depending on the size of the organization, each terrorist in the cadre may 
have one or more specialties. Other terrorists support each specialty, but the active cadre is the 
striking arm of the terrorist group.”17  Much larger than the active cadre is the body of active 
supporters, "people who work in terrorist organizations serve to keep the terrorist in the field" by 
working to "maintain communication channels, provide safe houses, gather intelligence, and 
ensure that all other logistical needs are met.”18 Finally, below the active supporters is the body 
of passive supporters. Not members of the terrorist group themselves, the passive supporters 
                                                 
16
 Jonathan R. White, Terrorism: An Introduction, 2nd Ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1998) 37. 
17
 White, 37. 
18
 White, 38. 
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"simply represent a favorable element in the political climate" and may aid the terrorist group 
without knowing it.19  
This conception of terrorist group organization was criticized by Wayman Mullins, 
however, in A Sourcebook of Domestic and International Terrorism as both "simplistic" and 
"inaccurate in its description of not only the terrorist organization but bureaucracies in 
general.”20 Mullins writes that not only did Fraser and Fulton err by counting supporters as part 
of the organizational structure (rather than outside of it), but that terrorist organizations are 
"circular structures" with a "leader ... at the center of this arrangement and the members 
surrounding him” – or, in other words, they are cellular.21  In such a cellular system, there is no 
division between operational and support occupations – members spending most of their time in 
support roles must, nevertheless, expect to be called upon for operations – and all members are 
under the direct supervision of the leader, lest the group be penetrated by informants.22  
Furthermore, Mullins writes, leaders are personally involved in operations, work constantly to 
reinforce the members' devotion to group beliefs, maintain control over recruitment and 
members' behavior, and keep the group in close proximity.23  All of this serves to "support rapid 
communications, speedy decision making, constant organizational change, and [the] ability to 
adapt to changing circumstances.”24 
                                                 
19
 White, 38. 
20
 Wayman Mullins, A Sourcebook of Domestic and International Terrorism (Springfield, 
IL: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, Ltd., 1997) 134. 
21
 Mullins, 134. 
22
 Mullins, 137-138. 
23
 Mullins, 135-138. 
24
 Mullins, 134. 
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The cellular view was supported and elaborated by Martha Crenshaw, who describes 
terrorist groups as closed cabals held together through close, mutually-reinforcing personal 
contact:  
Terrorists can only trust each other. The nature of their commitment cuts them off 
from society; they inhabit a closed community that is forsaken only at great cost. 
Isolation and the perception of a hostile environment intensify shared beliefs and 
make faith in the cause imperative. A pattern of mutual reassurance, solidarity, 
and comradeship develops, in which the members of the group reinforce each 
other's self-righteousness, image of a hostile world, and sense of mission. Because 
of the real danger terrorists confront, the strain they live under, and the moral 
conflicts they undergo, they value solidarity. Terrorists are not necessarily people 
who seek 'belonging' or personal integration through ideological commitment; but 
once embarked on the path of terrorism, they desperately need the group. Isolation 
and the need for internal consensus explain how the beliefs and values of a 
terrorist group can be so drastically at odds with those of society at large.25 
 
Crenshaw further argues that this "need for the group" may push the organization to commit 
violent acts, regardless of their perceived utility toward its stated ends: "In fact, the 
organization's leaders may be reluctant to see purpose accomplished and the organization's utility 
ended. They are likely to seek incremental gains sufficient to sustain group morale but not to end 
members' dependence on the organization.”26  
But, while this cellular organization/cult approach may be well suited for explaining 
individual cells or small organizations, it begins to fall apart as Mullins attempts to explain the 
structure of larger groups. Regarding the changes that terrorist groups undergo as they grow, 
Mullins writes that not only will they develop specialized branches in order to gain efficiency 
from divisions of labor, but that their leaders will become removed from day-to-day operations, 
                                                 
25
 Martha Crenshaw, “Causes of Terrorism,” The New Global Terrorism, ed. Charles W. 
Kegley, Jr. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003) 101. 
26
 Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational 
Approaches,” Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988) 22. 
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delegating such decisions to lower-level leaders.27  In other words, after criticizing Fraser and 
Fulton for describing terrorist groups as bureaucratic hierarchies, Mullins essentially states that 
as terrorist groups grow in size and complexity, they turn into bureaucratic hierarchies.   
Anthony Burton (in James White's Terrorism: An Introduction, 2nd Ed.) provides a bit 
more of a compromise between the cellular and hierarchical views by describing large terrorist 
organizations as being composed of compartmentalized cells (both handling operations and 
support services) which, themselves, are arranged in "semiautonomous conglomerations of cells 
with a variety of specialties and a single command structure" called columns that provide support 
to the operational cells.28 But despite their use of cells, the division of labor and layers of 
authority still firmly classify these types of groups as hierarchical organizations (they are, after 
all, vertically- rather than horizontally-integrated).   
However, the idea that large terrorist groups would necessarily be hierarchical finally 
came under a critical challenge in the last decade of the 20th century as the concept of “netwar” 
was developed and promoted by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt of the RAND Corporation.  
Defined as “an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional 
military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related 
doctrine, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age,” one of the various 
phenomena categorized under netwar’s broad umbrella is the use of information technology to 
organize dispersed networks of loosely-connected terrorist cells.29  According to Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, such networks can vary in terms of how they are configured, potentially forming a 
“chain” pattern (in which operatives only know those immediately above and below them), a 
                                                 
27
 Mullins, 143, 153-154. 
28
 White, 38. 
29
 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” Networks and 
Netwars, eds. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001) 6. 
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“star” pattern (in which operatives all report directly to a single, central leader), or an “all-
channel network” (in which all operatives are connected to one another).30  In support of these 
claims that terrorist groups’ organizational structures were being shaped by the rise of netwar, 
Michele Zanini and Sean J.A. Edwards write that in the 1980s and 1990s, the Middle East saw 
the rise of a new generation of terrorist groups (such as Hamas and Hezbollah) that were less 
hierarchical than their predecessors (such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization) and, in 
some cases, fit its model of network-based groups whose organizational structure is flexible, 
characterized by informal ties to other organizations, and held together by shared norms.31 
The idea that terrorist organizations are best characterized as cellular networks gained yet 
more influence following Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  While still 
hierarchical in that it possessed vertical layers of authority and a division of labor among its 
units, the organizational structure of Al Qaeda preceding its ejection from Afghanistan was 
highly diffuse, with local cells tied together into a far-flung international network.  In Terrorism 
in the Twenty-First Century, 3rd Ed, Cindy Combs characterizes Al Qaeda's organization in the 
following way:  
[T]errorism in the al-Qaeda network resembles a warped mirror image of an 
international corporation, in its financial structure with corporate chieftains who 
manage lean, trimmed-down firms and bring in consultants and free1ancers to 
perform specific jobs... In this image, too, [al Qaeda leader Osama] bin Laden is 
much like a terror 'mogul,' a man with the power to approve projects suggested to 
him, who has final veto over the content or timing, but often little to do with the 
project's actual creation. His most important contribution is the money.32 
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Combs then goes on to describe the features of such networking: "It appears in the form of 
shared members, training camps, weaponry, and tactics. It is obvious in the propaganda being 
disseminated by the groups. Perhaps the most obvious linkage, funding, became evident after the 
September 11 attacks.”33  
Following Al Qaeda’s loss of its Afghan safe haven, the organization became even 
looser, characterized in Marc Sageman’s Understanding Terror Networks as a "small-world 
network" of globally dispersed cells and allied groups, with little input from the Al Qaeda central 
leadership who were, then, laying low in Pakistan.34  For Sageman, these terrorist cells (or 
"cliques") make up a “global Salafi jihad” that serves as "nodes connected through links 
[interaction such as "financial support, logistical support, or common planning for operations"], 
connecting them to other more isolated nodes.”35  Key individuals (high-ranking operatives) in 
this network serve as "hubs" that, by being connected to many nodes, provide the means for 
providing a greater degree of inter-node coordination.36 This makes the organization difficult to 
kill as "Unlike a hierarchical network that can be eliminated through decapitation of its 
leadership, a small-world network resists fragmentation because of its dense inter-connectivity. 
A significant fraction of nodes can be randomly removed without much impact on its 
integrity.”37  But it can be successfully crippled by attacking its hubs: "If enough hubs are 
destroyed, the network breaks down into isolated, non-communicating islands of nodes" and, 
thus "incapable of mounting sophisticated large scale operations...”38  Many of Sageman’s 
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assertions have been supported by Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger’s work on suicide attacks 
among Palestinian terrorist groups.  In looking at groups in Nablus, Northern Samaria, Jenin and 
Hebon, Pedahzur and Perliger found that not only were they organized according to a hybrid of 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s chain and star structures; but that the suicide bombings were carried out 
by relatively peripheral nodes (rather than hubs, as the loss of hubs would cripple an 
organization); and that the more hubs a group had, the more attacks it would carry out.39  Further 
support for the characterization of terrorist groups as cellular networks has been provided 
through the work of EUROPOL analyst Efstathios Mainas.  Applying social network analysis 
software to data on an unnamed Islamist terrorist group collected by EUROPOL’s Courter-
Terrorism Unit and Analysis Unit, Mainas found that the group matched the characteristics of a 
small world network in that it was revealed to have “very low density, long geodesic distances 
and high clustering” between its nodes – that is, its cells had little contact with each other and 
high redundancy, with only certain individuals (“bridges”) providing a means for communication 
between them.40  
But while cellular networks have made up the bulk of the research in the more recent 
literature on terrorist organizations, there remain results supporting hierarchy’s role as well.  For 
example, Scott Helfstein notes that documents captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan “display a 
high level of organization and bureaucratization… [with] detailed registries of foreign fighters…, 
resources…, and operating requirements.”41  This has been supported by Jacob Shapiro and 
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David Siegel’s finding that extensive intra-organizational record keeping is a common activity 
among terrorist leaders despite the risk that these records would pose if they to fell into the hands 
of the authorities.42  Using a game-theoretic model, Shapiro and Siegel propose that the purpose 
of this record keeping is to allow the terrorist leaders to calibrate their use of discipline within 
the organization – in other words, to provide them with a sense of whether an operation failed 
due to circumstances beyond an operative’s control or whether it failed due to an operative’s 
incompetence (and thereby help them decide whether to deal out punishment).43  
Meanwhile, Steven J. Brams, Hande Mutlu and Shawn Ling Ramirez have drawn 
attention to hierarchical patterns in the relationships between Al Qaeda operatives.  Taking the 
network behind the 9/11 attacks and arranging it according to whether pairs of operatives had 
one-way influence (i.e. delivered orders from superior to inferior) or had two-way influence (i.e. 
were equals), and by grouping the two-way pairs into “mutual influence sets,” Brams, Mutlu and 
Ramirez found that the network fell into a pyramidal authority structure in which superiors 
delivered orders to layers of inferiors, who in turn delivered orders to those below them.44 
Graham Myres has likewise argued in favor of hierarchy’s importance by noting that a common 
trait among long-lived terrorist groups is that they “have devised a division of labor related to 
financing that is characterized by discreet tasks and differentiated levels of responsibility…. 
because bureaucratic specialization facilitates effective responses to complex and multifaceted 
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organizational activities, ultimately providing the group with flexibility and options.”45  And in 
an analysis of the resources, planning, and preparation that went into Pakistani terrorist group 
Lashkar-e-Taiba’s 2008 attacks on Mumbai, Arabinda Acharya and Sonal Marwah have 
demonstrated that such a sophisticated operation demanded that LeT have a formal, bureaucratic 
structure (and the at least passive support of Pakistan’s authorities).46 
So, which represents the more accurate description of how terrorist groups are organized:  
a rigid, vertical hierarchy or a loose, horizontal network?  The answer, as a growing body of 
literature indicates, is “it varies according to the group.”  In a recent article, Joshua Kilberg has 
argued that the organizational structures of terrorist groups fall into four types:  market, all-
channel, hub-spoke, and bureaucracy.47  In this categorization, market groups are characterized 
by having “no discernable leadership, are not centrally controlled and have no functional 
differentiation.”48  All-channel groups, meanwhile, feature “rapid, dense, multidirectional 
communications” (as described by Arquilla and Ronfeldt) and, to quote Kilberg, “have a leader, 
but there is little hierarchy, no central control or functional differentiation…”49  Hub-spoke 
groups, as in Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s words, feature a ring of units “tied to a central (but not 
hierarchical) node or actor, and must go through that node to communicate and coordinate with 
each other.”50  Additionally, Kilberg notes that they “have a leader and employ functional 
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differentiation but do not have central command and control.”51  As for bureaucracies, they have 
“clear departmental boundaries, clean lines of authority, detailed reporting mechanisms, and 
formal decision making procedures” (as defined via Walter Powell) and “The relationship 
between the agenda-setting leadership and its subordinate units is clearly defined and 
unidirectional.”52 
But while Kilberg’s four-type categorization of terrorist groups is a major improvement 
over the past attempts to declare that all terrorist groups hold one type of structure (or that all 
modern groups hold one type of structure while all past groups held a different type of structure), 
it is not without its problems.  For one thing, as will be addressed in the section below (“A Short 
Note on Terrorist Non-Organizations”), market groups are better understood as being movements 
rather than organizations.  For another, the organizational structures of terrorist groups feature a 
mixture of bureaucratic and cellular-network features, and the degree of this mix can change 
over time.  For example, Vera Eccarius-Kelly has highlighted this both in how the Armed 
Revolutionary Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) are 
organized, and in how their structures have evolved.53  According to Eccarius-Kelly, FARC is 
best described as a “wheel”: a very rigid, hierarchical command and control system at the center 
with operational “spokes” on its edges – and the group has granted these spokes greater 
autonomy in response to changes in its political environment.54  As for the PKK, it is an 
“octopus” with a centralized command structure that, nevertheless, allows a degree of autonomy 
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and redundancy among its operational “tentacles.”55  Additionally, the combination of 
hierarchical and cellular features (and their change over time) will be seen in this dissertation’s 
case histories of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Red Brigades, the Red Army 
Faction, and the Weather Underground. 
Thus, rather than attempt to place terrorist groups into select categories, it is better to 
view them as falling along a continuum in which bureaucratic hierarchies and cells/cellular 
networks represent ideal types – that is, rather than being hierarchical or cellular, groups are 
better understood as being “more hierarchical” or “more cellular.”  And this study will also seek 
to show that, where the groups fall in this spectrum between hierarchy and cellular/networked 
forms (whether they happen to be “more hierarchical” or “more cellular”), is influenced by their 
political environment.   
 
A Short Note on Terrorist Non-Organizations 
Before proceeding to the literature on why terrorist groups adopt their organizational 
structures, an important clarification needs to be made about terrorist groups and about the scope 
of this study.  That clarification is this: the term “terrorist group” is often applied to describe 
communities of people who are not arranged into organizations. 
For example, as detailed in the FBI report Terrorism 2000/2001, the Earth Liberation 
Front describes their form as "an international underground organization consisting of 
autonomous groups of people who carry out direct action according to ELF guidelines."56 More 
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specifically, "the ELF 'operates in groups called cells that may consist of one to many individuals 
working together. Each cell is autonomous not only to the public, but also to one another. This 
secure structure helps to keep activists out of jail and free to continue conducting actions."57  In 
sum, ELF merely consists of a staff at the center that publishes the groups' guidelines, ideology, 
and techniques and an unknown number of strangers who act upon it as they see fit.  
A very similar type of collectivity is reflected in the rise of what Marc Sageman has 
termed the “leaderless jihad.”58  Sageman’s leaderless jihad is made up of individuals and small 
groups who engage in terrorism to support the goals espoused by Al Qaeda, but who are not 
members of Al Qaeda and receive no orders, no training, no financing, and no support from the 
organization. 59 
Neither ELF’s autonomous operatives nor the leaderless jihad can be defined as making 
up organizations or as being parts of organizations.  According to Richard H. Hall, an 
organization is “a collectivity with a relatively identifiable boundary [between members and non-
members], a normative order; ranks of authority, communications systems, and membership 
coordinating systems…”60  As far as these criteria go the ELF’s autonomous operatives and the 
members of the leaderless jihad lack an identifiable boundary and cannot be coordinated or 
controlled by (respectively) the ELF’s founders or Al Qaeda in pursuit of their strategies.  
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Instead, Sageman himself argues that the leaderless jihad is a social movement rather 
than part of the Al Qaeda organization.61  As per Sidney Tarrow’s definition, the ELF’s 
autonomous operatives and the leaderless jihad both qualify as social movements because they 
each collectively challenge the actions of others, express common purposes, draw upon a sense 
of solidarity across a group of individuals, have maintained sustained interaction against their 
political opponents over time, and yet are not “under the control of a single leader or 
organization.”62  As these collectivities are not organizations, and hence do not have 
organizational structures, they are outside the purview of this study.  Hence, all references to 
“terrorist groups” in this work can be considered to be synonymous with “terrorist 
organizations.”   
This is by no means an attempt to disregard the significance of such terrorist social 
movements – for example, in a quantitative analysis using Edward Mickolus' International 
Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) dataset, Kent Layne Oots found that while 
coalitions between terrorist groups were rare, more difficult operations were being undertaken by 
larger groups and coalitions of groups, while more violent operations are being perpetrated by 
coalitions and intermediate-sized groups.63   
Rather, these coalitions of organizations and loosely-affiliated individuals will likely be 
subject to different factors than those that influence single organizations, and will likely have 
different responses, and are best left to another, future study (although I hope that, by adding to 
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the understanding of terrorist organizations that might make up parts of these broader-based 
collectivities, it could aid future efforts at better understanding the collectivities themselves). 
 
Explanations for the Designs of Terrorist Group 
Organizational Structures 
Up until recently, the literature regarding why terrorist groups have the organizational 
structures that they do has been even thinner than the literature on how they are organized – and 
it has been based mainly on supposition, assumption and anecdote rather than on rigorous 
empirical testing.  Fortunately for the study of terrorism, this has begun to change.  Below is a 
summary and evaluation of the three predominant explanations for why terrorist groups have 
their respective organizational structures. 
 
Historical and Cultural Context 
In an early (1980) quantitative study on the occurrence of terrorism, Manus I. Midlarsky, 
Martha Crenshaw and Fumihiko Yoshida found that it was subject to a “contagion effect” in 
which terrorist incidents in one country would be shortly followed by similar incidents in other 
countries.64  While Midlarsky et al. focused more so on tactics than on the groups’ organizational 
structures (very likely due to data constraints), the underpinning of their argument held that 
“wannabe” terrorists studied the practices of foreign campaigns for ideas about their own – and 
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that, while the contagion could be regional in nature (the investigators having examined its 
spread in Latin America), it could also be spread via ideological affinity.65  In particular, they 
claim that Marxist groups in Western Europe were the heirs of a body of advice that began 
accumulating with the Bolshevik Revolution; continued building through the Chinese, Algerian, 
Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions; was informed by the Tupamaros of Uruguay; and was finally 
delivered via a combination of writings by “Revolutionary intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon, 
Abraham Guillen, and Carlos Marighela…” and training at Palestinian-run camps in the Middle 
East.66  This drive to learn from past example is echoed by Bruce Hoffman who, in researching 
the behavior of individual terrorists, concluded that “An almost Darwinian principle of natural 
selection thus seems to affect terrorist organizations, whereby… every new terrorist generation 
learns from its predecessors, becoming smarter, tougher and more difficult to capture or 
eliminate.”67 
In contrast to this “best practices” view and its assumption of a very deliberate, 
entrepreneurial approach to the design of terrorist organizations, the cellular/network perspective 
has argued instead that the structures of these groups follow the lines of the informal social 
connections between their members.  In Leaderless Jihad, Sageman wrote that because terrorists 
need to be able to trust one another, terrorist organizations “are often the extension of natural 
groups of friends and family.”68 Among the groups studied by Pedahzur and Perliger, they found 
that hubs recruited suicide bombers from among their neighbors, friends and family members.69 
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But neither of these explanations can account for the diversity in organizational structures 
seen across terrorist groups.  In a dataset that (among other things) collected information on the 
organizational structures of 228 terrorist groups, the University of Texas, Austin’s Terrorism, 
Insurgencies, and Guerrillas in Education and Research program showed that despite sharing 
goals (such as national independence or Marxist revolution) and time periods, groups still vary 
between hierarchical or network-based (see Figure 4 below).   
 
Figure 4: Numbers of Hierarchical Terrorist Groups and Cellular/Network Terrorist 
Groups According to Decade and Ideology 
Decade and Ideology Hierarchical Groups Network Groups 
1860's Right-Wing 0 1 
1910's Nationalist 1 0 
1920's Nationalist 1 0 
1920's Right-Wing 0 1 
1930's Left-Wing 1 1 
1940's Religious 0 1 
1940's Right-Wing 1 0 
1950's Left-Wing 3 0 
1950's Nationalist 2 2 
1960's Left-Wing 32 8 
1960's Nationalist 9 1 
1960's Right-Wing 3 2 
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1970's Anarchic 1 0 
1970's Anti-American 0 1 
1970's Anti-Cuban 1 0 
1970's Left-Wing 28 9 
1970's Nationalist 11 5 
1970's Religious 1 3 
1970's Right-Wing 12 4 
1980's Anarchic 1 2 
1980's Anti-American 0 1 
1980's Left-Wing 15 4 
1980's Nationalist 3 2 
1980's Religious 6 5 
1980's Right-Wing 6 3 
1990's Anarchic 0 1 
1990's Left-Wing 3 1 
1990's Nationalist 2 0 
1990's Religious 2 3 
1990's Right-Wing 1 2 
2000's Anarchic 1 1 
2000's Left-Wing 0 1 
2000's Nationalist 1 1 
2000's Religious 0 3 
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Source: TIGER Dataset 
Meanwhile, among the groups studied by Pedahzur and Perliger, the structure of the 
Nablus network (a network supported by Hamas rather than being fully independent) differed 
from the structures of the other four local networks in that it more closely fit Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt’s star model rather than that of an all-channel network.70  While each of these 
explanations point to likely influences in determining how terrorist groups are structured, they 
clearly fall short from capturing the full picture.    
 
Technology 
The key argument of the netwar approach to terrorism is that terrorist groups have moved 
toward adopting network structures as a reaction to the changes in information technology that 
have occurred since the end of the 20th century.  Zanini and Edwards argue that advances in areas 
such as personal computers, the Internet, satellite communications, cellular networks, and 
encryption software have greatly enhanced terrorists’ ability to coordinate dispersed cellular 
networks while reducing the ability of authorities to monitor or disrupt their communications.71  
In Understanding Terror Networks, Sageman writes that Al Qaeda’s rapid adoption of satellite 
phones, laptops, email, fax machines, and websites in the 1990s was what allowed it to move 
from operating on a regional basis to operating globally – particularly as it could now control 
cells worldwide while sheltering its central leadership in Afghanistan.72 
However, Sageman also writes about how these technologies later made Al Qaeda 
vulnerable in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, as the United States and allied 
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governments traced and intercepted the group’s cellular and satellite communications, and 
gathered intelligence from captured computers.73  He also writes that, due to the threat of 
infiltration, Al Qaeda still has to rely on personal social connections and face-to-face meetings 
for recruitment.74  Meanwhile, Arquilla and Ronfeldt note the use of older technologies, such as 
couriers, drum codes, and ham radios for maintaining communication between insurgent cells in 
Somalia and Chechnya.75 
The fact is that while technology has undoubtedly made it faster, cheaper, and easier to 
communicate between cells, it is not the reason for establishing a cellular network in the first 
place.  Again, as can be seen in figure 1 above, a significant number of network-based groups 
predate the “information revolution” of the 1990s and 2000s – indeed, with 22 groups, the 1970s 
saw double the number of networked groups than the 1990s and 2000s put together. 
 
Security 
The need for security, on the other hand, makes for a very strong reason why a terrorist 
group would want to adopt a cellular/network structure (although, as will be seen below, it is 
counterbalanced by a loss of coordination and control).   
Bonnie Erickson has made the argument that the primary determinant of the structure of 
secret societies is the amount of risk that their members face from exposure (for example, the 
severity of the legal penalties were their activities uncovered).76  However, Carlo Morselli, 
Synthia Giguère and Katia Petit have argued that as a motivator the avoidance of risk is 
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counterbalanced by the need for efficiency, with efficiency defined as the amount of time spent 
between when a decision is made and when it is carried out.77  Based on a comparison between 
the 9/11 terrorist network and the Caviar network (a Montreal-based drug importation operation) 
Morselli, Giguère, and Petit claim that terrorist groups’ organizational structures reflect an 
emphasis on security at the expense of efficiency, with less communication and coordination 
between their members.78  Scott Helfstein has characterized this dilemma as a tension between 
transaction costs (the expense and risk of relying on actors from outside the group to provide 
services) on one end and contracting and footprint costs on the other (that is, respectively, the 
cost of monitoring operatives and enforcing the group’s rules, and the cost of risking discovery 
as a result of increased communication between members of a group).79 
Using a game theoretic model drawn from both the rational-choice and structuralist 
approaches to organizational theory, Walter Enders and Xuejuan Su (2007) have further explored 
this security-efficiency trade-off.  For example, Enders and Su posit that the chain structure 
described by Arquilla and Ronfeldt offers greater security against infiltration, but presents 
barriers to communication that will lessen the ability of a group to successfully conduct complex 
operations.80  Meanwhile, the star structure enhances a group’s ability to coordinate complex 
operations, but is more vulnerable to infiltration.81  However, with the exception of technology 
(which can work, depending on the technological development, to aid terrorist groups against 
infiltration, to aid government infiltration efforts, to raise the input costs of operations, or to 
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lower them), Enders and Su do not look at how a group’s political environment might push them 
toward increasingly chain-like or star-like structures.82   
This question of how political environment might impact organizational structure through 
affecting organizational security has only very recently begun to be taken up in the study of 
terrorism.  In her study of FARC and the PKK, Eccarius-Kelly notes that both groups employ 
organizational structures that attempt to take into account the different political environments 
that their leadership and operatives are under:  For FARC, the leadership at the center of its 
“wheel” structure is based in its safe haven in the jungles of Colombia’s Meta and Caquetá 
departments, while its “spokes” (regional units) have been afforded greater autonomy in 
response to growing pressure from the Colombian government; for the PKK, its leadership in the 
head of its “octopus” structure is based in the southeastern provinces of Turkey, while its 
“tentacles” (regional branches of operatives) extend into the countries bordering Turkey and 
beyond, moving as they come under pressure from the local authorities.83 
Likewise, in his four-type categorization of terrorist organizational structures, Kilberg 
argues that a combination of external and internal factors drive the decision of which structure a 
group chooses.  Based on a multivariate regression analysis of data on 246 terrorist groups from 
the Global Terrorism Database, Kilberg found that groups were more likely to be bureaucratic in 
countries with capacities to engage in counterterrorism (measured in terms of per capita GDP), in 
countries with low levels of political and civil liberties (according to their Freedom House 
score), and in countries with low political stability (measured in terms of the number of years 
that the polity has held power).84  In addition, groups that targeted “hard targets” (the police and 
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military), groups with narrow goals, nationalist groups, and groups with state sponsorship were 
found to be more likely to be bureaucratic.85  
While Kilberg’s findings support the theory being advanced in this dissertation, his study 
is limited in many ways.  For one, Kilberg’s scheme for coding the terrorist groups into their 
respective four categories is less than clear, giving rise to the risk that groups may have been 
inaccurately coded, and strips them of much of their organizational variance.86  It addition, it 
fails to account for organizational change within groups – which, as this dissertation will show, 
not only occurs but has major implications for the groups and their behavior.  As will also be 
seen in this dissertation, per capita GDP is an exceedingly blunt measure of state 
counterterrorism capacity – while there is no doubt that wealthy states have more resources with 
which to combat terrorism than poor states, a state’s capacity can be seriously impacted by 
factors such as its domestic political environment and the availability of safe havens.  Finally, 
besides noting that groups face a trade-off between security and efficiency, Kilberg provides 
very little theoretical support for why groups choose the structures that they do.87 
For this last question, though – of how the level of security (or perceived level of 
security) might influence the way that founders and/or leaders of a terrorist group structure their 
organization – the branch of organizational theory called “contingency theory” might hold an 
answer. 
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Contingency Theory, Environmental Factors, 
Uncertainty and Organizational Structure  
In his discussion of the "environmental imperative" to organizational theory, Danny 
Miller brings together a number of different schools of thought that emphasize the impact of 
external factors on organizations – but, beyond the source of their factors, they share an 
overarching commonality: a conviction that environment determines organizational structure by 
the power of natural selection.88  This school of thought is better known in business literature as 
“contingency theory” and its reasoning runs as follows: a firm that is ill-adapted to the context in 
which it is operating (the reliability of demand for its product, the technical complexity required, 
its size relative to its competitors, etc.) will be unable to compete effectively with other firms 
and, thus, will be driven out of business – like a species unsuited for its environment, it will be 
unable to "survive."  Or as Henry Mintzberg expresses it in his “extended configuration 
hypothesis”: “effective structuring requires a consistency among the design parameters [that 
make up an organization’s structure] and contingency factors [that make up the context within 
which the organization is acting].”89 For terrorist groups, survival takes a far more literal tack – if 
an organization proves unable to adapt to its environment, governmental authorities will 
dismantle it (or, on rarer occasions, it will be dismantled by other terrorist groups).  
One of the conditions theorized to have an impact on organizational structure is the 
degree of environmental uncertainty that an organization faces. Environmental uncertainty, 
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according to Robert Duncan, is the sum result of the complexity of the environment (defined as 
the number of decision factors multiplied by the square of the number of organizational 
components involved) and its "static-dynamic dimension"": "the degree to which the factors of 
the decision unit's internal and external environment remain basically the same over time or are 
in a continual process of change.”90  
Organizational theorist Tom Bums has argued that uncertainty was the determining factor 
in where a firm placed on a spectrum between a "mechanistic" or an "organismic" type of 
structure.91 Mechanistic organizations fit the standard conception of the formal bureaucracy; 
featuring a division of labor into specialized departments, clear levels of hierarchical authority, 
"vertical communication," and "an insistence on loyalty to the concern and obedience to 
superiors.”92 In contrast, organismic organizations feature "a continual adjustment and 
redefinition of individual tasks and the contributive rather than restrictive nature of specialist 
knowledge is emphasized" – i.e., a fluid structure that may vary from project to project, with 
communication "at any level as required by the process, and a much higher degree of 
commitment to the aims of the organization as a whole…”93  
According to Burns, what led firms to being relatively more mechanistic or more 
organismic was the degree of stability in their given market. Mechanistic firms thrived under 
conditions of stability because "not only could the actual manufacturing processes be routinized, 
mechanized and quickened, but the various management functions also could be broken down 
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into specialisms and routines.”94 However, this type of structure suffers under conditions of 
instability – facing situations that fall out of the routine, they experience difficulty determining 
who will make the critical decisions. They adopt "pathological systems," including the hire of 
outside consultants of ambiguous authority, the overwhelming of executives at the top of the 
hierarchy, the creation of roles or departments that depend upon the perpetuation of 
organizational problems, and the forging of inter-departmental committees that become crippled 
by the departments' competing interests.95 Organismic firms, on the other hand, do not achieve 
the gains in efficiency brought by routinization and specialization, but do adapt readily to the 
uncertain conditions due to their freer flow of information and less rigidly delineated 
responsibility (that is, the fact that the firm's employees are held responsible for its overall 
success rather than the success of specific departments).96 
Michael Tushman and David Nadler have argued that uncertainty's impact on 
organizational structure comes from the information-processing needs of organizations. They 
write that "a critical task of the organization is to facilitate the collection, gathering, and 
processing of information about how different components of the organization are functioning, 
about quality of outputs, and about conditions in external technological and market domains" 
and, thus "a basic function of the organization's structure is to create the most appropriate 
configuration of work units (as well as the linkages between these units) to facilitate the effective 
collection, processing and distribution of information."97  Organizations with organismic 
structures are better able to handle the information- processing demands that come with 
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uncertain environments because: (1) their greater flow of inter-unit communication will "increase 
the opportunity for feedback and error correction and for the synthesis of different points of 
view"; (2) as they are less hierarchical, there is less risk that things will be hampered by a single 
decision-maker becoming overwhelmed; and (3) they "tend to be associated with less formality, 
less attention to rules and regulation, and greater peer involvement in decision making.”98  And, 
yet, the cost of all this communication is that decision-making processes in organismic 
organizations "consume more time, effort, energy, and are less amenable to managerial control" 
– making the process in hierarchical mechanistic organizations more efficient, given lower 
environmental complexity.99  
This hierarchy-stability relationship finds empirical support in a 1958 study by Joan 
Woodward and the Human Relations Research unit at South-East Essex College of Technology.  
Woodward and her team surveyed 100 South-East Essex manufacturing firms on "specific 
features such as the number of levels of authority between top and bottom, the span of control or 
average number of subordinates of supervisors, the clarity or otherwise with which duties are 
defined, the amount of written communication, and the extent of division of functions among 
specialists" – and found that a key determinant of organizational structure was the type of 
technology involved.100  
Specifically, the more predictable the production process – that is, the more routinized, 
mechanized, and easily measurable it was (such as technology used for mass production or 
continuous production of chemicals) – the more formally hierarchical the organization.101  
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Providing further evidence is Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch's 1967 survey of the impact 
of environmental adaptation on the performance six chemical processing firms.  Concentrating 
on organizational subsystems rather than entire organizations, they nevertheless found, among 
other things, "that subsystems tend to develop a degree of formalized [(increasingly 
mechanistic)] structure related to the certainty of their relevant subenvironment.”102  And as 
organizations sought to adapt their subsystems to the conditions of their environments, Lawrence 
and Lorsch reported that, based on executives' own assessment of their company's 
competitiveness in the marketplace, "subsystems in the high-performing organizations were 
achieving differentiation that was more consistent with subenvironmental requirements than 
were subsystems in less effective organizations...”103  Likewise, in a 1979 study of 64 
organizational units of 21 Vancouver, Canada companies, Rosalie Tung found that the amount of 
environmental complexity, the change rate, and the routineness of decision-making – all 
identified as contributors to environmental uncertainty – had statistically significant (<.005) 
influences on departmental structure.104  
Could this stability-hierarchy relationship apply to terrorist groups? Not in strictly the 
same way, of course – not in economic terms – but, in the degree of uncertainty produced by the 
risk they face from dissolution by authorities? 
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Security vs. Insecurity: Contributing Factors 
In the course of examining the strategies pursued by terrorists, Andrew H. Kydd and 
Barbara F. Walter highlight the influence of the perceived risk of government retaliation on 
terrorist strategies: “Terrorist organizations almost always are weaker than the governments they 
target and, as a result, are vulnerable to government retaliation.  The more constrained the 
government is in its use of force, the less costly an attrition strategy is [that is, inflicting high 
costs to convince an enemy to meet one’s demands], and the longer the terrorists can hold out in 
the hopes of achieving their goal.”105   
What, then, might constrain a government’s use of force?  James Fearon and David Laitin 
have argued that, along with unstable and/or inept governments and population size, the rise of 
insurgencies “is favored by rough terrain [and] rebels with local knowledge of the population 
superior to the government’s…” as well as “Foreign base camps, financial support, and 
training…”106  In their research, Fearon and Laitin found that the presence of “mountainous and 
noncontiguous” territory had a statistically significant relationship to the outbreak of civil war.107  
Extending this theory to terrorism, Alberto Abadie likewise found that geographic factors 
contributing to the availability of safe havens (country area, elevation, and fraction of tropical 
area) all were significantly related to the occurrence of terrorism.108   
In addition to Abadie’s conclusions, a 2007 comparative analysis of ungoverned 
territories around the world by researchers for the RAND Corporation found that the territories 
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most conducive to serving as terrorist safe havens were characterized by “the presence of 
extremist groups, supportive social norms among the population, a preexisting state of violence, 
the presence of informed social networks that can be exploited by terrorists, and the presence of 
criminal syndicates that can serve as contractors to terrorist groups.”109  And in yet another 
study, Idean Salehyan has found that the availability of extraterritorial bases to insurgents has a 
significant and positive impact on the duration of internal conflicts.110  Salehyan suggests that the 
possession of an external base increases the cost of retaliation by the targeted state due to the fact 
that an invasion will risk retaliation from the host state, will meet with high governance costs 
afterward, will present a difficult counterinsurgency operation (due to lack of local knowledge), 
and could possibly bring punishment from the international community.111   
The belief that terrorist groups will always benefit from possessing a safe haven is not 
universal, however.  Based on a competing risks model using data on 648 terrorist groups active 
from 1968 to 2006, David Carter concluded that for terrorist groups who received state 
sponsorship with a safe haven, the costs outweighed the benefits:  The possession of state 
sponsorship with a safe haven was not found to significantly decrease their probability of internal 
dissolution (that is, members leaving the cause or for other groups) – while, at the same time, it 
increased their probability of forceful elimination by a state adversary.112  This, Carter argues, is 
because state sponsors might have an incentive to use terrorist groups, but not to protect them – 
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when the price is right, they will provide the group’s adversaries with information that will be 
used to target them.113 
This dissertation, then, examines whether or not the availability of foreign or domestic 
safe havens produces the low risk environment that, in turn, will allow a terrorist groups to adopt 
a more efficient (but less secure) hierarchical organizational structure.  The significance of safe 
havens will be determined both through the analyses of the cases contained in Chapters Three 
through Six, then further examined via controlled comparison in Chapter Seven.  The next 
section will provide further information on this study’s definitions for the factors tested, its 
hypotheses, and the methodologies employed. 
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Chapter 2: Research Design and Methodology 
Theory 
Contingency theory states that, through a process akin to natural selection, the market 
environments in which firms do business shape their organizational structures (as ill-adapted 
firms go out of business or are swallowed by rivals).  Building upon this idea, this dissertation 
will examine whether the political environments in which terrorist groups operate likewise 
determine their organizational structures.    
Based upon the past literature on the organizational structures of terrorist groups, there 
are two basic types of structure:  hierarchies and cellular networks.  Ami Pedahzur and Arie 
Perliger provide the following criteria for distinguishing between them (note that Pedahzur and 
Perliger use the terms “hierarchy” and “network” while, in this study, horizontal networks are 
considered to be the same as cellular groups – the latter term is used because many small terrorist 
groups never extend beyond a single cell):  
• Hierarchical groups are vertically-organized, with clear leaders.  Cellular groups are 
horizontally-organized, with what direction there is provided by “hubs” – individuals 
who are important not due to their formal authority, but due to their connection to a great 
many other individuals.  In cellular groups, there is not a clear distinction between leaders 
and operatives, and even the most important hubs might not know the full extent of their 
organization.114 
• In hierarchical groups, operatives work to fulfill goals handed down from the central 
leadership.  In cellular groups, operatives might carry out orders from a central source, 
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but primarily work to achieve localized goals (such as “to gain territorial control or 
political dominance in a specific region for their network or family”).115 
• Hierarchical and cellular groups each recruit in different ways.  Pedahzur and Perliger 
write that “Conventional hierarchical groups generally initiate recruitment programs, 
select potential candidates, persuade or force them to join, and train them for various 
operations… Horizontal networks [(‘cellular groups’ in this dissertation’s terms)], in 
contrast, are formed through friendships and family relations.”116   
Regarding their capabilities, hierarchical groups – with a pyramidal authority structure 
and a clear division of labor among their members – will be better able to carry out operations in 
pursuit of their strategies thanks to the quicker and easier flow of information between their 
decision-makers and subordinates, and the efficiency provided by their subunits’ specialization.  
But the same clarity of the roles in such an organization, and the volume of interactions required 
to carry out operations, will make it more vulnerable to dissolution, infiltration, and possibly 
decapitation (that is, government agents need only work their way up the pyramid from the 
subordinates to the decision-makers; and can take advantage of the division of labor to 
plant/maintain informants).117  However, if terrorist groups have safe havens from which they 
can operate that prevent (or, at least, restrict) the government from taking actions against them, 
they will be able to take advantage of the benefits of a hierarchical structure without suffering 
from its weaknesses.  These safe havens could be in the form of a single enclave within the 
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borders of the targeted nation-state (protected from government intervention by geographic 
features, local autonomy, or both), an enclave outside the borders of the targeted nation-state 
(protected from government intervention by a sympathetic government, or even simply 
sovereignty’s limitations on transnational law enforcement), or a patchwork of concentrated 
communities of supporters (such as individual neighborhoods, towns, or villages). 
Meanwhile, a group that is organized in a cellular fashion – being a cell of operatives 
based around a central leader without a clear division of labor, or a loose network of such cells – 
is much more limited in its capabilities due to the restricted communication between cells and 
the lack of specialization of its subunits.  However, the direct oversight of a cell by its leader, 
and the limited contact of those leaders with one another, results in an organization that is much 
more difficult for an enemy to dissolve, infiltrate, or decapitate.  Because cellular organizations 
do not rely as heavily on communication between units, and because connections in these 
organization are narrowly restricted to ties between individual hubs (who might only know a few 
other members), they will be better equipped to survive in political environments where safe 
havens are not available; but, when they are available, will not be able to coordinate attacks as 
easily or as well as hierarchical organizations.   
Thus, the organizational structure of a terrorist group is determined by its founders and/or 
leaders’ perception of how high of a risk of government intervention they face, and by their 
calculation of how to best pursue their tactical and strategic aims given this level of risk.  If the 
founders/leaders underestimate the level of risk, and are too reckless in coordinating their 
organizations, their organization will face dissolution by its adversaries.  But if the 
founders/leaders overestimate the level of risk, and act too conservatively, they face the threat of 
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being ineffectual (or, at least, less effectual than they could optimally be) and will fail to 
mobilize supporters. 
 
Qualitative Tests 
Definition and Operationalization of the Variables 
This theory suggests that a “good fit” between a terrorist group’s organizational structure 
and its political environment will occur when a hierarchical group operates an environment with 
a safe haven or when a cellular group operates without a safe haven.  A “bad fit,” meanwhile, 
will occur when a hierarchical group operates without a safe haven or a cellular group operates 
with a safe haven.  
The goodness of fit, then, is determined by the interaction of two factors:  the group’s 
organizational structure (independent variable) and the presence of a safe haven (condition 
variable).  The definitions for these two factors are provided below.  They are followed by the 
definition for the dependent variable, effectiveness. 
 
The Independent Variable:  Organizational Structure 
For the independent variable “organizational structure,” this study uses a definition from 
Peter Blau and cited by Richard H. Hall in Organizations: Structures, Processes, and Outcomes, 
7th Edition: “the distributions, along various lines, of people among social positions that 
influence the role relations among these people.”118  Hall goes on to elaborate that: 
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Organizational structures serve three basic functions.  First and foremost, 
structures are intended to produce organizational outputs and to achieve 
organizational goals...  Second, structures are designed to minimize or at least 
regulate the influence of individual variations on the organization...  Third, 
structures are the settings in which power is exercised…, in which decisions are 
made…, and which organizations’ activities are carried out… 
 
As a factor, terrorist organizational structure is herein considered to have two ideal types: 
hierarchical and cellular/networks.  Based on Pedahzur and Perliger’s definitions above, 
hierarchical organizations are characterized by strong vertical and horizontal differentiation: they 
have distinct layers of decision-making authority and they have a clear division of labor into 
specialized units.  Cellular organizations, on the other hand, have weak vertical and horizontal 
differentiation. 119 
With “hierarchical” and “cellular” being ideal types, though, most real-world terrorist 
groups are posited to fall into a continuum between the two – for example, while they may 
formally have several layers of decision-making authority between their low-ranking operatives 
and their leaders, weak central control might result in decision-making being dominated by the 
lower operatives.  Terrorist groups can also transition from being hierarchical to being cellular 
(and vice versa) over time.   
But while the groups in this study may not be perfectly hierarchical or perfectly cellular-
networked, they do nonetheless come closer to one ideal type or the other at any given time.  By 
comparing the groups, both against one another and against their past selves, according to where 
they lie in the spectrum between the two models, this study highlights general trends between 
how their organizational structures and political environments interact to determine their 
effectiveness.  The organizational structure of each group (and any changes in that structure over 
the course of its history) is discussed in the cases that follow. 
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The Condition Variable:  Presence of a Safe Haven.   
The condition (antecedent) variable “presence of a safe haven” is herein defined as 
whether a group has access to a location in which a it can securely conduct logistical and support 
operations (such as training or bomb-making).  For the sake of this study two types of safe haven 
exist:  domestic safe havens and foreign safe havens.  Domestic safe havens are territories  
within the borders of a targeted nation-state that are under the terrorist group’s control (for 
conflicts based on ethnic, linguistic, or religious polarization, terrorist groups may find shelter 
with sympathetic communities).  Foreign safe havens are non-targeted countries where terrorists 
are able to carry out their logistical and support operations (with or without the host’s 
permission).  The presence or absence of safe havens, and any change in their availability over 
the course of a group’s history, is discussed in the cases that follow. 
 
The Dependent Variable:  Effectiveness and Its Measures 
The dependent variable “effectiveness” is herein defined as the degree to which a terrorist 
group can achieve three basic, universal goals at a low cost in comparison to other terrorist 
groups.  As is discussed further below, these three goals are ensuring the group’s survival, 
accomplishing a high quantity and quality of attacks, and mobilizing supporters.  
The emphasis on these three, largely tactical goals, rather than a group’s strategic goals or 
ultimate goals, constitutes a major limitation on the explanatory power of the effectiveness 
variable, but is necessary in order to facilitate comparison across the groups in this study while 
also providing for cross-group variation.  Were the effectiveness variable based on the 
achievement of the groups’ ultimate, stated goals, the result would be no variation – none of the 
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groups in this study, and very few terrorist groups historically, have achieved their ultimate 
goals.120  Meanwhile, were the effectiveness variable based on the achievement of the groups’ 
strategic goals, this would introduce a wave of new factors that are currently beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, but would be well worth investigation in future research – factors such as the 
breadth or narrowness of a group’s goals, the effect of competing goals within an organization, 
and its leadership’s perception of the reactions of its intended audience and its governmental 
adversaries. 
Furthermore, for the measurement of effectiveness, these three basic goals are being 
examined in terms of their relative achievement (or lack of achievement) by each group relative 
to the others in this dissertation, rather than against a broader, more universal measure of 
effectiveness versus non-effectiveness. Developing such a measure of effectiveness/non-
effectiveness lies outside the scope of this dissertation but, once again, would be a worthy 
question for future study.     
Survival.  Part of the measurement of group survival is the duration of the period from 
the group’s founding until its dissolution (or last attack).  However, this study also measures 
group “health” over time through information such as the numbers of arrests of operatives 
relative to the estimated size of the group, the loss of key personnel and/or subdivisions and their 
impact, and the state of group support and funding.  Finally, the counterterrorism measures that 
resulted in the group’s ultimate demise are examined. 
Quantity and Quality of Attacks.  Besides the numbers of attacks and casualties (again, 
relative to estimated group strength), this variable also takes into consideration the organizational 
                                                 
120
 See Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and 
Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009) 73-93; and 
Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security, 33.2 (Fall 2006) 51. 
  
 
48
coordination and logistical complexity behind different types of operations (for example: the fact 
that hijacking an airliner demands far greater coordination than planting bombs in public areas), 
and the contribution of these operations toward achieving the group’s goals.  Representative 
operations have been detailed to show the extent of each group’s capabilities at different times.   
Mobilization.  This variable takes into consideration both the terrorist group’s success in 
recruiting new operatives and in its persuasion of others to support it in both legal and illegal 
ways (examples of the former being public demonstrations or praise by radical media sources, 
examples of the latter being the provision of resources or shelter from the authorities).  Where 
possible, information is provided in the cases on group size, the rate of recruitment, opinion 
surveys, public events, and other sources of information that provide some measure of the level 
of support that the group enjoys among its intended population. 
 
Control Variable: Historical and Cultural Context 
As noted above in the review of the past literature on the organizational structures of 
terrorist groups, one of the posited explanations for why groups adopt the structures that they do 
is due to their ideological, strategic, and cultural roots.  This study controls for this variable 
through selecting cases that share a common period in history and ideological basis, and similar 
cultural backgrounds. 
 
Control Variable: Technological Change 
Again, as noted above in the review of the past literature on the organizational structures 
of terrorist groups, another posited explanations for why groups adopt the structures that they do 
is as a reaction to technological developments.  This study controls for this variable through 
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selecting cases that share a common period in history, when the groups examined had access to 
the same technologies. 
 
Control Variable: Target Government 
A variable that could influence the survival of terrorist groups and their ability to carry 
out attacks, persuade an audience, and achieve their goals is the type of government that they are 
targeting.  Governments in poor countries, for example, will not have the same resources for 
counterterrorism as those in wealthy countries.  And, compared to authoritarian states, 
democracies will be limited in both the extent of their repressive measures and their ability to 
censor terrorist messages.  This study controls for this variable through selecting cases for which 
the target countries held similar types of government and similar levels of economic 
development. 
 
Control Variable: Foreign Support 
Finally, another variable that could affect group survival and the ability to carry out 
attacks is access to support from foreign governments.  This study controls for this variable 
through selecting cases in which all of the terrorist groups received or were alleged to have 
received foreign support. 
 
Qualitative Methods 
This dissertation employs three different (but complementary) approaches to qualitative 
research via four case studies.   
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First, each case has been subjected to the process tracing method of investigation.  
Through this method, the cases search for causal linkages that demonstrate not only that the 
terrorist group’s organizational structure interacts with its risk of government interference, but 
also that this interaction impacts its effectiveness.121  Causal linkages include evidence such as 
quotes from terrorist group members and counterterrorism officials indicating the perception that 
the factors were connected, the occurrence of actions that could be expected to accompany such 
interaction, and a timeline of events that conforms to the expected direction of causality. 
Second, each individual case has been tested according to the congruence procedure type 
2 – that is, they were examined to see whether variance in the independent variable 
(organizational structure) or condition variable (presence of a safe haven) results in variance on 
the dependent variable (the measures of effectiveness).122  In addition, they were examined for 
whether changes in the risk of government interference might influence the organizational 
structures that groups take (that is, whether the risk of government interference might serve as an 
independent variable to organizational structure’s dependent variable). 
Third, the case studies were grouped into two dyads that match according to the condition 
variable (the presence of a safe haven) and differ according to the independent variable (the type 
of organizational structure).  A controlled comparison (“method of difference approach”) was 
then conducted to examine whether the two cases differ on their dependent variables (the 
measures of effectiveness).123  In other words, the two dyads under comparison were: (1) a pair 
of groups with access to safe havens, in which one case features a hierarchical structure and the 
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other features a cellular structure; and (2) a pair of groups without access to safe havens, in 
which one case features a hierarchical structure and the other features a cellular structure. 
 
Case Selection 
For these tests, four cases were used:  the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) of 
Northern Ireland, the Baader-Meinhof/Red Army Faction (RAF) of Germany, the Red Brigades 
of Italy, and the Weathermen/Weather Underground of the United States.   
 
Dyad I (Presence of Safe Havens): PIRA and RAF 
In the first dyad, both the PIRA and the RAF were known to have possessed safe havens.  
For the PIRA, shelter from British authorities could be found in the Republic of Ireland (due to 
barriers presented by sovereignty and public opinion rather than deliberate government support) 
and in sympathetic Catholic communities in Northern Ireland.124  For the RAF, shelter from 
West German authorities could be found in East Germany.125  
However, the two differed substantially in terms of organizational structure.  The PIRA 
possessed a hierarchical structure, with the group headed by a 12-member Executive elected by a 
General Army Convention made up of delegates from lower-level units throughout the 
organization.126  This Executive, in turn, selected a 7-member Army Council that oversaw day-
to-day decision-making and chose a Chief of Staff who was in charge of the PIRA’s General 
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Headquarters (GHQ).127  The GHQ coordinated a number of the organization’s logistical 
activities, such as intelligence, finance, and publicity.128  Beneath the GHQ (following a 1977 
reorganization), the PIRA divided into Northern and Southern Commands, with the North 
overseeing operations in Northern Ireland and the South overseeing international operations and 
support operations in the Republic of Ireland.129  Finally, under these two Commands was a 
combination of local brigades and, again after 1977, Active Service Units (attack cells).130   
The Red Army Faction, on the other hand, had a cellular network structure, having begun 
as individual cells (the original Baader-Meinhof Gang, The Socialist Patients Collective, and 
members of the Movement 2nd June), and later becoming organized into loosely-connected attack 
cells called “commandos” that were supported logistically by a diffuse network of sympathizers 
(as well as East German intelligence).131 
 
Dyad II (Absence of Safe Havens): Red Brigades and Weather Underground 
In the second dyad, the Red Brigades and the Weather Underground were not known to 
have possessed safe havens. 
Regarding organizational structure, the Red Brigades possessed a cellular network 
structure made up of autonomous units called “columns” that were divided up by locality (that is, 
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they were based in Trento, Reggio Emilia, Milan, Turin, etc.).132  As the organization grew, the 
leaders of these columns formed a series of horizontal bodies that served to coordinate activities 
between them, including the handling of logistics, propaganda, and forging a common strategy 
(this last body was called the Strategic Direction and was in charge of selecting the Red 
Brigades’ Executive Council, which oversaw the coordination of strategy on a day-to-day 
basis).133  In addition, with the growth of the organization, the columns transitioned from being 
cells of operatives themselves to becoming hubs that each controlled a number of nodes (called 
“brigades”) in their location.134 
The Weathermen/Weather Underground, on the other hand, had a hierarchical structure 
in that a centralized leadership (called “The Weatherbureau”) commanded cells (“collectives”) of 
one to a dozen operatives that were distributed across a number of major American cities.135  As 
the case demonstrates below, the Weather Underground leadership soon recognized the extreme 
vulnerability of this structure and shifted to a cellular-network.136 
Figure 5: Case Studies 
Terrorist Group 
Organizational 
Structure Safe Haven 
Provisional Irish Republican 
Army Hierarchical 
Republic of Ireland, Catholic Enclaves 
in Northern Ireland 
Baader-Meinhof Gang/Red Cellular/Network East Germany 
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Army Faction 
Weathermen/Weather 
Underground Hierarchical None 
Red Brigades Cellular/Network None 
 
Controlled Variables and Data Availability 
These groups have been chosen not just for their differences on the independent and 
condition variables, however.  As all four groups arose from the same historical context 
(originating from the international student protest movements of 1967-1968), share the same 
ideological affinity (Marxist-Leninist), and came from Western liberal democratic cultures, their 
similarities provide some control over possible intervening factors (such as technology and 
historical and cultural context).  In addition, all four groups targeted economically developed, 
liberal democratic governments, and received (or were alleged to have received) some degree of 
foreign support – factors that could impact their survival and effectiveness.137  
In addition, the gap in time between these groups’ formation and the present has resulted 
in a rich body of data sources from which their organizational behavior can be analyzed.  This 
includes intelligence reports, historical records, journalistic investigations, court records, 
government documents, biographies, datasets, and even former members who could be available 
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for interviewing.  Given that terrorist groups are highly secretive, and that information about 
their internal structures is often jealously guarded (both by the groups and by their adversaries), 
the value of these sources cannot be overstated. 
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Hypotheses To Be Tested 
H1: Given the non-presence of a safe haven, a cellular/network group will be 
more successful at surviving than a hierarchical group. 
Due to the direct oversight of cells by their leaders and the restricted connections between 
cells, which work to prevent government informers from penetrating the group and restrict the 
amount of information that can be gained through the interrogation of captured operatives, 
cellular-network groups will be better suited to survive in the event that they do not possess a 
safe haven.  In this dissertation, this hypothesis has been tested through the controlled 
comparison method. 
 
H2:  Given the presence of a safe haven, a hierarchical group will be able to 
carry out a higher quantity and quality of attacks than a cellular/network group. 
Due to hierarchies’ advantages in terms of command and control and in terms of the 
division of labor, hierarchical groups are expected to be able to carry out more attacks and more 
sophisticated attacks than cellular/network groups when they possess a safe haven.  In this 
dissertation, this hypothesis has been tested through the controlled comparison method. 
 
H3:  Given the presence of a safe haven, a hierarchical group will be better able 
to mobilize supporters than a cellular/network group.  
In the mobilization of supporters, hierarchies will again be able to draw upon their 
advantages in coordinating the group members behind a common – but they will also be able to 
more easily support specialized units in charge of propaganda and recruitment.  Even more 
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importantly, as the hierarchical group’s members are not arranged into tightly compartmentalized 
cells, they are better able to interact with potential followers – this both allows them to bring 
social contacts into the group and allows the group to tailor its message to its intended audience.  
In this dissertation, this hypothesis has been tested through the controlled comparison method. 
 
H4: A decrease in the goodness of fit between a terrorist group’s organizational 
structure and the presence of a safe haven negatively affect its ability to survive. 
As a terrorist group moves from a “good fit” between organizational structure and the 
presence of a safe haven (whether through, for example, a process of organizational change or 
the loss the loss of a safe haven) toward a “bad fit,” or vice versa, its ability to survive will 
change correspondingly (as seen in indicators such as the numbers of operatives killed or 
arrested, or the number of infiltrators caught).  In this dissertation, this hypothesis has been tested 
through the congruence procedure type-2 method. 
 
H5: A decrease in the goodness of fit between a terrorist group’s organizational 
structure and the presence of a safe haven will negatively affect the quantity and 
quality of attacks that it is able to carry out. 
Likewise, as a terrorist group moves from a “good fit” between organizational structure 
and the presence of a safe haven toward a “bad fit,” or vice versa, the quantity and quality of 
attacks will change correspondingly (whether, for example, through changes in group 
coordination or a change in the amount of disruption by authorities).  In this dissertation, this 
hypothesis has been tested through the congruence procedure type-2 method. 
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H6: A decrease in the goodness of fit between a terrorist group’s organizational 
structure and the presence of a safe haven will negatively affect its ability to 
persuade its target audience(s). 
As a terrorist group moves from a “good fit” between organizational structure and the 
presence of a safe haven toward a “bad fit,” or vice versa, and its ability to carry out attacks 
and/or survive changes, its credibility with its target audience(s) will be influenced.  As this 
credibility increases, the group will become more persuasive; as it decreases, the group will be 
come less so.  In this dissertation, this hypothesis has been tested through the congruence 
procedure type-2 method. 
Throughout the individual cases to follow, process tracing will be employed (along the 
congruence type-2 procedure) to examine whether causal linkages indeed exist between the 
interaction of a group’s organizational and political environment, on the one hand, and its 
effectiveness on the other.  
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Chapter 3:  The Provisional Irish Republican Army 
Chapter Objective and Structure 
The objective for this chapter will be to test the following hypothesis through the method 
of process tracing:  The better the fit between organizational structure and the presence of a safe 
haven, the longer a terrorist group can be expected to survive. 
Again, regarding the “goodness of fit” between the type of organizational structure and 
the presence of a safe haven, hierarchical terrorist groups are predicted to be better suited to 
conditions where the group can rely on the protection of foreign and/or domestic safe havens.  
This is because their centralized, bureaucratic command and control systems provide advantages 
in terms of attack coordination, recruitment, and the implementation of strategy; but make them 
vulnerable to state intervention.  Meanwhile, cellular terrorist groups are predicted to be better 
suited to conditions where the group does not possess a foreign or domestic safe haven.  This is 
because, despite a decreased ability to coordinate attacks, recruit, or implement strategy, the 
restriction on operatives’ knowledge about the leadership and its plans provides protection from 
state intervention. 
This case, then, employs process tracing as a means of determining whether the 
“goodness of fit” between a group’s organizational structure and its possession of safe havens 
does indeed affect its survival.  Given that the determinants of group organizational structure and 
survival might potentially be subject to alternative explanations, intervening variables, recursive 
processes and other complications, the method of process tracing is particularly well-suited to 
testing these hypotheses due to its ability to incrementally search for the existence of proposed 
causal linkages between the independent and dependent variables.  It also affords for the 
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examination of whether changes in the value of the independent variable lead to corresponding 
changes in the dependent variable.  
Toward this end, the case will employ the following structure:  First, it will present an 
analysis of how closely the history of the Provisional Irish Republican Army corresponds to the 
outcome predicted by the hypothesis.  Second, in order to contextualize the case, it will feature a 
brief treatment of the history and goals of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.  Third, it will 
describe the organizational structure of the Provisional IRA.  As the Provisional IRA’s structure 
changed following an official overhaul in 1977, “before” and “after” descriptions will be 
provided (that is, a description of the group’s organizational structure from 1969 to 1976 and a 
description of its structure from 1977 to 1997).  Fourth, the case will include a description of the 
degree to which safe havens were available to the Provisional IRA (as will be seen in the cases 
below, the relative security of these safe havens was subject to variance over time).  Given that 
the Provisional IRA had access to safe havens in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland at points in its history, each will be treated separately.  Fifth, possible intervening 
variables will be addressed and evaluated.  Finally, the case will conclude with a summation of 
its findings and notes on its implications for the cases to follow. 
 
Analytical Overview 
The general pattern of the history of the Provisional IRA does appear to match the results 
predicted for a “good fit” scenario between a hierarchical organizational structure and a secure 
operating environment (that is, the possession of a safe haven).  As predicted, the Provisional 
IRA was able to take advantage of the benefits of maintaining a hierarchically-structured 
organization (that is, it was able to both efficiently carry out operations and to maintain sufficient 
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control over its operatives to keep their actions in line with the organization’s strategy) while it 
possessed safe havens (the safe havens reduced the threat of infiltration and disruption by the 
authorities).  
The strongest evidence in this case for supporting this conclusion comes from the 
sequence of events.  In 1970-1972, the Provisional IRA had a hierarchical structure (based on the 
organization of a conventional military), and was able to take advantage of both the “no go” 
areas in Northern Ireland and the lack of cooperation between the governments of Great Britain 
and the Republic of Ireland.138  At this time, it carried out its highest volume of attacks and 
accomplished (or helped to accomplish) two of its strategic goals: the replacement of the 
Northern Irish parliament with direct rule from London, and a meeting for negotiations with the 
British authorities.139  During the 1972-1977 period, however, it had a hierarchical structure, but 
had lost some of the security of its safe havens: “Operation Motorman” had cleared out the “no 
go” areas, while the Republic of Ireland undertook a crackdown on the Provisional IRA through 
new counterterrorist legislation and increased enforcement.140  The result was increased losses 
for the Provisional IRA and a halt in its strategic progress.141  The 1977 reorganization, then, was 
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an adjustment toward achieving a better fit:  the Provisional IRA adopted an organizational 
structure that was more cellular/network-oriented (if still very hierarchical in vertical terms) to 
match its less secure environment.142  The trade-offs in this adjustment were, again, as predicted:  
the Provisional IRA saw reduced losses, but at the cost of a lower number of attacks, more 
limited effectiveness, and a reduction in central control.143  The following sections will provide 
further information regarding the Provisional IRA’s origins and aims, its organizational structure 
(pre- and post-1977), and the shifting conditions in its safe havens. 
 
Background 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) was a primarily national-liberation-driven 
terrorist group, which also adhered to leftist ideological beliefs (albeit to varying degrees 
throughout its history) and had an unofficial (but undeniable) role in Northern Ireland’s sectarian 
religious conflict.  Its goal was to achieve the secession of the province of Northern Ireland from 
the United Kingdom and unite it with the rest of Ireland under a democratic socialist system of 
government.144  Additionally, contrary to the organization’s policy and its leaders’ will, many of 
the members were chiefly driven by a desire to protect and avenge the Catholic community of 
Northern Ireland, seen as oppressed by the Northern authorities and threatened by Protestant 
paramilitary groups.  Active from 1969 to 1997 (and officially renouncing violence in 2005), the 
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organization was one of the longest-lived and deadliest groups of the Cold War period, estimated 
by Brendan O’Brien to have been responsible for approximately 1,776 deaths in the course of the 
conflict in Northern Ireland.145 
While the tradition of Irish nationalist terrorist groups dates back to the formation of the 
Irish Republican Brotherhood in the 19th century, the process leading to the creation of the 
Provisional IRA can be more clearly traced to the 1919-1921 Irish War of Independence.  Facing 
a British military that was far superior in terms of its conventional warfare capability, the IRA 
was organized as a guerrilla army that focused on hit and run tactics, and attacking Britain’s 
intelligence network in Ireland.146  (It is notable that, given these historical circumstances, the 
IRA began with a hierarchical organizational structure mirroring its adversary, the British 
army.147) When the war ended in 1921, with the (predominantly Catholic and pro-independence) 
southern 26 counties of Ireland being given de facto independence as the Irish Free State and the 
(predominantly Protestant and anti-independence) northern six counties of Ireland being retained 
within the United Kingdom as Northern Ireland, the IRA rejected this outcome and declared war 
on the forces of the newly created Free State.148  In the Irish Civil War of 1922-1923, the IRA 
was defeated (albeit without formally surrendering) and became an underground organization.149  
From the 1920s and 1930s on, the IRA declined considerably in terms of membership and 
operations, being declared illegal by the government of Ireland in 1936, and being hit by a 
serious crackdown in 1940 (following a series of bombings in Britain).150  Also starting in the 
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mid-1920s, the IRA became increasingly influenced by socialist thinking (although this remained 
controversial within the organization), eventually in the 1960s adopting a neo-Marxist view that 
Ireland was trapped in a “neo-colonial” relationship with Britain and thus could only become 
truly free through the adoption of a state-centric economy.151 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the IRA staged some ineffectual attacks, questioned the 
degree to which it should adopt socialist beliefs, and bickered over whether to abandon its policy 
of “abstentionism” (the refusal to participate in the state’s political institutions – such as being 
elected and serving in the Irish parliament).152  The political environment was to change 
considerably, however, in 1968.  In Northern Ireland, a civil rights movement had emerged to 
protest provincial laws that discriminated against Catholics in terms of jobs, housing, and 
suffrage.  But on October 5, 1968, a peaceful march by the demonstrators in Derry was blocked, 
and then attacked with batons by members of Northern Ireland’s Royal Ulster Constabulary, 
resulting in 50 hospitalizations – all captured on television and leading to two days of rioting.153  
More demonstrations would come under attack by police and loyalist paramilitaries in the 
months ahead, resulting in more rioting and an outpouring of sectarian violence. 
In the South, the IRA found itself badly split over how to respond to the situation in the 
North.  On one hand, the organization’s official doctrine held that engaging in sectarian conflict 
would undermine its efforts to achieve a united Ireland; not to mention that its leadership was 
working toward abandoning the use of force and engaging in electoral politics.  On the other 
hand, many of the members felt that they could not stand idly by while the Northern authorities 
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allowed Protestant gangs to attack Catholic neighborhoods.  Finally, an Army Convention in 
December 1969 over whether to end the IRA’s abstention policy led to a split between the 
dissenters and the leadership (this split became official a month later at the Sinn Féin party 
convention in Dublin).  These dissenters dubbed their organization “the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army,” while the remainder of the IRA became “the Official Irish Republican 
Army.” 
The Provisional IRA mounted an effective defense of the Catholic neighborhoods of the 
North – providing it with safe havens that, while less secure as the conflict wore on, would 
nevertheless prove enduring assets throughout the conflict.  Once established in these 
neighborhoods, the Provisional IRA soon went on the offensive – targeting commercial centers, 
police, government officials, and the British army through shootings and bombings (its members 
also engaged in revenge killings against Protestants, although this was officially forbidden by the 
leadership).154  In 1972, during what was to be the bloodiest year in the conflict, the instability 
reached such an extreme level that the British government disbanded Northern Ireland’s 
parliament and instituted direct rule from Westminster.155  At this time, the Provisional IRA 
declared a ceasefire and met with representatives from Great Britain, but no grounds for 
compromise could be found.156  Not long after, a major British military operation drove the 
Provisional IRA out of many of its safe havens, severely reducing its capabilities.  Still the 
conflict continued and another attempt at talks was made in 1975, but once again, no progress 
could be made.   
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Facing mounting arrests, a high attrition rate, and a lack of progress toward its goals, the 
Provisional IRA underwent reorganization and a major shift in its strategy in 1977, adopting a 
more cellular-based structure and putting more emphasis on long-term popular mobilization.157  
And while some effects of this change were immediate (such as a decline in the number of 
operatives arrested), it only truly began to come to fruition with the hunger strikes of 1981.158  
Imprisoned members of the Provisional IRA began starving themselves to death to protest the 
British government’s decision to strip them of their special status as political prisoners – 
resulting in a surprise boost in public support for the republican cause in both Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland.159  This support would falter as the 1980s continued, due to the 
unpopularity of the Provisional IRA’s attacks, but it had a lasting effect in that it convinced key 
members of the group’s leadership that if it were to achieve its goals, the Provisional IRA had to 
abandon abstentionism and allow its elected representatives (from its political wing, Provisional 
Sinn Féin) to serve in the British and Irish parliaments – which it did, after some internal 
conflict, in 1986.160  Meanwhile, the Provisional IRA had begun to receive funding and massive 
shipments of weapons from Libyan dictator Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi.161  At the same time, 
though, the organization faced much stiffer opposition due to a combination of dramatically 
improved cooperation between the British and Irish governments, tougher British 
counterterrorism tactics, and violence from loyalist paramilitary groups.162  Once again, an 
attempt was made in 1988 to engage in talks – this time through contacts between Sinn Féin 
president Gerry Adams and John Hume of the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP – the 
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largest republican party in Northern Ireland, and the nonviolent alternative to Sinn Féin).  But, 
again, this effort did not succeed.163 
It would not be until the beginning of the 1990s that progress would finally start to be 
made toward getting the Provisional IRA to abandon violence and pursue its goals from within 
the confines of the Irish, Northern Irish, and British political systems.  As the British government 
conducted talks between the major unionist and republican parties (to the deliberate exclusion of 
Sinn Féin), the Provisional IRA realized that it risked being left out of the negotiations that 
would shape the future of Northern Ireland’s political system.164  Thus, in 1992, the organization 
began making peace overtures; and, in 1993, again reached out to SDLP head John Hume.165  
Hume brought Adams and the Provisional IRA into negotiations with the British and Irish 
governments and, after lengthy talks, the organization declared a ceasefire in 1994.166  Facilitated 
by the United States government via US Senator George Mitchell, progress toward a peace 
settlement would continue until 1996, when the Provisional IRA briefly called an end to the 
ceasefire and staged attacks in response to a report prepared by Mitchell calling for the 
decommissioning of all paramilitary forces as one of the requirements of a Northern Ireland 
peace agreement.167  The Provisional IRA was, however, persuaded by a combination of internal 
voices (such as Adams) and external actors (the governments and republican parties involved) to 
return to the table – leading to a fourth and final ceasefire in 1997.168  The negotiations that 
followed produced the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, bringing with it a new power-sharing 
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system for Northern Ireland, the decommissioning of most of its paramilitary organizations, and, 
in 2005, the official end of the Provisional IRA’s armed campaign.169 
 
Organizational Structure  
1969-1976 
Following its split with the Official IRA, the Provisional IRA adopted its predecessor’s 
organizational structure: a hierarchically-ranked command structure, with operational units 
divided according to geographic location – a structure that dated back to the 1919-1921 Irish 
War of Independence, and was itself based on the organization of the British army.170 
In theory, the highest authority in the Provisional IRA command structure was the Army 
Convention, a body made up of delegates from each of the local operational units, that was to 
convene every other year to elect the organization’s Army Executive (in reality, the Convention 
was only assembled in 1969, 1970, and 1986 due to the risk of apprehension by the 
authorities).171  Originally created as the (pre-division) IRA’s top decision-making body, 
political infighting in the mid-1920’s reduced the Army Executive to a 12-member advisory 
group that, in turn, elected the organization’s actual leadership:  the Army Council.172   
The Army Council was itself made up of seven members, who were the most influential 
O/Cs (Officers in Command) out of the local operational units.173  The Council would then 
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choose a Chief of Staff to serve as the organization’s chief executive officer, to be supported by 
the staff of the Provisional IRA’s General Headquarters (GHQ) based in Dublin.174  According to 
Brendan O’Brien, this staff was made up of “eight departments, comprising the Quartermaster, 
and Directors of Engineering, Publicity, Operations, Finance, Intelligence, Security, and 
Training.”175 
Beneath this command structure were the operational units, divided into territorially-
based brigades, battalions, and companies. (Note that while the traditional British military 
structure dictates that brigades are composed of battalions, which themselves are composed of 
companies, the IRA structure was less formal, with battalions and companies sometimes existing 
independent of brigades.  On some occasions, whether a unit was termed a “brigade,” 
“battalion,” or “company” might depend on how many members it had, rather than who it 
reported to.)176  Kevin Kelley provides an illustrative example in his description of the 
composition of the Belfast Brigade, circa 1970: 
The Belfast Brigade consisted of three separate battalions, each of which included 
several companies.  The battalions were organized according to geographical area, 
with the First Battalion, Belfast Brigade, Provisional IRA, encompassing the 
Upper Falls neighbourhood, the Ballymurphy housing project and the outlying 
section of west Belfast around the Glen and Falls Roads known as Andersontown.  
The Second Battalion operated in a sector closer to the city centre – the Lower 
Falls and Clonard, both of which were densely populated neighbourhoods with 
street after street of terraced houses.  The 7,000-resident Divis Flats project, a 
collection of high-rise apartment blocks and some multi-family houses, also fell 
within the area of operations for the Second Battalion.  The Provos’ Third 
Battalion in the city covered nationalist neighbourhoods that were not included in 
either of the other two battalions’ jurisdiction.  Isolated and vulnerable Catholic 
communities, like the Ardoyne in north Belfast and the Short Strand in the 
overwhelmingly Protestant eastern half of the city, were the responsibility of the 
Third Battalion.177 
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These battalions held a mix of active operatives (“volunteers”) and reserve members 
(“auxiliaries”) who were available for lesser tasks and neighborhood defense.178  Beneath the 
battalion-level, each company was composed of 10-30 operatives.179 
This organizational structure, with its Dublin-based leadership and military-style 
groupings of the operational units, served through the most violent years of the Provisional 
IRA’s existence, as well as the collapse of Northern Ireland’s parliament in 1972 and two rounds 
of talks with officials from the British government (in 1972 and 1975).180  And, yet, the 
diminishing security of its safe havens in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
forced the Provisional IRA to make major changes to its organizational structure and general 
strategy in 1977 in order to avoid defeat by the British authorities.  
 
1977-1997 
In 1977, with the arrest of Chief of Staff Seamus Twomey, Irish authorities came into 
possession of an internal GHQ document called the Staff Report that detailed a wide-ranging 
structural reorganization and strategic reorientation of the Provisional IRA.181  In terms of 
organizational structure, the Staff Report called for two major changes: the creation of distinct 
Northern and Southern Commands; and the replacement of the geographically-divided, military-
style brigade/battalion/company hierarchy with a more cellular, functionally-divided system of 
Active Service Units (ASUs). 
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Placed beneath the Army Council, but above the operational units in terms of the 
Provisional IRA’s hierarchy, the Northern and Southern Commands represented a shift away 
from the control of the Dublin-based GHQ and toward greater autonomy for the O/Cs based in 
Northern Ireland.  With units in 21 counties across the Republic of Ireland (in particular, those 
based in Dublin), the Southern Command would provide logistical support; while the Northern 
Command, with units in the 11 counties of Northern Ireland would be primarily in charge of 
carrying out attacks.182  Meanwhile, operations outside of Northern Ireland or the Republic of 
Ireland (such as in the rest of Britain or Continental Europe) would be mainly directed by the 
GHQ itself using operatives from either Command and/or local personnel.183 
Regarding the ASUs, Kelley writes that the Staff Report called for “three- or four- person 
units specializing in a particular type of operation.  Intelligence-gathering, sniping, bombing, 
executions and robberies, were among the specific tasks to be performed by the cells.”184  
O’Brien, however, notes that ASUs tended to have five to eight members, and occasionally 
overlap in membership.185  Regardless, the structure of the ASU was a direct response to the 
success of the British government in infiltrating the Provisional IRA’s ranks and in interrogating 
its members.  For the sake of organizational security, each ASU cell was to have only one 
member who was in contact with the rest of the organization, and the cells were only permitted 
to have access to weapons on a short-term basis to prevent them from undertaking unauthorized 
operations (particularly, purely sectarian revenge attacks).186  Kelley further notes, though, that 
as of 1983 (the time of writing), the ASU system remained both controversial in the organization 
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and less than impenetrable.  For one thing, while removing the units’ territorial basis restricted 
the authorities’ ability to track them down following an incident, it also meant that the ASUs 
were less likely to be able to draw upon local area knowledge and connections.187  For another, it 
was impossible to fully cut the ties between the operatives in the ASUs and their fellow 
nationalists, their communities, and individuals in other ASUs (in fact, in some particularly pro-
nationalist neighborhoods, the cellular reorganization was never fully implemented).188  
The shift to the ASU system (as well as a concomitant reduction in the number of 
Provisional IRA operatives) resulted in a reduced frequency of attacks; lessened the control that 
the leadership had over its operatives; and separated the operatives from the larger nationalist 
community, reducing their ability to mobilize support.189  But nevertheless, it did reduce the 
authorities’ ability to apprehend Provisional IRA operatives and disrupt their activities – Smith 
reports that “In 1978, there were 465 fewer charges for paramilitary offenses than the previous 
year.”190  And the Provisional IRA would continue to be active for another 20 years, only ceasing 
operations as a result of the Good Friday Agreement.  
 
Safe Haven Conditions  
Northern Ireland 
The very nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland produced favorable conditions for the 
establishment of Provisional IRA safe havens throughout the six-county region.  As Catholic 
civil rights protesters came under attack from Protestant police and paramilitaries in 1968, and 
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these attacks led to sectarian riots, Catholic communities in the North became desperate for 
protection from the authorities and loyalist gangs.  In large part, the Provisional IRA split off 
from the rest of the Southern-based organization (soon to be called the Official IRA) to defend 
these communities – which, naturally, soon became safe havens from which their defenders 
could operate. 
In the early part of the Troubles (1969-1972) the creation of these Northern safe havens 
was unintentionally aided by British government policy.  While, by this time, the British 
government had become convinced that it was necessary to send in troops in order to stabilize 
the situation, it was also convinced that these troops should have as small a role as possible – 
serving merely as peacekeepers to stand between the warring groups.  Lest they be seen as 
enforcers for Northern Ireland’s unionist parliament, and thereby complicate the British 
government’s efforts to forge a peace agreement between the unionist and nationalist factions, 
the troops were to generally stay out of designated “no go” Catholic neighborhoods in Belfast 
and Derry-City.191  Peter Neumann writes that when they did venture into these areas, it was to 
be only with “the approval of so-called community leaders who often turned out to be the 
commanders of local IRA units.”192  
This policy would work out exceedingly poorly for both the British troops and the effort 
to put an end to the Northern Ireland conflict.  For the Provisional IRA leadership, the troops 
represented an ideal target: they were a symbol of the British state while also being separate from 
Northern Ireland’s majority-Protestant institutions, thus attacking them could further the group’s 
irredentist aims while also avoiding the unionist accusations that they were a sectarian 
organization bent on destroying the Protestant community.  (It should be noted that, at lower 
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levels, the Provisional IRA could be much more sectarian than its leaders intended – throughout 
the group’s existence, a persistent source of tension was the leadership’s belief that a united 
Ireland could only be achieved by appealing to the North’s Protestants, while many of its 
operatives had joined out of a desire to avenge Protestant attacks on the Catholic community.)193  
At the same time, the “no go” areas provided places where they could hide, recruit operatives, 
distribute propaganda, store weapons, and plan ever more spectacular attacks – activities aided 
by the organization’s hierarchical structure.  As a result, the number of Provisional IRA attacks 
increased dramatically through the 1970 to 1972 period.194 
The British government quickly realized that the Provisional IRA were using the “no go” 
areas as safe havens, but feared that retaking these neighborhoods would alienate the Catholic 
population and further inflame the conflict.195  This changed, however, on July 21, 1972, when 
the Provisional IRA set off 21 explosions in Belfast city center within a 75-minute period, killing 
two British soldiers and seven civilians.196  While impressive from a tactical standpoint, the 
attack was a public relations disaster, drawing fury from both the Protestant and Catholic 
populations.197  Taking advantage of the opportunity, the British military launched “Operation 
Motorman,” sending 31,000 troops to take control of the “no go” areas.198  According to Smith, 
the Provisional IRA saw any attempt to resist the army as futile, and “Motorman… broke up the 
hard core of [Provisional IRA] operatives in Belfast and Derry, most of whom were dispersed 
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into the countryside or over the border.”199  As a result of the loss of these safe havens, the 
number of attacks carried out by the Provisional IRA quickly plummeted and would never again 
return to the level seen in 1972.200   
But while the loss of the “no go” areas severely restricted the Provisional IRA’s freedom 
to operate, the group retained its role as the protector of the North’s embattled Catholic 
communities – and therefore could still count on some protection by the locals throughout the 
duration of the conflict.  In a 1989 study of Belfast’s Divis Flats ghetto, anthropologist Jeffrey 
Sluka found that while only 46.5 percent of the residents claimed to be supporters of the 
Provisional IRA and/or fellow nationalist group the Irish National Liberation Army (compared to 
46.6 percent not being supporters and the remainder responding “mixed feelings” or “no 
comment”); nevertheless 83.7 percent said that the community needed the groups to provide it 
with protection from loyalist paramilitaries and the authorities; 76.9 percent said that the groups 
were needed to police criminal behavior in the neighborhood; 69 percent said they supported the 
groups’ goal of a united Ireland; 55 percent said that the only means to achieve a united Ireland 
was armed struggle; and 69.9 percent reported that they did not feel threatened, afraid or 
intimidated by the groups201  Following further interviews, Sluka writes that while he found 
some respondents to be providers of “hard support” for the groups (in that they were members or 
willing to actively aid them), many more were “soft supporters” who would allow them to 
conduct their activities in the ghetto without interference.202  As noted above in the discussion of 
the post-1977 organizational structure of the Provisional IRA, this kind of support made it 
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possible for the group to survive even in those areas where the ASU model was not fully 
implemented.203 
 
The Republic of Ireland 
Throughout the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland, the government of the 
Republic of Ireland refused to provide support to the Provisional IRA and the other nationalist 
groups, and consistently stated its rejection of the use of violence to achieve unification.  But at 
times in the conflict – particularly during the early violence in 1968-1973 and the 1980-1981 
hunger strikes – its ability to take action against Provisional IRA activities within its borders 
(that is, logistical operations and the preparation of attacks against targets outside the Republic) 
was limited by pro-nationalist public sentiment.  It was the gradual, steady erosion of this 
sentiment by mounting violence in the North, and rising economic and human tolls for the people 
of the South, that eventually allowed the Republic to both undertake harsher domestic 
counterterrorism policies and forge the diplomatic agreements with the British government that 
succeeded in bringing the bulk of the conflict to an end.  As regards the Republic’s utility as a 
safe haven for the Provisional IRA, then, the group was able to take shelter in the South 
throughout its active life (to an extent), but found itself under mounting pressure beginning in the 
mid-1970s. 
Even before the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland in 1968, the amount of 
cooperation between the Northern and Southern governments was minimal.  Indeed, the very 
first meeting of the heads of government for the North and the South was not until 1965, between 
Northern Prime Minister Captain Terence O’Neill and Southern Taoiseach (prime minister of the 
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Republic of Ireland) Seán Lemass, and it was only after this meeting that a system of formal 
intergovernmental contacts was established.204  Furthermore, these contacts were almost 
exclusively focused on economic relations and technocratic issues (such as installing an 
electricity interconnector between the North and South to make the distribution of power across 
the island more efficient).205 
By 1967, these limited exercises in cooperation had already been stymied by pressure on 
the O’Neill government from loyalist hardliners, and were soon to be wiped out by 1968’s 
attacks on Catholic civil rights protesters by the North’s Royal Ulster Constabulary and pro-
union paramilitaries.206  In the South, the outbreak of violence saddled the government with a 
dilemma: on the one hand, the goal of reunification had near-universal support and the 
overwhelmingly (96 percent) Catholic population wished to defend its co-religionists in the 
North; on the other, the government desperately wanted to avoid being drawn into a military 
conflict (whether through a sectarian civil war, the spillover of violence into the South, or a 
confrontation with British forces) and had been working toward improving its relations with 
Britain as a means of achieving economic development and gaining membership in the European 
Economic Community (EEC).207  The situation was particularly tense, as the leading party in the 
government’s coalition was Fianna Fáil, which had been established by Eamon de Valera in 
1926 in specific opposition to the partition of Ireland.208  Further complicating matters was the 
British government’s refusal to engage the South in any kind of diplomatic talks on the basis that 
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the violence in the North was an “internal matter” and that such talks would worsen the problem 
by aggravating the Northern loyalists.209 
Apart from moving some military medical personnel to the border to provide care for 
possible refugees, and making a failed attempt to get the United Nations to intervene in the 
conflict, the Southern government’s official (if unspoken) policy became to do nothing lest they 
worsen the crisis.210  This, however, did not sit well with the more nationalist parts of the 
population or Fianna Fáil.  First on November 8, 1968, Southern Minister for Agriculture Neil 
Blaney broke with the government’s policy by publicly blasting the Northern prime minister in a 
speech in the town of Letterkenny.211  Then on August 13, 1969, a call from pro-nationalist 
Northern Member of Parliament Bernadette Devlin to the Southern Department of Defense 
begging for military protection against loyalist attacks prompted an emergency cabinet meeting 
where Taoiseach Jack Lynch had to talk his colleagues out of launching an intervention.212  An 
attempt by a trio of Northern MPs to get the Southern government to provide guns for the 
defense of Catholic areas was turned away on August 16, 1969, but scandal would hit the 
administration two months later when Finance Minister (and future Taoiseach) Charles Haughey 
was charged with being involved in a plot to procure guns for Northern IRA members (he and 
his alleged co-conspirators were later acquitted).213  Kevin Kelley has written that several 
meetings occurred between Fianna Fáil members and Northern IRA operatives about whether the 
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South could provide money and/or weapons for Catholic groups in the North, but that none of 
these appear to have come to fruition.214 
 However, while the Southern government refused to actively support the groups that 
would go on to become the Provisional IRA, in the early part of the conflict it was also reluctant 
to be seen to be cooperating too closely with the British in countering its operations (as long as 
they were not directed at targets in the Republic).  For example, in 1970 the Lynch government 
responded to a Provisional IRA plan to kidnap diplomats in the South by threatening to suspend 
habeas corpus and round up its suspected supporters; while in 1971, when the Northern 
parliament made the exact same threat and actually carried it out, the South responded by 
maintaining refugee camps for the thousands of Catholics who fled across the border.215  
Likewise, the South refused to extradite Provisional IRA suspects (or others accused of having 
committed crimes of a “political nature”) to British courts.216  Illustrative of the South’s dilemma 
at this time: George Clarke, a former member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary’s Special Branch 
(intelligence) service, writes in his memoirs that he regularly exchanged information with the 
Republic’s Garda Síochána Special Branch as they tracked Provisional IRA members across the 
border, but that this cooperation had to be kept secret as it was being done without the 
permission of the Southern government.217  The sum result was that, in the first years of the 
Troubles, the Provisional IRA employed the South as a base for shelter and logistical support. 
As the bloodshed mounted, though, and the situation in the North destabilized, the threat 
of spillover and the economic costs simply became too much for the Southern government.  At 
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the same time, the 1972 collapse of Northern Ireland’s parliament, and the reintroduction of 
direct rule over the North by Westminster, eliminated one of the major barriers preventing the 
Republic of Ireland from entering into diplomatic talks with Britain.  The South responded to all 
of this by taking a harder line against the Provisional IRA.  In 1972, Southern authorities 
apprehended Provisional Sinn Féin President Ruari O’Bradaigh on the grounds that he was a 
member of the Provisional IRA, and followed this with the arrest of the organization’s Chief of 
Staff Sean MacStiofain.218  In 1973, the South entered into talks with Britain and Northern 
nationalist and unionist politicians in an attempt to develop a system for power-sharing and 
institutionalized cooperation – the resulting Sunningdale Agreement, however, did not include a 
provision for cooperation on law enforcement matters, and ended up being scuttled by major 
loyalist protests regardless.219   
However, while the diplomatic process failed, the actions of the Provisional IRA itself 
served to make the South less hospitable to the organization.  The 1976 assassination of the 
British ambassador to Ireland, Christopher Ewart Biggs, in Dublin, would finally prompt the 
Republic to stage a major crackdown.220  It enacted the Emergency Powers Act, allowing it to 
detain suspects for seven days without bringing them to trial, and the Criminal Law Act, which 
expanded the power of officials (from the army, law enforcement, or prisons) to investigate 
crimes against the state and which called upon the courts to deal out more severe punishments.221  
At the same time, the Irish and British governments were finally developing formal institutions 
for cooperation on security issues.  A 1980 agreement between Taoiseach Charles Haughey and 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher resulted in a joint study on the two states’ security issues (as 
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well as studies on other areas such as economic cooperation and citizenship rights), the creation 
of an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, and a plan to eventually create representative body 
employing MPs from the European Parliament, Britain, Ireland, and a future elected Northern 
Ireland assembly.222  This progress was temporarily derailed by the surge in republican support 
that followed the hunger strikes of 1981-1982, but as Sinn Féin began to capitalize electorally 
from the strikes (threatening the Republic’s more mainstream political parties), this threat pushed 
the two governments to achieve the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.223  Besides providing a 
common position regarding Northern Ireland’s sovereignty (the territory would remain part of 
the United Kingdom until such time as a majority of the population wished to become part of 
Ireland), the agreement established a joint secretariat of civil servants to support the 
Intergovernmental Council, created a regular Intergovernmental Conference to deal with cross-
border issues, and explicitly included security as one of the areas to be subject to regular 
cooperation.224  This agreement would pave the way to ever-deepening forms of cooperation, 
leading eventually to the Joint Framework Document of 1995, the Good Friday Agreement of 
1998, and the St. Andrews Agreement of 2006 that would establish the supranational power-
sharing institutions that would come to govern Northern Ireland, depriving the Provisional IRA 
of its shelter in the South and bringing the conflict to an end. 
 
Alternative Factors 
The above sections show that the declining security of the Provisional IRA’s safe havens 
in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland produced conditions in which the group’s 
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members faced a greater danger from arrest and interrogation, which in turn prompted it to make 
an organizational change from a very hierarchical structure to a more cellular structure.  Or, in 
other words, as the goodness of fit between the Provisional IRA’s organizational structure and its 
security situation was reduced, the group was faced with a decreasing likelihood of survival – 
and, perceiving this, underwent an organizational change.  In the course of this progression from 
observed change in the independent variable (goodness of fit) to observed change in the 
dependent variable (survival), there are some possible alternative explanations that need to be 
addressed.  The two discussions to follow will address these factors and demonstrate that, while 
they had some limited impact, they do not challenge the causal linkage between the independent 
and dependent variables.  
 
Leadership Shift and Strategic Change 
The Provisional IRA Staff Report found with Seamus Twomey in 1977 called for not just 
an organizational restructuring of the group, but also a major strategic reorientation.  Since its 
entry into the Northern Ireland conflict, the Provisional IRA had operated according to the 
assumption that if it simply inflicted enough destruction on the British authorities, it could force 
them to come to the negotiating table – at which time, they would decide that Northern Ireland 
was not worth the ongoing cost in blood and treasure, and cut the province loose (in other words, 
they would completely surrender).225  By 1972, two of the group’s objectives had been 
accomplished:  Northern Ireland’s parliament had fallen (with Westminster establishing direct 
rule of the Six Counties), and British officials were prepared to meet for negotiations.226  But 
after meeting with the British twice, first during the ceasefire of 1972, then in the truce of 1975, 
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some members of the Provisional IRA leadership (and of the delegation to the talks) realized 
that, for all the damage it has caused, the group was simply too weak relative to the British army 
and could never force a surrender through military means alone.227  Furthermore, the Provisional 
IRA had been declaring that each year was to be “the year of victory” for five years straight 
(1972-1977), which threatened to become demoralizing for its supporters.228 
The new strategy held that the secession of Northern Ireland from Britain could only be 
achieved by mobilizing a mass political movement – and that while staging attacks would still be 
necessary for the sake of keeping the province’s political situation on the minds of the public, the 
violence would work in conjunction with building a broader-based socialist political platform 
able to attract individuals beyond its core of die hard republicans.  In this, the degree of support 
for Provisional IRA’s movement would be demonstrated though the contesting of elections (but 
not serving in government) via the group’s political arm: Provisional Sinn Féin.229  
Acknowledging that this effort to build a mass movement would of necessity be a very slow 
process, this strategy was called “the long war.”230 
In conjunction with the Provisional IRA’s change in organization and strategy, it was also 
undergoing a shift in leadership at this time.  As arrests chipped away at the older, Southern-
based leadership, a younger, Northern, and more politically radical group led by Gerry Adams 
rose quickly through the ranks.231  The shift in the organization’s strategy, and likely the division 
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of the organization into Northern and Southern Commands reflected the thinking of this faction 
(M.L.R. Smith even goes to far as to claim that the Staff Report might have been written by 
Adams).232 
However, while these factors did influence the Provisional IRA’s organization, they do 
not explain why it underwent a change in its structural type.  Rather than preceding the change in 
structure, the change in strategy was simultaneous and born out of the same cause: the group’s 
declining capabilities resulting from the decreased security of its safe havens in Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland.  As for the creation of the Northern and Southern Commands, this 
was less a change in organizational structure than an institutionalization of the de facto 
conditions in the Provisional IRA’s leadership – while it made sharper the distinction between 
who would be in charge of combat (the Northern Command) and logistical support (the Southern 
Command), this functional split was merely a recognition of the realities on the ground 
(particularly given that, according to “Standing Order No. 8” of the Army Council, Southern 
forces were not to be targeted for fear of losing popular support in the Republic).233  
 
Counterterrorism Tactics 
At the beginning of the 1970s, as the Provisional IRA’s campaign of bombings and 
shootings was starting to take off, the British and Northern Irish authorities quickly realized that 
not only would quality intelligence be critical to apprehending the members of the organization 
and disrupting its operations, but also that their means of gathering it were sorely lacking.  In his 
memoirs, Clarke paints a dire portrait of the state of intelligence gathering in the RUC Special 
Branch at this time, noting that few officers were well-educated or had much experiential 
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knowledge of the IRA, that a desperate rush to expand the group’s ranks led to the recruitment of 
unethical or paramilitary-affiliated officers, and that it was plagued by a deficient and poorly 
organized records system (later reorganized by military intelligence officers from the British 
army).234   
The authorities responded to this shortage of intelligence by flooding Northern Ireland 
with intelligence-gathering bodies.  Some of these were preexisting: the RUC’s Criminal 
Investigations Department (CID, in charge of interrogations) and Special Branch (in charge of 
informants), standard military intelligence, the Special Air Service, the Security Service (MI5) 
and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6).235  Others were created specifically to deal with the 
conflict: the army’s 12 Intelligence and Security Company, the Special Military Intelligence Unit 
(Northern Ireland), the Mobile Reconnaissance Force, the Northern Ireland Training Advisory 
Team/Intelligence and Security Group/14 Intelligence Company (the army’s elite surveillance 
group, so secretive that they kept changing its name to prevent it from gaining notoriety), the 
Northern Ireland Patrol Group/Close Observation Platoons, Bronze Section (the surveillance arm 
of the RUC’s anti-terrorist unit, the Special Patrol Group), RUC Special Branch’s E4A 
surveillance unit, and the RUC’s Beesbrook Support Unit.236  Mark Urban writes that “By mid-
1978 an IRA suspect might have been under observation by men or women from one of 14 
Company’s three detachments, one of the four SAS troops in Northern Ireland, or the seven 
Army Close Observation Platoons, the Special Patrol Group’s Bronze Section, or one of several 
squads from E4A.”237 
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This, however, created a serious problem with coordination between the organizations, 
leading to rivalries, inefficiencies, and the disruption of one another’s operations.  As a result, 
the authorities’ ability to successfully employ the intelligence they gathered was severely 
hampered.  Using the discovery of republican weapon caches as an indicator of the effectiveness 
of the British/Northern Irish intelligence community, Urban writes that “In 1974, 465 rifles were 
found; in 1976, 275 and in 1978, 188.  The amount of explosives dropped from 53,214lb in 1974 
to 7966lb in 1978.”238 
There was, however, one counterterrorism innovation that was acknowledged by the 
Provisional IRA itself to have had an impact.  The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1974 extended 
the duration for which police could hold suspects without filing charges from 48 hours to a 
maximum of seven days (given the approval of the secretary of state).239  According to the 
Provisional IRA Staff Report, the three- to seven-day detention periods were allowing the RUC 
to effectively interrogate captured operatives.240  In addition, Urban writes that the longer 
detentions were supplemented by a centralization of responsibility for interrogation under the 
RUC’s CID.241  This allowed the interrogators to bring more information to bear in questioning a 
subject (on a darker note, Urban also claims that the CID was more permissive about beating 
confessions out of suspects).242 
Thus, while many of the British/Northern Irish intelligence-gathering developments in 
the 1970s were ineffectual, and therefore unlikely to have persuaded the Provisional IRA’s 
organizational change, the change in detention periods did have an influence.  This, however, 
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went hand-in-hand with the reduced security of the organization’s safe havens and followed, 
rather than preceded, the beginning of the decline in the number of attacks carried out by the 
Provisional IRA after its 1972 high-point.243  While the change in interrogation policy might 
have helped push the Provisional IRA toward changing its organizational structure, it was merely 
augmenting a pattern of decline that had begun with the loss of its “no-go areas” in 1972. 
 
Conclusion and Notes 
The case of the Provisional IRA supports the hypothesis that a causal relationship exists 
between the goodness of fit between a terrorist group’s organizational structure and 
environmental security (on the one hand) and its survival (on the other).  Originally established 
as a group with a hierarchical, bureaucratic structure based on a military model, the Provisional 
IRA proved to be both very deadly and (to an extent) successful at achieving its ends while it 
was in possession of safe havens in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  However, as 
the security of these safe havens decreased, the Provisional IRA found itself more vulnerable to 
disruption, resulting in a higher number of arrests of its operatives and a lower number of 
attacks.  Recognizing that the group’s organizational structure was ill-suited to its new security 
environment, the Provisional IRA underwent a structural change to a more cellular-based system, 
thereby dramatically reducing the number of arrests and remaining active for another 20 years.  
And this proposed linkage between the goodness of fit and group survival was shown to more 
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closely correspond to the sequence of events in the case than the possible alternative 
explanations of changes in leadership, strategy, and counterterrorism techniques. 
The cases to follow will examine the histories of one more group predicted to feature a 
“good fit” between its organizational structure and security environment (Italy’s Red Brigades), 
and two groups predicted to have “bad fits” (Germany’s Red Army Faction and the United 
States’ Weathermen/Weather Underground).  These groups will, likewise, be examined for 
possible intervening variables and organizational change, and their performance (in terms of 
number of attacks, goals met, and survival) will be discussed.  
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Chapter 4:  The Red Brigades 
Chapter Objective and Structure 
As in the previous chapter, this chapter will use the method of process tracing to examine 
the question of whether the “goodness of fit” between a terrorist group’s organizational structure 
and the presence of a safe haven served to impact its survival and effectiveness.  Toward this 
end, it will employ the same structure:  first, by presenting an analysis of how closely the history 
of the Red Brigades matches the predictions of the hypothesis; second, by providing the 
historical context surrounding this case; third, by describing the organizational structure of the 
Red Brigades; fourth, by describing the Red Brigades’ access to international and domestic safe 
havens (or the lack thereof); fifth, by examining any possible intervening variables that should be 
taken into account; and finally, by concluding with a summary of its findings and some possible 
implications for the other cases in this dissertation. 
 
Analytical Overview 
The history of the Red Brigades stands in support of many of the predicted results for a 
“good fit” scenario between a cellular-network organizational structure and an insecure political 
environment (an environment without a safe haven) – although how closely it corresponds to 
some other predictions only becomes apparent through comparison with the other cases in this 
work (see Chapter Seven).  According to the hypothesis, the predicted outcome is that a cellular-
network – with its compartmentalized and largely independent cells – should prove more 
resistant to government attempts at infiltration and disruption, but at the cost of also being more 
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difficult for the group’s leadership to coordinate and control.  The expected result, then, is that in 
an environment without a safe haven, the increased longevity provided by a cellular-network’s 
greater internal security will make it far more effective at pursuing its goals than would be the 
case for a hierarchical group (although, in an environment with a safe haven, a cellular-network 
group should be less effective than a hierarchical group). 
In support of this prediction, the Red Brigades, despite lacking a safe haven, and despite 
conducting very high profile attacks such as the 1978 kidnapping and assassination of former 
Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, nevertheless still managed to survive for 13 years (1970-
1983; or 1970-1988 if one counts the smaller splinter groups that remained at large after the 
larger organization’s demise).244  Furthermore, the Red Brigades managed to survive and carry 
out major attacks despite repeatedly losing prominent members of the group’s leadership to 
death or capture (including almost all the group’s original leadership in 1974-1975).245 
The conclusion that the Red Brigades’ cellular-network structure helped it survive despite 
the lack of a safe haven is further supported by the fact that the group’s demise was precipitated 
by a shift in its organization to a more hierarchical form.  Following the loss of the original 
leadership, the Red Brigades underwent an organizational change that placed more formal 
control in the hands of central coordinating bodies (the executive committee and strategic 
management – see “Organizational Structure” for more information).246  As the central bodies 
sought to exert more and more control over the rest of the organization, splits arose between the 
top leadership and lower-level commanders – the eventual results being, first, that when one of 
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these commanders (Patrizio Peci) was captured by the authorities, he was able to reveal a 
devastating amount of information about the rest of the organization; and second, that regional 
units began to rebel against the top leadership, leading to the group’s collapse into rival 
factions.247 
However, there is a slight counterpoint to be made regarding the argument that being a 
“good fit” with its political environment made the Red Brigades more effective:  While 
establishing a cellular-network structure made the organization more secure, the tight 
compartmentalization also served to distance its operatives from the masses that they were 
seeking to mobilize.248  Also, the question of whether the combination of a cellular-network 
group without safe haven truly represents a better fit between organization and environment than 
that of a cellular-network group with a safe haven, or whether the possession of a safe haven 
simply benefits groups regardless of organizational structure, can only be answered through 
Chapter Seven’s cross-case comparison.  
 
Background 
The Red Brigades were founded in Milan, Italy in 1970 by former student activists 
Renato Curcio, Margherita Cagol, and Alberto Francheschini.249  Throughout the 1950’s and 
1960’s, Italy had undergone a rapid period of industrialization that brought considerably higher 
living standards, but also a massive migration of workers from rural and southern parts of Italy to 
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the industrial urban centers of the north.250  This development not only brought major cultural 
changes for the migrants (disrupting traditional family networks, belief systems, and patterns of 
work), but also put serious strain on the capacity of the national and local governments to 
provide public services – particularly in areas such as higher education and housing.251  By the 
mid- and late-1960’s, the result was an intense and often violent period of political activism – 
whether in the form of clashes between police and striking workers, demonstrations by student 
activists that turned into riots, or bombings by neo-fascist terrorist groups.252  Concurrent with 
this strife, the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) had broken ranks with the Soviet Union over the 
USSR’s 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, announced that it would no longer seek the overthrow 
of the Italian government, and undertaken the process of becoming a mainstream political 
party.253  This change led its former supporters on the far-left to accuse the PCI (and its allied 
trade unions) of betraying the communist cause and of selling out to the state and its capitalist 
interests. 
In reaction to the PCI’s change of policy, the persistently high amount of political 
violence raging around them, and a fear that fascist forces might come to power, the founders of 
the Red Brigades concluded that the time for a Marxist revolution was drawing near and that 
they would be the “revolutionary vanguard” that would build the movement to eventually 
overthrow the state.254  To this end, they began with firebombing the car of an executive of the 
Sit-Siemens corporation, as well as some company trucks owned by the tire manufacturers, 
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Pirelli – all while distributing propaganda to attempt to mobilize the firms’ workers.255  Then, 
starting in 1972, they began to carry out kidnappings of company officials, in order to finance the 
organization, and set about establishing a cell in Turin.256  But, that year, they also suffered their 
first major setback:  Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, a publishing tycoon and leader of a Marxist 
terrorist organization called the Groups of Partisan Action, accidentally blew himself up while 
attempting to bomb a high-tension pylon in Milan.257  While Feltrinelli was not a member of the 
Red Brigades, he had had regular contact with the group, and the ensuing police investigation led 
to the arrests of some of its members and the loss of a number of safe houses and other 
resources.258  While most of the arrested members would only be in jail for a few months, the 
incident scared the leadership of the Red Brigades into adopting strict new security policies, 
making the organization more difficult to disrupt (but also reducing its members’ contact with 
the workers that they were trying to mobilize and, indeed, most of the rest of the world).259  
Throughout 1973 and 1974, the Red Brigades kidnapped several more executives, as well 
as Mario Sossi (a right-wing judge unpopular among leftist groups for his harsh sentences).260  
But the group ran into a far more serious snag on September 8, 1974, when a police sting 
operation resulted in more arrests and the loss of more resources – most damagingly, the arrest of 
key members Renato Curcio, Alberto Franceschini, and Alfredo Buonavita.261  These arrests 
would both serve to centralize the Red Brigades’ leadership into a more hierarchical form under 
the group’s remaining members (bringing about the formal system of columns and fronts, and 
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the creation of the executive committee and strategic management – all described in the next 
section), and to harden its tactics.262  In 1975, the organization took to shooting targets in the 
knees (“knee-capping”) as a signature technique for terrorizing those it viewed as enemies.263  
Also that year, the Red Brigades successfully broke Curcio out of jail and published its first 
Strategic Resolution (a long statement of purpose written by the strategic management) – but 
also suffered another severe loss when Margherita Cagol was killed in a gunfight with the 
carabinieri (Italian paramilitary police) during the successful rescue of another kidnapping 
victim.264  Soon, this was followed by the re-capture of Curcio, along with another Red Brigades 
member.265 
With 23 Red Brigadists, including much of the group’s original leadership, on trial in 
1976, the group looked from the outside to be on its last legs (indeed, Meade writes that it only 
had “about 15 regular members left”) – but it had actually come under a new, more ruthless 
leadership headed by Mario Moretti.266  This was soon demonstrated through the assassination of 
Prosecutor General Francesco Coco, along with his bodyguard and driver.267  Meanwhile, the 
trial of the Red Brigadists had fallen into a shambles as the defendants disrupted the proceedings 
for political speeches inside the court, while the rest of the group intimidated potential public 
defenders from outside it (which, due to the rules of the Italian legal system, served to delay the 
trial).268  Throughout 1977, the Red Brigades killed a policeman, a journalist, and the head of the 
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Order of Attorneys of Turin (who was in charge of selecting the public defender for the 
Brigadists on trial), while also wounding 20 other public, business, and media officials.269 
Next would come the Red Brigades’ most famous operation, and the one that would 
trigger the group’s eventual decline.  On March 16, 1978, the Red Brigades kidnapped president 
of the Christian Democratic Party and former prime minister Aldo Moro, killing two carabinieri 
and three police officers in the process.270  In an attempt to free its jailed comrades, as well as 
publicize its cause, the Red Brigades held Moro prisoner for 54 days before finally assassinating 
him (after concluding that the Italian government would never agree to a “prisoner 
exchange”).271  The incident achieved a significant boost in publicity and recruitment for the Red 
Brigades, but engendered the beginning of a large-scale public backlash against the group and a 
major crackdown by the Italian authorities.272  A 1975 law had already increased the length of 
time suspects could be held without trial, the powers of police to search suspicious persons and 
vehicles, and the circumstances under which an officer could use a gun in the line of duty; and a 
1977 change in prison policy had tightened the security around jailed terrorists.273  But 1978 
brought a law that permitted the interrogation of suspects without the presence of legal counsel, 
loosened the restrictions on wiretapping, and required that anyone who sold or rented a house 
report the identities of the buyer/renter within 48 hours after the deal was concluded.274  Most 
importantly, the Italian government established a national anti-terrorism squad under carabinieri 
General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa charged specifically with hunting down the Red Brigades.275 
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In 1978-1979, the Red Brigades became still more violent, carrying out a wave of knee-
cappings and assassinations.  This, however, backfired in two important ways.  First, the Red 
Brigades killed Guido Rossa – a factory worker, union delegate and Communist Party member 
who had been targeted for turning in a Brigadist who had been distributing the group’s 
propaganda.276  The result was a huge demonstration against the Red Brigades by the very 
workers they were trying to mobilize (Meade estimates that 200-250,000 people attended 
Rossa’s funeral).277  The second problem was that the increased emphasis on violence led to a 
split within the ranks of the Red Brigades itself, as regulars in the Rome column (and 
participants in the Moro kidnapping), Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faranda left the group with a 
handful of other defectors and a cache of the organization’s weapons, money, and documents.278  
Arrested shortly after leaving the Red Brigades, jail did not prevent Morucci and Faranda from 
airing their criticisms of the leadership’s authoritarianism and militarism following its transition 
to the more hierarchical organizational structure, and a war of words erupted between them and 
the previously imprisoned Brigadists (led by Curcio).279 
This growing dissent within its ranks would lead to the Red Brigades’ ultimate (if not 
immediate) undoing.  In 1980, a tip from an informant among the group’s irregulars led to the 
arrest of two more high-ranking members.280  This loss would have been bad enough, but as it 
turned out, one of the Brigadists, former Turin column logistical head Patrizio Peci, both had 
extensive knowledge about the organization and had been losing faith in its mission.281  Peci’s 
confession provided the Italian authorities with a wealth of information about the organizational 
                                                 
276
 Meade, 187 
277
 Meade, 188 
278
 Meade, 106, 188-189 
279
 Meade, 188-189 
280
 Meade, 193 
281
 Meade, 194 
  
 
97
structure of the Red Brigades, the group’s membership, its resources, and its operations – 
resulting in the arrests of 85 members, the loss of many safe houses, and the destruction or 
crippling of every column (territorial division) except the one based in Rome.282  
The Red Brigades continued its campaign of assassinations and knee-cappings, even 
scoring a small victory in 1980 when the kidnapping of Ministry of Justice magistrate Giovanni 
D’Urso led to the closing of Asinara prison (although the Italian authorities claimed that they had 
been planning to close it before the kidnapping).283  But the split between the Moretti-led 
executive committee and the critics who complained that it was emphasizing tactical operations 
over popular mobilization continued to grow.  Shortly after being rebuilt by the executive 
committee (following the damage done by Peci’s confessions), the new Milan column split from 
the rest of the organization – and in the process of building a second, orthodox Milan column in 
1981, Moretti was finally arrested.284  Shortly thereafter, the Naples column, led by Giovanni 
Senzani also broke with the executive committee, kidnapping Christian Democrat official Ciro 
Cirillo in an unsanctioned operation.285  Lest they look weak compared to the dissenters, the 
original leadership had the Veneto column kidnap executive Giuseppe Taliercio.286  A few 
months later, the rogue Milan column kidnapped an executive from Alfa Romeo; while, in 
Rome, supporters of Senzani’s faction kidnapped Roberto Peci (in revenge against his brother 
Patrizio).  Of these kidnappings, Cirillo and the Alfa Romeo executive were released, the former 
after the receipt of a large ransom from the Christian Democrats, while Taliercio and Roberto 
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Peci were assassinated (the latter on film, and in particularly brutal fashion).287  The sum result 
of all these kidnappings was a political loss for both factions, with Taliercio’s and Peci’s 
assassinations only further alienating the working class groups that the Red Brigades were trying 
to mobilize, and the outcome of Cirillo’s kidnapping making Senzani and his supporters look 
like mercenaries.288  This was capped off with each faction releasing its own strategic resolution 
claiming to speak for the Red Brigades as a whole.289 
In an attempt to regain some measure of public support, the strategic resolution of the 
Red Brigades’ orthodox faction declared that it was joining the growing trans-European 
movement in opposition to NATO and the stationing of nuclear missiles in Western Europe.290  
Toward this end, the group kidnapped NATO General James Dozier on December 17, 1981.291  
However, after only slightly more than a month, the Italian authorities managed to find were 
Dozier was being held, rescue him, and capture four more Brigadists without firing a shot, 
including then-group leader Antonio Savasta.292 
In 1982, with the Red Brigades split and most of the group’s leadership captured, the 
Italian parliament enacted a law that reduced the prison sentences of captured terrorists who 
cooperated with the government (with greater and more valuable cooperation, as judged by the 
authorities, leading to greater reductions).293  In combination with the pre-existing philosophical 
divisions among its members, the law succeeded in shattering the Red Brigades, leading to the 
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capture, surrender or desertion of most of the outstanding operatives by 1983.294  By 1985, the 
few remaining active Red Brigades members had formally split into two competing groups:  the 
“Fighting Communist Party” and the “Union of Fighting Communists.”295  Nevertheless, despite 
this division and their severely reduced numbers, these rump groups managed to assassinate US 
diplomat Leamon Hunt, economics professor Ezio Tarantelli, former mayor of Florence Lando 
Conti, two policemen, Italian air force general Licio Giorgieri, and Christian Democratic senator 
Roberto Ruffilli in the period from 1984 to 1988.296  Likewise, a small successor group called the 
BR-PCC (Brigate Rosse – per la Costituzione del Partito Comunista Combattente) assassinated 
labor consultants Massimo D’Antona in 1999 and Marco Biagi in 2002 before being arrested by 
the Italian police in 2003.297 
 
Organizational Structure  
The Red Brigades were organized in a cellular-network structure inspired by Vladimir 
Lenin’s concept of a revolutionary vanguard (a small group of individuals whose actions 
mobilize the larger working class into overthrowing the capital-owner-dominated government); 
and were modeled on contemporaneous Marxist groups such as Uruguay’s Tupamaros, as well as 
the Italian anti-fascist resistance movement of the Second World War.298  (An additional factor 
that might have contributed to this choice of model is the fact that, before the group’s creation, 
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some of its founding members were given guerrilla training by Soviet-sponsored camps in 
Czechoslovakia.299)   
Beginning in 1970, the Red Brigades were confined to a single cell based in Milan 
(which later came to be known as the “historic nucleus”).300  After a series of arrests and raids by 
the authorities on the group’s safe houses in 1972 (brought on by the death of Giangiacomo 
Feltrinelli, the cell went underground and tightened its security procedures.301  By 1974, as 
further cells were established (or were in the process of being established) in Turin, the Veneto, 
Rome and Genoa, the organization developed a formal network structure for horizontal and 
vertical coordination.302  The basic component part of this network was the individual “brigade,” 
a cell made up of one to five operatives, most of whom were “irregulars” (who worked part-time 
for the organization, as compared to the full-time “regulars”) and “legals” (individuals whose 
Red Brigade membership was not yet known to the authorities, and so still lived under their real 
identities; unlike the fugitive “clandestines”).303  These brigades were then arranged according to 
their “column” (location) and “front” (function).  At the time of Brigadist Patrizio Peci’s 
interrogation by the Italian authorities in 1980, the columns were based in the cities of Genoa, 
Milan, Rome, and Turin, and in The Veneto region.304  As for the fronts, there were two:  the 
logistic front and the “front of the masses” – the former provided equipment and operational 
support services, while the latter was responsible for intelligence and recruitment.305  The front 
of the masses was further subdivided into three types of brigades: brigades based in factories, 
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brigades of “the triple” (assigned to monitoring the police, the courts, and the prisons), and 
brigades focused on the Christian Democrats and other political parties.306  Thus, for example, a 
given brigade could be part of the Milan column and tasked with making fake license plates for 
the logistic front; or a part of the Turin column’s “front of the masses” and tasked with 
distributing propaganda, finding targets, and mobilizing the workers of a particular automobile 
factory.  These brigades reported to two regulars, who would each serve as the heads of a front in 
a given column (so, the Turin column would be led by a logistical front regular and a front of the 
masses regular).307  These regulars were also responsible for carrying out attacks (following their 
receipt of orders from the Red Brigades’ national-level leadership).308 
Above the columns in terms of authority were the national fronts, made up of all the 
logistical regulars and masses regulars from the various columns, respectively (in other words, 
there was a national logistics front and a national front of the masses).309  In conjunction, these 
bodies formulated the proposals for operations and, assuming approval from the Red Brigades’ 
supreme leadership (the executive committee), carried them out.310  Above the national fronts, 
the four members of the executive committee (two from the logistical front, two from the masses 
front) represented the highest level of day-to-day authority in the Red Brigades.311  The 
executive committee also, personally, carried out the most ambitious operations for the 
organization (such as the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro) and was responsible for 
conducting relations with allied terrorist groups.312  Finally, a body called the strategic 
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management served as a sort of board of directors for the Red Brigades.  Made up of a selection 
of influential regulars representing the fronts and columns, as well as the members of the 
executive committee, the strategic management met every six to twelve months (or could be 
convened in an emergency).313  According to Robert Meade Jr., the meetings of the strategic 
management (called “the Strategic Direction” in his history of the Red Brigades) were occasions 
when the organization would “discuss and formulate a single political line for the group, develop 
and enforce internal rules, control the budget and nominate the Executive Committee.”314 
Throughout the organization, an extensive set of strict policies dictated the members’ 
behavior so as to prevent detection by the authorities and to limit the risk that one cell’s 
compromise would lead to the compromise of others.  According to Alessandro Orsini, a 1974 
document titled Security and Work Rules prescribed that not only should a clandestine operative 
faithfully reproduce every detail of their false identity, but even went so far as to dictate “the 
‘bleak furnishings’ allowed [in your domicile]… how to file bills, the type of keys to use, the 
noises to avoid so as not to arouse the neighbors’ suspicions, how to do the shopping or buy 
newspapers, the rules for going to cafés and restaurants… [how to maintain your car]… 
Dressing, combing your hair, tending your beard…” and so on.315  In particular, the 
organization’s policies prevented regulars from having personal relationships with irregulars (or, 
for that matter, with anyone besides other regulars).316 
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Safe Haven Conditions  
All available evidence shows that the Red Brigades did not have a foreign or domestic 
safe haven.  Indeed, for a Cold War-era Marxist terrorist organization, the Red Brigades had 
unusually weak international ties.  As noted before, statements made by founding member 
Alberto Franceschini, as well as former Italian and Czechoslovakian officials, have revealed that 
Franceschini and other future Red Brigade operatives were trained in guerrilla warfare by Soviet 
intelligence in Czechoslovakian military camps prior to the creation of the Red Brigades (as part 
of an attempt to undermine the Communist Party of Italy, which had split with the Soviet Union 
and was working toward becoming part of the parliamentary mainstream).317  However, 
statements from other founding members (as well as Italian authorities) also show that the KGB 
had relatively little contact with the group after its creation, and indeed that the Red Brigades 
saw engagement in Cold War competition as being a distraction from their goal of achieving a 
communist revolution in Italy – the founders would train the other members in Italy, rather than 
send them abroad.318  Likewise, the Red Brigades funded themselves through kidnapping 
ransoms and robberies, rather than relying on KGB financial support.319  The only other 
international link to the Red Brigades is the fact that the group would occasionally send 
representatives to Paris to arrange arms transfers, exchange ideological beliefs, and (late in the 
organization’s life) coordinate anti-NATO attacks with groups such as the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization and the Red Army Faction.320  (Note, however, that Robert Meade cites a claim that 
after the collapse of the Red Brigades, some of the remaining members from its daughter groups, 
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the “Fighting Communist Party” and “Union of Fighting Communists,” might have had bases in 
France.321) 
Historical records demonstrate as well that the Red Brigades did not have a domestic safe 
haven in Italy.  They closest that the group came to possessing such an asset came early in its 
existence (1970-1973), when the organization could command widespread support among 
workers in Milan and Turin – cities that had been subject to violent conflicts between labor 
groups, police, fascist organizations, and leftist organizations.322  However, the Red Brigades’ 
shift from property destruction and kidnapping to assassination (particularly the deaths of Aldo 
Moro and his bodyguards in 1978, and of Guido Rossa in 1979) alienated most of its working-
class supporters, costing it even this modest source of cover.323   
 
Alternative Factors 
Regarding the organization of the Red Brigades, the history of the group points very 
strongly toward internal security and the need for cross-cell coordination as being the factors that 
shaped the group’s structure.  The adoption of strictly compartmentalized cells followed the 1972 
arrests of Red Brigades members following the death of Giangiacomo Feltrinelli; while the 
1974-1975 formalization of the Red Brigades’ structure (including the creation of the strategic 
management and the executive committee) was preceded both by the killing/capture of Renato 
Curcio, Alberto Franceschini, Alfredo Buonavita, and Margherita Cagol, and by the expansion of 
the group from two to five territorially-based columns.324 
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Furthermore, the two possible alternative factors examined in the previous case (the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army) have little bearing on the organizational structure of the Red 
Brigades.  For the first factor, “leadership shift and strategic change,” while the Red Brigades did 
undergo a change in leadership at the time of its 1974-1975 reorganization due to the arrests, the 
new leadership did not pursue a new strategy or differ markedly in terms of political views from 
its predecessors (although later they would come to disagree on whether the executive committee 
was too focused on tactical operations rather than mass mobilization).325  For the second factor, 
“counterterrorism tactics,” the Italian government did not adopt its new antiterrorism policies 
until after the Red Brigades’ organizational change (with most of the new policies coming after 
the Moro assassination).326 
 
Conclusion and Notes 
The history of Italy’s Red Brigades supports the hypothesis that the “goodness of fit” 
between a terrorist group’s organizational structure and the presence of a safe haven has a 
significant impact on its survival.  As a cellular-network, the Red Brigades were able to survive 
for 13 years, despite several conditions that put the group under serious risk:  the lack of a safe 
haven, the lost of most of its original leaders, and its use of high-profile attacks bound to invite a 
severe crackdown by the state.  In the end, the group was undone in large part because it had 
gradually moved away from keeping its individual cells compartmentalized and autonomous, and 
toward controlling the group’s actions through a central leadership – once this central leadership 
came under strain through internal challenges of its control, and through the capture and 
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confession of an operative privy to a wide range of the Red Brigades’ secrets, the group soon 
collapsed.  
The next two cases will both be examples of “bad fits” between organizational structure 
and safe haven presence:  Germany’s Red Army Faction (a group that possessed a safe haven 
and had a cellular-network organizational structure) and the United States’ Weathermen/Weather 
Underground (a group that did not possess a safe haven and had a hierarchical structure).  Again, 
these groups will be examined for possible intervening variables and organizational change, and 
their performance (in terms of number of attacks, goals met, and survival) will be discussed.  
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Chapter 5:  The Red Army Faction 
Chapter Objective and Structure 
This chapter will use the method of process tracing to examine whether there is a  
“goodness of fit” between a terrorist group’s organizational structure and the political 
environment in which it operates.  That is to say, the chapter will investigate whether the type of 
organizational structure that a terrorist group employs (be it hierarchical or cellular-network-
based) interacts with the relative security of the group’s environment (its access to a safe haven 
or not) to impact its survival and effectiveness.   
As with the preceding cases, this case will first provide an analytical overview of how 
closely the history of the Red Army Faction (RAF) matches the predictions of the hypothesis; 
then, second, it will provide the historical context surrounding the case; third, it will describe the 
organizational structure of the RAF; fourth, it will describe the RAF’s access to international and 
domestic safe havens (or the lack thereof); fifth, it will discuss any possible intervening variables 
that need to be taken into account; and, lastly, it will summarize the findings of this case and 
discuss the possible implications for other cases in this dissertation. 
 
Analytical Overview 
The history of the Red Army Faction appears to support the predicted results for a “poor 
fit” scenario between a cellular-network organizational structure and the presence of a safe haven 
– although factors unique to the RAF and its origin present a possible alternative explanation that 
muddies at least part of this conclusion.  According to the hypothesis, a cellular-network – given 
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its compartmentalized and largely independent cells – should be more difficult for government 
agents to infiltrate and disrupt, but should also be more difficult for the leaders of the network to 
coordinate and control.  This should, then, make a cellular-network group more resilient in the 
absence of a safe haven than a hierarchical group (with its greater coordination and control, but 
more vulnerable linkages) would be.  But what if a group has both a cellular-network structure 
and a safe haven?  Given both the protection of a cellular-network structure and the protection of 
a safe haven, the hypothesis would then predict that the group would be very durable (at least, 
against government infiltration attempts) – but the hypothesis also predicts that, because of the 
limitations imposed by the cellular-network organizational structure, the group would be unable 
to fully capitalize on the benefits that this durability provides.  This is because the same 
restrictions on contact between cells that prevent them from being infiltrated by the authorities 
(for example: the practice of only a cells’ commander being in touch with anyone else in the 
group, and of that commander only being in communication with his or her direct superior) will 
also prevent them from being controlled and coordinated by the group’s leadership.  And this 
lack of control and coordination will hamper the group’s ability to make and effectively execute 
long-term strategies (that might lead, for example, to negotiations with the target government or 
concessions) and its ability to take advantage of economies of scale and divisions of labor to 
mount a higher quantity and quality of attacks.  Furthermore, the restrictions on cells’ 
communication with the outside world, imposed by the group’s need to evade detection, also 
reduce their ability to mobilize supporters and recruit operatives. 
Regarding durability, there is no doubt that the RAF was an astounding success:  the 
group survived for 28 years (1970-1998) and twice recovered from the arrests of its entire top 
leadership (first, from the arrests of Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof, and Jan-
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Carl Raspe in 1972; and second, from the arrests of Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Christian Klar in 
1982).327  It was able to achieve this not only because it had a cellular-network structure, but also 
because it was able to utilize East Germany as a safe haven almost from the very beginning of 
the group’s foundation (although the degree to which the East German authorities supported the 
RAF varied over time).328 
The more difficult question involves whether being a cellular-network with a safe haven 
limited the RAF’s capabilities beyond what they would have been had the group possessed both 
a horizontal organizational form and a safe haven.  On the one hand, the RAF was able to carry 
out ambitious operations that drew the attention of large West German and international 
audiences:  a series of successful bank robberies starting in December 1970, a wave of bombings 
in 1972 (the “May Offensive”), prison hunger strikes throughout the mid-1970s, seizing the West 
German embassy in Stockholm in 1975, and the combined kidnapping of Confederation of 
German Employers’ Associations chairman Hanns Martin Schleyer and hijacking of Lufthansa 
Flight 181 in fall of 1977 (the last conducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
in support of the RAF).329  On the other, it was able to achieve almost nothing from the West 
German government (in terms of negotiations or concessions), its membership remained small 
(15-40 underground operatives and 200-1,500 above-ground supporters, depending on the time 
period), and the brief periods when it achieved some degree of public sympathy (during its early 
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bank-robbing period, and after the prison deaths of Meinhof and Holger Meins) were swiftly 
undone by public revulsion at the brutality of its attacks (the May Offensive and the killing of 
Schleyer/hijacking of Flight 181, respectively).330 
While the failure of the RAF on these accounts can be attributed to the fact that the 
group’s cellular structure cut its members off from the larger world and thereby prevented them 
from being able to mobilize potential supporters into a larger movement (which could, then, be 
used to pressure the government and find recruits) – it can also be said that other factors 
regarding the philosophy and personalities within the RAF prevented it from achieving this 
result.331  The founding members’ emphasis on action over theory discouraged the RAF from 
formulating any sort of long-term strategy or articulating a coherent ideology, and led them to 
only attempt to mobilize a mass movement through a “propaganda of the deed” approach 
(whether through attacks or hunger strikes).332  Meanwhile, the founders’ roots in the student 
protest movement and upper-class leftist (“schili” or “chic left”) communities gave it an elitist 
cast, narrowing its appeal.333   
Arguably, however, the combination of a safe haven with a cellular-network structure 
created a “bad fit” due to the fact that it allowed these problems to flourish:  the double-security 
meant that there was little pressure for the RAF to develop a long-term strategy, to consistently 
attempt to build a popular movement, or to make much in the way of adjustments over time.  In 
this, it is telling that after the founding members were arrested and imprisoned by the West 
German government (1972-1977), the RAF focused its entire campaign on freeing them, rather 
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than any political issue that might affect people outside the organization (although before and 
after this period, it did focus on things outside itself).334  Furthermore, it was only in the third 
generation of the RAF’s leadership, the one that was not connected directly to the original 
founders, that the group undertook efforts to reform its ideology and formalize its organizational 
structure (it, however, had the misfortune to be active at a time when both communist terrorist 
groups and communist states were going into decline).335  Most notable of all, however, is the 
fact that, faced with internal dissent in 1979, the RAF was able to cooperate with the Stasi to 
purge the dissenters from its organization and have them retire under assumed identities in East 
German rather than attempt to reform itself.336 
 
 
Background 
The Red Army Faction was founded on May 14, 1970 in the Dahlem neighborhood of 
West Berlin (the date and place of the first group action to involve leading members Andreas 
Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and Ulrike Meinhof).  But the events leading to the group’s creation 
began three years earlier, on June 2, 1967, when a student demonstration against the Shah of 
Iran’s visit to West Berlin devolved into a riot that resulted in the killing of protester Benno 
Ohnesorg by a plainclothes police officer.337  Despite the fact that Ohnesorg was unarmed and 
fleeing when he was shot, a court judged the officer not guilty of manslaughter.338  This incident 
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not only made Ohnesorg a martyr for the student movement, it also led the future members of the 
RAF (most notably Ensslin) to conclude that the West German state would crush any peaceful 
dissent and that the student movement not only had to engage in violence to effect change, but 
also to protect itself.339  (A common belief among leftist groups at the time was that the 
government of the Federal Republic was still under the sway of ideas and individuals left over 
from the Nazi regime and that it was only a matter of time before they reestablished an 
authoritarian political system.)340  This view that the student movement was under attack was 
further reinforced when, on April 11, 1968, one of its leaders, Rudi Dutschke, was shot and 
critically injured by a right-wing fanatic.341  The student movement blamed this attack on hostile 
news coverage by the publications of the Axel Springer group, resulting in a riot at the 
company’s headquarters on that same day.342  
In response to these events, and in an attempt to shake the German public’s complacency 
regarding the United States’ war in Vietnam, a group of four militants led by student activist 
Gudrun Ensslin and her boyfriend Andreas Baader set fire to two Frankfurt department stores 
through the use of timed incendiary bombs on April 2-3, 1968.343  After their arrest, the militants 
employed their trial itself as a political demonstration against the West German government and 
perceived U.S imperialism (one of their nine attorneys being another future RAF leader, Horst 
Mahler).344  This resulted in a surge of support from Germany’s upper-class leftist community 
(the schili or “chic left”) and brought them into contact with established leftist journalist, Ulrike 
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Meinhof.345  While the group was convicted of arson, it was shortly thereafter released from 
prison while the verdict was under appeal.346  Taking advantage of the opportunity, Baader and 
Ensslin established an experimental commune for orphaned boys and came into further contact 
with Meinhof (who was researching a story on state homes for girls).347   
When the appeal was denied, three out of the four members of the group decided to 
become fugitives rather than serve time in prison (of these three, Baader and Ensslin remained 
fugitives, while the third eventually surrendered to the authorities).348  While they were on the 
run, employing safe houses and resources provided by supporters in the schili community, 
Mahler had begun making the preparations to engage in armed insurgency against the state as 
part of a group called the Socialist Lawyers Collective.349  Upon Baader and Ensslin’s return to 
West Berlin, they were reunited with Mahler and took shelter at Meinhof’s apartment.350  
Baader, Ensslin and Meinhof all quickly became involved in Mahler’s effort to acquire guns for 
his underground army.  It was while on an errand to get guns for the group that Baader was 
arrested again (a passing police patrol having recognized the Mercedes he was driving).351  With 
his arrest, the remainder of the group shifted focus to breaking him out of jail.  As Mahler had 
finally succeeded in acquiring guns from a criminal associate, the group devised a plan whereby 
Meinhof would employ her reputation as a journalist to convince the police to allow Baader to do 
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research with her on “the organization of young people at the fringes of society” at the German 
Institute for Social Questions in Dahlem, West Berlin.352 
On May 14, 1970, as Meinhof and Baader waited in the Institute’s reading room, 
pretending to work, a team of three other RAF members overwhelmed Baader’s guards and shot 
a librarian, critically injuring him.  In the ensuing struggle, Baader and Meinhof escaped out of 
the reading room’s window to a waiting car, soon joined by the rest of the group.353  Shortly 
thereafter, in the May 22 issue of the West Berlin anarchist newspaper, 833, the group 
announced its creation and called for violent, global, proletarian revolution.354 
By June of 1970, the members of the group had escaped via East Germany to Beirut and, 
from there, to a training camp in Jordan run by the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine.355  Cultural differences between the RAF and their PFLP hosts quickly undermined the 
undertaking, however, and after only two months the RAF returned to West Germany through 
(again) East Berlin.356  Upon its return, the RAF set about establishing safe houses and cells of 
local supporters, stockpiled weapons, and undertook a campaign of bank robberies to finance the 
organization that would last through June 1972 (most famously robbing three banks in the same 
day on September 29, 1970 and acquiring 217,469.50 deutschmarks – or just under $60,000 in 
1970 U.S. dollars).357  This success in robbing banks, though, was tempered by major losses to 
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the organization: the arrest of five members, including Mahler, on October 9, 1970; an additional 
three arrests on December 23, 1970; three more arrests in February-May 1971; and the deaths of 
Petra Schelm (July 15, 1971), Georg Rauch (December 4, 1971), and Thomas Weissbecker 
(March 2, 1971) in shootouts with the police.358  
In July of 1971, however, the RAF received reinforcements from the membership of 
another group: the Socialist Patients’ Collective.  Established on September 30, 1970, the SPC 
was made up of psychiatric patients led by their doctor and leader, Wolfgang Huber.359  
Claiming that their mental illness was being caused by “the late capitalist performance society of 
the Federal Republic,” Huber convinced his patients that they could only be cured through the 
overthrow of the state and organized them into “working circles” focused on subjects such as 
bomb-making and hand-to-hand combat.360  On July 12, 1971, the group unilaterally declared its 
affiliation with the Red Army Faction.361  Shortly thereafter, a shooting incident between a 
member and a police officer led to the arrests of seven members of the SPC, including Huber – 
but the remaining members escaped underground and merged with the RAF.362 
Around the same time (May 1971), and despite the fact that it had already been active for 
almost a year, the RAF finally released a paper on its ideological beliefs, The Concept Urban 
Guerrilla.363  Described by Jillian Becker as “immoderate, emotional, at times incoherent” and 
by Jeremy Varon as “fragmentary, sloganistic, and, on important points, contradictory,” the 
document established the RAF’s reputation for being weak on the theoretical justification for its 
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campaign or for its actions.364  It did, however, unequivocally assert that the RAF was a 
communist (rather than anarchist) organization and that it viewed illegal, violent action as the 
only way to bring about change in West German society.365  
Starting in May of 1972, the RAF took this violence to a new level by engaging in a 
campaign of bombings, striking the U.S. Army headquarters in Frankfurt/Main on May 11, 
police headquarters in Augsburg and Munich on May 12, the wife of a federal judge on May 15, 
the headquarters of Axel Springer publishing on May 19, and the U.S. Army in Europe’s 
Supreme Headquarters in Heidelberg.366  The campaign resulted in four deaths and 50 injuries.367   
But, for the first generation of the RAF, the “May Offensive” proved to be its undoing.  
In response to the violence (particularly the injuring of workers in the Axel Springer publishing 
bombing), its support from the student leftist and schili communities began to dry up.368  At the 
same time, a sophisticated forensic data analysis program undertaken by the Federal Criminal 
Office provided the authorities with vital clues for tracking down the RAF and its supporters.369  
The result was the sweeping arrests of 10 members of the RAF in June and July, 1972, including 
leaders Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof, and Jan-Carl Raspe.370 
Incredibly, the RAF survived these arrests, eventually transitioning into the second 
generation of its leadership under one of the arrestees, Brigitte Mohnhaupt.371  Starting in 
January, 1973, the leadership of the first generation led the imprisoned RAF members in a series 
of hunger strikes to protest against the conditions in which they were held (alleging, for example, 
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that their being kept in isolated cells was a form of psychological torture).372  The third of these 
strikes, begun in September of 1974, resulted in the death by starvation of RAF member Holger 
Meins.373  The result was a resurgence of sympathy for the RAF in leftist circles and a boost in 
recruitment that would fill the ranks of the second generation.374 
The guiding objective for the second generation, thus, was to achieve the release of the 
imprisoned RAF leadership – with which they remained in contact via the leaders’ defense 
lawyers.375  On April 25, 1975, an RAF commando group organized by Siegfried Haag, one of 
the RAF’s lawyers, stormed the West German embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, planning to hold 
its staff hostage in exchange for the release of the prisoners.376  The operation failed, however, 
after the group accidentally set off the explosives they had brought, leading to the deaths of two 
RAF militants (two of the hostages were also executed by the commando in the events before the 
explosion).377 
Sometime on May 8 or 9, 1976, Meinhof committed suicide in her cell in Stammheim 
prison, leading to another boost in public sympathy for the RAF.378  Possibly reacting to the 
criticism of its treatment of the RAF prisoners, in spring of 1977, the West German authorities 
released Brigitte Mohnhaupt.379  Unbeknownst to the authorities, however, Mohnhaupt had 
served as the liaison between the imprisoned leaders and RAF militants in the outside world, 
helping to coordinate the RAF’s operations.380   
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Taking control of a second generation RAF that had improved its techniques and 
infrastructure in the preceding years, Mohnhaupt launched the group’s “Offensive 77” – a series 
of operations directed, as always, at freeing the imprisoned RAF leadership.381  On April 7, 1977, 
the RAF assassinated Chief Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback and his driver in retaliation for 
the prosecutions of the RAF.382  This was followed, on July 30, with the killing of Jürgen Ponto, 
chairman of the board of Dresdner Bank, in a botched kidnapping attempt.383   
Then, on September 5, 1977, the RAF kidnapped Hanns-Martin Schleyer, chairman of 
the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations, killing his driver and three police 
bodyguards in the process.384  As the RAF held Schleyer, threatening to kill him if its prisoners 
were not released, the group’s allies in the PFLP applied further pressure on the West German 
government by hijacking Lufthansa Flight 181 on October 13, taking its 91 passengers as 
hostages (and killing the pilot on October 16.385  Rather than release the RAF prisoners, 
however, the West German government held firm – and on October 17-18, a strike team of its 
GSG-9 counterterrorism unit successfully boarded the plane, killed three of the four PFLP 
militants aboard, and safely rescued all of the hostages.386  In prison, Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe 
responded to the news of the hijacking’s failure by killing themselves.387  In turn, the RAF 
responded to its leaders’ suicides by executing Schleyer.388 
The failure of these operations and the imprisoned leaders’ suicides seriously 
demoralized the rest of the RAF, while the brutality of Schleyer’s kidnapping and murder 
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demolished much of the support and sympathy that the organization had accumulated as a result 
of Meins’ and Meinhof’s deaths.389  Furthermore, the crackdown following the events of what 
had become known as the “German Autumn,” resulted in the capture of half of the group’s 
experienced leaders.390 
On November 19, 1979, a failed bank robbery resulted in the killing of a pedestrian who 
the RAF operatives viewed as an innocent casualty.391  This proved to be the last straw for eight 
members of the group’s core underground cell, who left the organization and retired to East 
Germany under assumed names (with the cooperation of the East German government).392  They 
would be joined by two more in 1981 and 1982.393  While the loss of these members reduced the 
size of the RAF’s core underground cell by half yet again, the group was able to find some 
replacements by absorbing the remaining members of an allied terrorist group, the June 2nd 
Movement, including its leader Inge Viett.394  
The negotiations over the resettlement of the retiring members brought the RAF into 
closer cooperation with the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi), which provided the 
remaining members of the RAF with military training (including in heavy weapons) in 1980 and 
1981.395  The RAF employed this training first by bombing the U.S. Air Force base in Ramstein 
on August 31, 1981 (injuring 17 people), then, on September 15, by attempting to assassinate the 
commander of U.S. armed forces in Europe, General Frederick Kroesen through attacking his car 
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with rocket-powered grenades and machine guns (the attack failed due to his car being 
armored).396 
During the 1978-1982 period, the RAF also underwent a change in motivation and 
strategy.  With its founding leaders gone, the group moved away from freeing its imprisoned 
members and focused instead on carrying out attacks against the “Military-Industrial-Complex” 
and the “apparatus of repression.”397  Besides the 1981 attacks on Ramstein and General 
Kroesen, this included a failed attempt to assassinate NATO Commander Alexander Haig in 
Brussels in June 1979.398  In 1982, the RAF made this change in focus explicit in its strategy 
paper “Guerrilla, Resistance and Anti-Imperialist Front,” which also provided a formalization of 
the group’s organizational structure (discussed further below).399 
However, despite these changes, the days were numbered for the RAF’s second 
generation.  By 1982, the RAF and Stasi had had a falling out, reducing their cooperation – and 
on October 26 of that year, West German police discovered an RAF weapons cache which, 
among other things, contained documents with the locations of ten other caches.400  Staking out 
the caches, the police soon arrested Monhaupt, as well as Adelheid Schulz and Christian Klar 
(the last being the other leading member of the group, after Monhaupt).401 
And yet, even with the loss of its second-generation leadership, the RAF survived and 
transitioned into a third generation.  By 1984, the leaders of the third-generation RAF had 
become Wolfgang Grams and Birgit Hogefeld, and the group announced its plan to form a “West 
European Guerrilla” movement through alliances with France’s Action Directe, Belgium’s 
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Communist Combatant Cells, and Italy’s Red Brigades.402  Out of these groups, the RAF did 
have some success in cooperating with Action Directe, a Marxist-Leninist group responsible for 
carrying out bombings and assassinations against United States, Israeli, and French government 
targets from 1979 to 1987.403  A hunger strike begun by the RAF’s remaining prisoners on 
December 4, 1984 was followed by Action Directe’s assassination of General René Audran on 
January 25, 1985, which in turn was followed by the RAF’s assassination of Motors and 
Turbines Union CEO Ernst Zimmermann on February 1.404  The two groups also cooperated on 
the August 8, 1985 bombing of the U.S. Rhine-Main airbase in Frankfurt, which killed two and 
injured 11 – the militants having gained access to the base by killing an American serviceman on 
the day before and stealing his identity card.405  In its effort to work with the other two groups, 
however, the RAF had almost no success.  Cooperation with the CCC yielded only the transfer of 
some of the Belgians’ stolen explosives into the RAF’s hands (the CCC had been virtually 
neutralized by the arrest of its leader in December 1985).406  The Red Brigades, meanwhile, were 
riven by conflict between the groups’ two factions – one of which (the Red Brigades for the 
Construction of the Fighting Communist Party) openly refused the RAF’s suggestion of 
cooperation while the other (the Union of Fighting Communists) attempted to take part in the 
West European Guerrilla movement through assassinating Italian General Licio Giorgiere on 
March 20, 1987, but shortly thereafter lost around 100 of its members to arrest by Italian security 
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forces.407  The RAF’s allies in Action Directe likewise suffered a crushing blow on February, 21, 
1987, when the entire leadership of the group’s international faction (the group’s largest and 
most active faction) was arrested by French authorities while meeting in a farmhouse near 
Orleans.408 
On its own, the RAF assassinated Seimens manager Karl Heinz Beckurts and his driver 
on July 9, 1986, diplomat Gerold von Braunmühl on October 10, 1986, and Deutsche Bank CEO 
Alfred Herrhausen on November 30, 1989 – but its final end was also in the works.409  The fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the reunification of Germany in 1990 both cost the RAF its 
primary state supporter and undermined its ideological basis.  Furthermore, in June of 1990, the 
government of the new, unified Germany quickly arrested the RAF operatives who had retired to 
the East ten years earlier.410  The group attacked the U.S. embassy in Bonn in February 1991 and 
conducted another assassination, of Detlev Carsten Rohwedder, head of a company tasked with 
the privatization of former state assets in East Germany, on April 1 – but otherwise accomplished 
little while some of the imprisoned retirees cooperated with the authorities to provide 
information about the organization in exchange for lighter sentences.411 
Recognizing that the RAF prisoners were a major source of motivation and propaganda 
for the group, German Minister of Justice Klaus Kinkel announced on January 1, 1992 that the 
government would undertake a program that would, to quote Dennis Pluchinsky, “prematurely 
release certain imprisoned RAF members who were seriously ill or who had served long prison 
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sentences” as a step toward getting the group to lay down its arms.412  This policy, called the 
Kinkel Initiative, elicited a positive response from the underground core of the RAF, who 
released a statement on April 10, 1992 saying not only that the group would end its policy of 
targeting individuals in return for the immediate release of these prisoners, but that its entire 
campaign of violence had been a failure (but not that it would give up on its goals or 
surrender).413  The April statement caused a major rift within the RAF, however, as several long-
serving RAF prisoners announced that that they would not return to the group after being 
released, and in the following years, a growing number called on the RAF to disband and 
provided information to the authorities.414  On June 27, 1993, the leaders of the third generation, 
Grams and Hogefeld were caught by the GSG-9 in Bad Kleinen – Hogefeld was arrested, while 
Grams died in a shootout with a GSG-9 officer (who was also killed).415  Finally, on April 20, 
1998, the few remaining members of the RAF core underground cell released a statement to the 
Reuters news agency announcing that the group had officially disbanded.416 
 
Organizational Structure  
Throughout its existence, the Red Army Faction had a cellular-network organizational 
structure.  While this structure was based on directions provided in Brazilian Marxist militant 
Carlos Marighella’s 1969 “Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,” it was more so the de facto 
outcome of the group’s genesis and day-to-day activities rather than any sort of formal attempt at 
                                                 
412
 Dennis A. Pluchinsky, “Germany’s Red Army Faction: An Obituary,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, 16 (1993) 139. 
413
 Pluchinsky, 136-140. 
414
 Moghadam, 170-171. 
415
 Moghadam, 170. 
416
 Moghadam, 170-171. 
  
 
124
organization (at least, until 1982 – as will be discussed below regarding the RAF’s third 
generation).417  This lax approach to the group’s structure was a side-effect of a deliberate 
decision by the founding members of the RAF to focus on “taking action” rather than “debating 
theory” (a decision that also left the group without a clear ideology or strategy), and was 
facilitated by the group’s consistently small membership (estimated to be about 20 active 
underground members at the height of the first generation, under 40 at the height of the second, 
and around 15-20 in the third; with a number of above-ground, but clandestine supporting 
members estimated from around 1,000-1,500 in the 1970s to around 200 in the 1980s).418 
Regarding the RAF’s structure, the term “cellular” is especially appropriate – besides 
being made up of compartmentalized circles of militants based around the nucleus-like leaders, 
the RAF also grew like a single-celled organism by absorbing cells from other groups (notably 
from the Socialist Patients Collective in 1971 and the June 2nd Movement in 1977) and carried 
out operations by dividing itself into smaller cells.419  For the RAF’s first two generations, the 
core cell made up of the group’s leaders and other underground members would, as per the 
demands of a particular objective or an effort to elude the authorities, spin off smaller sub-units 
(with these sub-units sometimes supported by recruits who were not yet wanted by the police and 
still held day-jobs).420 While the escape-oriented versions of these sub-units had no special name, 
the operation-driven ones were called “commandos,” and each commando was named in honor 
of a martyr for the Marxist cause (for example, the May 11, 1972 bombing of the U.S. Fifth 
Army’s Headquarters in Frankfurt was carried out by the “Petra Schelm Commando” – 
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composed of leading members Baader, Ensslin and Meins, and named for the first RAF member 
to die in a gunfight with police).421  These commando groups were responsible for both the 
planning and execution of their operations and, while the commandos of the RAF’s first 
generation were seen as “amateurish,” former head of German domestic intelligence, Hans Josef 
Horchem described the commandos of the second and third generations as being exceedingly 
deliberate in both their planning and their decision-making:  
Experience hitherto has shown that the RAF has always prepared its actions very 
carefully and long in advance; for example, the attack on Karlheinz Beckurts on 9 
July 1986 was prepared, according to the Federal Criminal Office (BKA), at least 
three months in advance by the ‘Mara Cargol Commando’ group which was 
responsible for the attack…. The preparations for all the RAF actions hitherto 
were carried out collectively by the commando group concerned.  Plans were 
discussed and decided on collectively, then individual tasks assigned according to 
the expertise of the appropriately qualified member of the group.  In the case of 
all the actions, the deed was a communal one: successes could be claimed by each 
and every individual; likewise, an unsuccessful action was a failure for which 
each individual had to share the blame.422   
 
Besides the commandos and the core leadership cell, Jeremy Varon has also noted that 
from the outset, “the RAF established small cells in cities throughout West Germany.” 423  These 
local cells of operatives who had not yet been forced underground were later to be called “illegal 
militants,” and would carry out minor attacks on their independent initiative, as well support the 
commando cells and serve as a talent pool for later recruitment to the core group.424   
In addition to the core leadership cell, the temporarily-arranged commando cells, and the 
local illegal militant cells, the 1972 arrests of the RAF’s first generation of leaders added another 
element to the group’s organizational structure:  the RAF prisoners.  While imprisonment 
prevented these members from being directly involved in carrying out attacks, and limited their 
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influence over the attacks’ planning, they nevertheless exerted significant influence over the 
RAF’s strategy, publicity, and recruitment.  Facilitated by their lawyers (some of whom became 
active RAF militants), this influence worked through both overt and covert means:  Overtly, 
through hunger strikes, press interviews, and the channeling of writings to leftist publications; 
covertly through secret communications between the prisoners and the members of the core 
leadership cell.425  The peak of the prisoners’ influence was 1972-1977, the period from the 
leaders’ arrest until the suicides of Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe – during which the RAF’s 
activities were focused exclusively on the prisoners’ treatment and on achieving their release.426  
And while the RAF shifted emphasis away from freeing its prisoners after 1977, the group 
continued to exert a degree of influence as symbolic figureheads of the organization – so much 
so that a 1992 split between the RAF’s underground core and many of the prisoners (these 
prisoners having repudiated their time in the RAF) kicked off the gradual process of dissolution 
that led to the group’s 1998 demise.427 
Despite having all these institutions in place, it was not until the rise of the RAF’s third 
generation that its leaders announced a formal plan for the group’s organization.  In a May 1982 
strategy paper titled “Guerrilla, Resistance and Anti-Imperialist Front,” the leadership laid out a 
structure with the prisoners at the top, followed by “the commandos” (meaning both the 
underground core cell and its ad hoc sub-units), the above-ground illegal militants, and finally 
the “political fighters” – supporters who only engaged in legal activities (such as protests).428  
This structure was, however, much more of an idealized system than an accurate reflection of 
RAF’s inner workings – since 1977, the locus of the group’s leadership had been shifting back 
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from the prisoners to the underground core cell; there was little command or control over the 
illegal militants or political fighters; and, in another development resulting from the events of 
1977, the number of political fighters had swiftly and significantly diminished (and would 
continue to do so throughout the 1980s and 1990s).429 
 
Safe Haven Conditions  
East Germany 
Almost from the very beginning of its creation, the Red Army Faction was able to utilize 
East Germany as a safe haven.  According to Ministry of State Security (Stasi) archives made 
available after the collapse of East Germany and its reunification with the West, shortly after the 
group’s seminal jailbreak of Baader on May 14, 1970, Meinhof met personally with the secretary 
of the German Democratic Republic’s Central Committee (to whom she had access thanks to 
contacts made via the East German government’s secret subsidization of her husband’s 
magazine) and secured for her group shelter and free passage through the East.430  East Germany 
did not, however, create an institutionalized system of support for terrorism until 1975, with the 
creation of the Stasi’s Department XXII, and it would not be until 1978 that the government 
would move from a policy of passive support (allowing RAF members to pass through the 
country) to a policy of active support.431   
Starting in 1979, Inge Viett, a Stasi informant who had recently joined the RAF from the 
June 2nd Movement, began a process of negotiation between the group and the GDR to arrange 
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the retirement of 10 disaffected RAF militants (including herself) to East Germany under new 
identities.432  While the loss of these members was a significant blow to the RAF (they 
constituted approximately half the underground core membership at the time), the managed 
retirement provided by the GDR allowed them to purge the members without resorting to self-
destructive violence or fearing that they would turn into informants for the West German 
authorities.433  
This, however, was only the beginning of the Stasi’s increased engagement with the 
RAF.  In 1980 and 1981, the Stasi provided military training for the RAF (particularly in heavy 
weapons) at a paramilitary camp in Briesen.434  The camp also briefly became a secure 
headquarters from which the RAF could make its statements and launch attacks in the West, but 
the group began to fall out with the Stasi starting in 1982, leading to a diminished level of 
engagement.435  In his book, STASI: Sword and Shield of the Party, John Schmeidel notes that 
the surviving records left behind by the Stasi (many of which, of course, were destroyed before 
Germany’s reunification), do not give an explanation for why the two fell out – instead, he 
provides a number of possible reasons, including that the Stasi received all the useful 
information that they could get out of the RAF, that the tightened security measures in the West 
caused by the RAF were complicating East German intelligence collection efforts, or that the 
RAF refused to be controlled by the Stasi and hence were deemed unreliable.436   
But while the RAF and Stasi may not have cooperated quite as closely after 1982, 
circumstantial evidence indicates that the GDR nevertheless provided logistical support to the 
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RAF (in the form of weapons, money, and training).437  Schmeidel points to the tactical and 
technical sophistication of the attacks carried out by the third generation of the RAF in the late 
1980s as indications of possible GDR support.438  In addition, the inability of the West German 
government to uncover any RAF safe houses after 1984, or solve a number of the attacks 
committed between then and 1998, point suspiciously toward the possibility that the RAF may 
have been using the GDR as a safe haven.439  
 
West Germany 
Unlike in the East, there was never a strong safe haven for the RAF in West Germany.  In 
1970-1972, the group was able to draw liberally upon Meinhof’s wide-ranging social contacts 
and its outlaw appeal among the schili to secure safe houses and some logistical support, but this 
support dried up considerably after the RAF’s bombing campaign of May 1972 (in the end, 
Meinhof was arrested after the police received a tip from one of her social contacts, in whose 
apartment the militants intended to stay).440  The RAF also had the ill fortune to come into being 
just after the West German government had already begun an extensive modernization of its 
crime fighting technology and techniques – particularly in the collection and computer-assisted 
analysis of forensic data, which helped bring about the rapid capture of the first generation’s 
entire leadership.441 
Furthermore, throughout the 1970s, the West German government instituted increasingly 
strict anti-terrorism legislation, including restrictions on communication between lawyers and 
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defendants (as a response to the role of the RAF prisoners’ defense lawyers in both facilitating 
the organization’s publicity and its internal communication), a ban on radicals in civil service 
jobs, and a criminalization of the “support of violence” and “incitement to violence” (this last 
move being repealed by the end of the decade for being a violation of citizens’ civil liberties).442  
And finally, following Black September’s 1972 killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich 
Olympics, the Federal Republic created its famous counterterrorism unit, GSG-9, who would be 
responsible for thwarting the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s hijacking of 
Lufthansa Flight 181 in 1977 (and thereby close the door on the RAF’s plans to achieve the 
release of its imprisoned leadership).443 
 
Other Countries 
The RAF actively sought out cooperation with a wide variety of foreign terrorist groups 
(including France’s Action Directe, Belgium’s Communist Combatant Cells, Italy’s Red 
Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), and its operatives carried out 
training and logistical support operations in a number of different countries.444  John Schmeidel 
reports that, following the failure of the Schleyer kidnapping and the hijacking of Lufthansa 
Flight 181, half of the RAF core cell took shelter in South Yemen, while the other half took 
shelter in Czechoslovakia.445  Meanwhile, in his biographical sketch of RAF operative Silke 
Maier-Witt, Jeremy Varon notes that she was active in both Yemen and the Netherlands.446 
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Apart from its time in East Germany, perhaps the most notable trip abroad for the RAF 
came after the group’s formation, when the first generation traveled to a PFLP training camp in 
Jordan.447  This trip, however, turned out to be a disaster – while the female members of the 
group gained some education in firearms, the male members squabbled too much with their 
PFLP instructors to receive any new knowledge, and the whole project was undermined by 
cultural differences (over subjects ranging from sexual freedoms and food to discipline and 
firearm use).448  After Baader came into conflict with RAF member Peter Homann (who accused 
Baader of pursuing violence for its own sake) and Ensslin tried, unsuccessfully, to have the 
PFLP execute Homann on the false accusation of being an Israeli spy, the group was 
unceremoniously sent home.449  In total, the RAF’s time at the PFLP training camp lasted only 
two months.450   
 
Alternative Factors 
While the Red Army Faction’s history clearly shows that the combination of a cellular-
network organizational structure and access to safe havens made the group highly resistant to 
being dismantled by the authorities, the question of whether its structure hampered the group’s 
activities is less clear. 
For one thing, while the operations undertaken by the RAF’s first generation were often 
amateurish in their planning and execution, those undertaken by the second and third generations 
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were far more sophisticated.451  Among such examples are the operations of “German Autumn” 
in 1977 (the combined Schleyer kidnapping and hijacking of Lufthansa Flight 181), the 1981 
attack on General Kroesen, and the 1985 attack on Rhine-Main airbase.452   
However, while on its own a cellular-network would have difficulty in coordination such 
operations, this sophistication is easily explained by the RAF’s access to safe havens and to the 
support of foreign actors.  Most notably, the RAF had assistance from the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (which, itself, was supported by the Soviet Union’s KGB via PFLP 
deputy leader and a KGB agent Wadi Haddad) and received resources and training from the Stasi 
of East Germany.453  With such support and safe havens from which it could plan its operations, 
the RAF was able to carry out ambitious attacks despite its small membership and informal 
organizational structure. 
More difficult to dismiss is the question of whether the RAF’s failure in the areas outside 
of tactics (that is, in its ability to get anything out of the West German government or to mobilize 
supporters) was due to the group’s organizational structure or to other factors.  Jeremy Varon 
writes that, as with other groups organized into cellular networks, isolation (made even worse by 
the state-engineered isolation of its imprisoned leaders) made the RAF subject to groupthink and 
a distorted perception of the outside world – leaving it oblivious to the fact that its actions were 
alienating the very groups that it was hoping to mobilize and preventing it from pursuing realistic 
goals.454   
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At the same time, one could argue that the RAF, from the beginning, never invested 
much in its strategic planning or its mobilization efforts.  The founding members of the group 
disdained of talking about “theory,” prizing “action” instead, and believed that carrying out 
attacks against the state would inherently mobilize larger public into a revolution.455  And, 
likewise, in its first generation, the RAF did little to appeal to anyone outside of the student 
protest movement or the schili community – histories of the first generation (more commonly 
called the “Baader-Meinhof Gang”) frequently highlight the contradiction between its advocacy 
for Marxist revolution while driving expensive cars, staying in fancy apartments, and contacting 
rich leftists for funding.456   
However, while these qualities did not prime the RAF for success, having both a cellular-
network organizational structure and a safe haven does appear to have worsened them over time.  
It is notable, for example, how the second generation of the RAF – isolated by the demands of 
the cellular system, but able to draw upon a safe haven and international assistance – focused on 
no real political issue except for the freeing of the group’s founders during their period of 
imprisonment (1972-1977).457  Varon writes that this obsessive, inward focus was a product of 
living in cladestine cells:  
For the guerrillas, the imperative of survival and the simple desire to avenge 
fallen comrades appeared to take precedence over ideological and moral 
considerations. Much of the early violence of RAF and other guerrillas was 
therefore oddly depoliticized, driven not by any grand design but by the pressures 
of illegality and the intense loyalties the underground bred.458 
 
It is likewise telling that it was not until the RAF’s third generation that the group began to 
undergo serious strategic and organizational reform (as seen in the May 1982 paper “Guerrilla, 
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Resistance and Anti-Imperialist Front”).459  Unlike the second generation, the leadership of the 
third generation were neither part of the RAF’s founding group nor its direct disciples (the 
preeminent leader of the second generation, Brigitte Mohnhaupt, on the other hand, was both).460  
This new group of leaders allowed the RAF to break (somewhat) with the previous generations’ 
failed approaches toward formulating strategy and mobilizing supporters (although the third 
generation was still far from effective at either). 
The most important indicator that the double-security of a cellular-network and a safe 
haven inhibited reform within the RAF comes from the 1979 purge of the “aussteigers” 
(“dropouts” in English).461  Following the crushing failures of 1977, and a botched bank robbery 
in 1979 that resulted in the killing of a pedestrian (considered an innocent victim by the members 
of the RAF), around half of the core underground cell of the RAF had begun to question the 
group’s strategy and methods.462  However, rather than bend to pressure from the dissenters, 
eliminate them, or risk having them turn themselves over to the authorities, the group’s 
leadership was provided with a safety valve from the Stasi:  the dissenters could retire in East 
Germany under assumed names.463  This allowed the RAF to continue along the same course 
without making any reforms that might improve its strategy or chances of mobilizing supporters 
– in fact, the old course was buttressed by the Stasi’s providing military training to the remaining 
members of the organization.464 
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Conclusion and Notes 
Despite some caveats, the history of West Germany’s Red Army Faction conforms to the 
hypothesis’ predicted results.  While the RAF’s possession of a cellular-network structure and a 
safe haven made it highly durable – allowing it to survive for 28 years and endure two losses of 
its entire leadership – it nevertheless also made it highly ineffectual at achieving its political 
objectives or mobilizing supporters.  Regarding the “goodness of fit” between a terrorist group’s 
organizational structure and the presence of a safe haven, the RAF made for a “bad fit.” 
The next and final case is also predicted to represent a “bad fit” between organizational 
structure and environmental security:  the United States’ Weathermen/Weather Underground, a 
group that had a hierarchical structure but did not possess a safe haven.  As with the previous 
cases, the history of the Weather Underground case will be examined for possible intervening 
variables and organizational change, and its performance (in terms of number of attacks, goals 
met, and survival) will be discussed.  
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Chapter 6:  The Weather Underground 
Chapter Objective and Structure 
In this chapter, the method of process tracing will be used to examine if a terrorist 
group’s organizational structure (whether it is hierarchical or cellular-network-based) interacts 
with the relative security of its political environment (its access to a safe haven or not) to affect 
its survival and effectiveness.  In other words, this case will look at whether the relationship 
conforms to the expectations of a “good fit” between organizational structure and presence of a 
safe haven, or a “poor fit.”   
The subject for this case is the Weather Underground (also known, at times, as 
“Weatherman,” “the Weatherman Underground,” and “the Weather Underground 
Organization”), an American terrorist group that was active from 1969 to 1976.  The Weather 
Underground subscribed to two ideological motivations (the conflict between which would 
eventually prove to be the group’s downfall):  it was a Marxist-Leninist organization that sought 
the overthrow of the capitalist system, and it was an organization of white youth who sought to 
support national liberation and anti-racism movements.465  Of the various issues that fell under 
these two umbrellas, it was most occupied with opposing the U.S. government’s intervention in 
Vietnam and with supporting the black power movement.  Initially, it sought to further these 
goals through mobilizing white, working-class youth into a violent revolution – but an early 
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incident that lead to the deaths of three of its members moved the Weather Underground to 
employ bombings that carefully avoided inflicting casualties.466 
The objectives for this chapter will first be to provide the historical background for the 
case; second, to provide an analytical overview of how closely the history of the Weather 
Underground fits with the predictions of the hypothesis; third, to describe the organizational 
structure of the Weather Underground; fourth, to discuss whether the Weather Underground had 
access to a domestic or international safe haven; fifth, to look at any intervening variables that 
need to be taken into account; and, finally, to summarize the findings of this case. 
 
Analytical Overview 
The history of the Weather Underground appears to generally support the predicted 
results for a “poor fit” between a hierarchical organizational structure and an environment in 
which a group does not have access to a safe haven.  However, this conclusion is complicated by 
the Weather Underground’s shift in organizational type from a centralized hierarchy to a more 
decentralized and cellular structure (in the process of the group’s decision to go underground in 
December of 1970), and by a shift in its political environment toward being more secure due to 
an exogenous shock weakening its governmental adversaries (the Watergate scandal of 1972-
1974, and its impact on both the Weather Underground’s political enemies in the Nixon 
administration and on the U.S. government’s counterintelligence capabilities). 
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According to the hypothesis, a hierarchical organizational structure allows its leaders to 
have greater coordination and control over their group – providing it with advantages in the 
carrying out of operations, strategies, mobilization, negotiations, and other collective efforts – 
but leaves it vulnerable to government infiltration and disruption.  This is because such an 
organization features a greater degree of communication between its higher and lower echelons, 
a clear authority structure, and a lower degree of autonomy among units.  Given a safe haven, 
these vulnerabilities are reduced due to the restriction on the authorities’ ability to gain access to 
the core leadership of the group – but without such protection, it should prove easy for the 
authorities to find out about the group’s activities through informants and to target its leaders. 
Such does seem to be the case for the Weather Underground for the period from June 
1969 to December 1970 when it maintained a centralized, hierarchical structure.  A review of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s now-declassified records on the Weather Underground show 
that the group’s leadership, membership, and activities were well known to the FBI during this 
period (even if the Bureau waited until it was too late to act against the Weather 
Underground).467  Furthermore, an informant for the FBI managed to not only penetrate the 
organization, but also gain access to the highest levels of its leadership – only being undone by a 
bungled arrest after the Bureau initiated its belated crackdown.468  Even after the Weather 
Underground moved to a more decentralized, cellular form of organization, a very close attempt 
at catching the group’s West Coast leadership in the spring of 1971 indicates that the group 
might not have remained at liberty for as long as it did, were it not for the Watergate scandal 
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occupying its pursuers in the FBI and leading to the curtailing of the Bureau’s 
counterintelligence efforts.469  
As for the effectiveness of the Weather Underground in conducting operations and 
mobilizing supporters – its relative success in these matters does support the hypothesis’s 
predictions.  While falling far short of the group’s (unrealistic) goals, the Weather Underground 
did manage to bring together hundreds of supporters from around the country to mount a large-
scale, violent demonstration in Chicago on October 8-11, 1969 (called the Days of Rage).470  
Even after the group’s shift away from hierarchy, the central control of its leadership both 
restricted the group’s actions to a carefully conducted series of bombings, and brought about a 
sophisticated effort to publicize its views.471  Likewise, until it was undone by its own internal 
ideological divisions, the Weather Underground was able to mobilize a larger following of 
supporters and allied groups – particularly after the publication of its book-length manifesto 
Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism in 1974.472 
 
Background 
The Weather Underground was founded over the course of the June 18-22, 1969 
convention of the Students for a Democratic Society in Chicago, Illinois.473  With an estimated 
100,000 members at the time, SDS was one of the most prominent public movements opposing 
the United States’ war against North Vietnam – but it was also a movement that had fractured 
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into competing factions.474  The key source of the split was the question of whether SDS should 
support national liberation movements, in particular the black power movement in the United 
States.475  The Progressive Labor Party, the SDS’s largest faction, adhered to a strict Maoist view 
that any national or racial grievances served only to distract the working class from its conflict 
with the capital-owning class; by contrast, its adversaries in the Revolutionary Youth Movement 
felt that, in addition to working toward a communist society, it was SDS’s duty to support such 
movements.476  Leading up to the convention, the RYM argument had been made in a 10,000-
word manifesto titled “You Don’t Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows” 
(from a lyric in Bob Dylan’s “Subterranean Homesick Blues”) – and the supporters of this 
manifesto became known as the Weatherman faction, which would eventually become the 
Weather Underground.477   
In the conflict between RYM and the PLP, RYM emerged as the relative victor (most 
SDS chapters refused to join either group, and the SDS effectively collapsed – but RYM retained 
the organization’s headquarters and newsletter).478  Shortly thereafter, however, RYM itself split 
between one faction that sought to gradually mobilize the white working class into a more 
conventional communist party (called RYM II) and the Weatherman faction, who wanted to 
immediately engage in violence against the state and the capitalist elite.479 
Led by Bernardine Dohrn, Bill Ayers, Mark Rudd, and Jeff Jones, the Weatherman 
faction worked swiftly toward building its revolution.480  The organization believed that three 
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groups would be key to this effort: third-world liberation movements, the black power 
movement, and a movement of white working-class youth – the third of which, they thought, 
would be ripe for recruitment into a revolutionary army due to their political and economic 
exploitation (their vulnerability to being drafted, for example) and their (assumed) greater 
familiarity with violence in their daily lives.481  Toward this end, the central leadership in 
Chicago (called “the Weatherbureau”) dispatched Weatherman members to establish collectives 
in cities around the country, from which the local youth could be mobilized.482  Among the 
tactics employed for this mobilization were the picking of fights with police and street thugs (to 
demonstrate that the organization was tough and, hence, worth joining) and the invasion and 
disruption of schools (called “jail breaks”) by Weatherman members.483  The collectives also 
attempted to instill revolutionary discipline among their members, prepare them for combat, and 
get them to live according to countercultural ideals (to be discussed further under 
“Organizational Structure” below).484   
In the short-term, Weatherman’s plan to was deploy these thousands of young foot 
soldiers at a demonstration in Chicago scheduled for October 8-11, 1969.485  This event (later 
called “the Days of Rage”), was purposefully planned as a violent protest that would encourage 
more widespread rebellion against the U.S. government and take revenge on the Chicago police 
for their brutality against demonstrators during the previous summer’s Democratic National 
Convention (the Days of Rage were timed to coincide with the opening of a trial against eight 
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leftist protest leaders accused of committing a “conspiracy to incite riot” at the Convention).486  
The mobilization effort was not successful due to Weatherman’s exceedingly naïve view of the 
motivations of working class youth, the vast majority of whom were not willing to arrest or 
injury for the sake of establishing a communist society, and only a few hundred hard-core 
Weatherman supporters arrived for the demonstration.487  But armed with improvised hand-to-
hand weapons, helmets, and heavy clothing, the few militants present nevertheless generated a 
level of violence and property damage that captured national headlines – according to Jeremy 
Varon, an estimated 800 automobile windows were broken along with another 600 residential or 
store windows; 8 demonstrators were shot; and 287 demonstrators were arrested, around a dozen 
of which were charged with assault or aggravated battery.488  In addition, two nights before the 
Days of Rage, Ayers and fellow Weatherman Terry Robbins had blown up a statue dedicated to 
the police officers killed while clashing with workers in Chicago’s 1886 Haymarket riots – a 
preview of the bombing campaign to come.489  
The Days of Rage alienated much the rest of the New Left (who saw the violence as 
counterproductive) and invited the authorities to pursue Weatherman, but the group’s leadership 
was undeterred.490  On December 27-30, Weatherman held another large-scale meeting called the 
Flint War Council.491  Amid a series of speeches pledging an intensified campaign of 
revolutionary violence, the leadership announced that the group would be going underground so 
as to continue its struggle in the face of the government crackdown that would inevitably follow 
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future attacks.492  In the aftermath of this decision, Weatherman’s membership shrank by about 
half through a combination of disaffection with the group’s course and a series of purges of 
members not considered to be reliable enough for its clandestine operations.493  In addition, the 
group attempted to move to a more decentralized structure, with major collectives operating on 
the East Coast, the West Coast, and in the Midwest (in reality, the Weatherman leadership 
maintained a high degree of centralized control, shuffling personnel from one collective to 
another as it saw fit).494 
In a twist of fate, however, while Weatherman would stay underground, its lust for 
revolutionary bloodshed would not last long.  On March 6, 1970, an accidental explosion at the 
New York City townhouse serving as the headquarters of the East Coast collective killed three of 
the group’s members, including Ayers’ then-girlfriend Diana Oughton, and sent two more into 
hiding.495  The explosion had occurred while the group was making a bomb to attack a dance at 
an Army base in Fort Dix, New Jersey – an operation deliberately planned to produce military 
and civilian casualties, in contrast to Weatherman’s previously nonlethal attacks.496  (Between 
the Flint War Council and the townhouse explosion, in late February the New York collective 
had firebombed the home of a judge presiding over the trial of 21 Black Panthers members – but 
there were no casualties.497) 
                                                 
492
 Berger, 122-124; Varon, 158-161. 
493
 Berger, 123-124; Varon, 171; Larry Grathwohl and Frank Reagan, Bringing Down 
America: An FBI Informer with the Weathermen (Arlington House: New Rochelle, NY, 1976), 
112-122. 
494
 Grathwohl and Reagan, 127-129, 152, 162, 168-169. 
495
 Berger, 127-128; Varon, 173-174; Keath Beattie, “Radical Pedagogy: Lessons from 
the Sixties,” Australasian Journal of American Studies, 23.2 (December 2004): 92. 
496
 Varon, 174. 
497
 Varon, 174. 
  
 
144
The townhouse explosion led the group’s leadership to reconsider its plans to carry out 
attacks against people – instead, the group decided to employ bombings only against property, 
and would take pains to avoid casualties.498  But at the same time, the explosion also spurred the 
federal authorities into a frenzied pursuit of Weatherman. On April 2, the federal government 
issued indictments against 12 leaders of the group and named another 28 as co-conspirators for 
their activities in the Days of Rage (this was in addition to another 64 indictments issued in 
December from the local court in Cook County, Illinois).499  Less than two weeks later, in the 
resulting scramble for arrests, the FBI blew the cover of their only undercover informant in the 
group, Larry Grathwohl, in the course of apprehending two mid-level operatives.500   
Despite the federal manhunt against it, in the course of 1970, Weatherman managed to 
carry out bombings of the National Guard Headquarters in Washington, D.C. on May 10, New 
York City Police headquarters on June 10, Presidio Army Base and Military Police Station in 
San Francisco on July 25, the police statue in Chicago’s Haymarket Square (again) on October 5, 
San Francisco’s Marin County Courthouse on October 8, New York’s Long Island City 
Courthouse on October 9, and the Harvard War Research Center for International Affairs on 
October 15.501  In addition, on September 15, the group helped counterculture figure and LSD-
advocate Dr. Timothy Leary escape from a minimum-security prison in San Luis Obispo, 
California and flee to Algeria (where he was hosted by the international chapter of the Black 
Panthers).502  By this time, staring with its communiqué on May 21, the group had also begun 
referring to itself as the “Weatherman Underground” – although on December 6, another, more 
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extensive communiqué would change this to the gender-neutral “Weather Underground,” part of 
a broader attempt by the group to be less chauvinistic and militaristic.503 
On February 28, 1971, the Weather Underground bombed the U.S. Capitol in response to 
the decision of the administration of President Richard Nixon to invade Laos – an attack that, in 
a televised address, Nixon denounced as “the most dastardly act in American history.”504  The 
authorities, meanwhile, were drawing closer to catching key members of the group – the arrest of 
a lower-level member in New York City in December 1970 had given the FBI information about 
the false identities that the rest of the members were using, and the leadership of the West Coast 
collective barely slipped out of an FBI trap in the spring of 1971.505  Unfortunately for the FBI, 
larger events would soon complicate its efforts to pursue the Weather Underground.  Since 1968, 
the Bureau had engaged in a special counterintelligence program against the New Left (called 
COINTELPRO-New Left) that sought to disrupt and monitor both legal and illegal groups – but 
on March 8, 1971, this program was brought to an end when the FBI’s office in Media, 
Pennsylvania was burglarized by a group calling itself the “The Citizens’ Commission to 
Investigate the FBI” and the secret COINTELPRO files were released to the press.506  Citing 
interviews with Weather Underground members and the account of an FBI whistleblower, Dan 
Berger claims that, despite the official death of COINTELPRO, the FBI redoubled its pursuit of 
the Weather Underground throughout 1971 and 1972, going so far as to use illegal measures 
(discussed further below under “Safe Haven Conditions”).507  But starting in 1972, these efforts 
would be curtailed by yet another, greater shock to the functioning of the FBI: the scandal that 
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erupted following Nixon administration operatives’ effort to break into the Democratic National 
Committee’s headquarters in Washington, D.C.’s Watergate Hotel, and the wide-ranging fallout 
that it would generate for the president, his advisors, the Republican Party, the Justice 
Department, the FBI, and the U.S. intelligence community as a whole.508  Facing intense public 
and Congressional scrutiny, as well as a proliferation of violent groups, the authorities’ pursuit of 
the Weather Underground gradually slackened even despite of the group’s bombing of the 
Pentagon on May 19, 1972.509  As the illegality of the FBI’s techniques weakened the Justice 
Department’s cases against the members of the Weather Underground, the Department finally 
dropped its indictments in October of 1973 and September of 1974.510 
But even with the authorities easing off, the Weather Underground was soon to go into 
decline.  The signing of the Paris Peace Accords between the United States and North Vietnam 
in January of 1973 brought about an end to direct American involvement in the war, and began 
to weaken the motivation that had held together Weather Underground.511  The group still carried 
out occasional bombings in response to national liberation and civil rights matters, but 
increasingly shifted to legal, aboveground means for publicizing its messages.512  In July of 
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1974, the Weather Underground released a book detailing its ideology and political positions 
titled Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism, and the popularity of this 
book among the radical left led to the establishment of an allied (but independent), non-violent, 
above-ground group called the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee.513  The creation of Prairie 
Fire and PFOC, however, led to further questions within the organization about the Weather 
Underground’s purpose.  For one thing, in the course of writing Prairie Fire, the group found 
itself increasingly torn over the question that had caused the SDS to split five years earlier: 
should the Weather Underground be anti-racist group supporting national liberation movements, 
or should it be a Marxist group supporting the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat?514  
For another, given Prairie Fire’s success and the dropping of the federal indictments against the 
members of the Weather Underground, why was the group bothering to stay underground and 
conduct bombings at all?515  And, lastly, the Weather Underground found itself divided over 
what, if anything, it should do to support women’s liberation.516 
Further efforts to publicize the Weather Underground’s message only aggravated these 
intra-group tensions – first through the magazine Osawatomie (named for the Kansas town 
where a small group under abolitionist John Brown fought a battle against a much larger pro-
slavery militia in 1856, it survived for only six issues); then through the 1975 documentary film 
Underground, in which concealed Weather Underground members were interviewed by the 
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filmmakers.517  When, under the cover of PFOC sponsorship, the Weather Underground 
convened a public conference of leftist groups titled “Hard Times are Fighting Times” (known 
retrospectively as the “Hard Times Conference”) on January 30-February 2, 1976, these tensions 
finally exploded – criticisms from black and feminist groups of the increasingly traditional 
Marxist bent of the Weather Underground and its leadership finally led the dissenters within the 
group to split with the organization, bringing about its collapse.518  The members of the Weather 
Underground would go on to either join smaller, shorter-lived groups or surface from the 
underground and pursue non-violent activities.519 
 
Organizational Structure  
Starting in the summer of 1969, the Weathermen constructed a hierarchical network of 
territorially distributed units (“collectives”) controlled by a centralized leadership based in 
Chicago (“the Weatherbureau”).520  This structure was the product of applying the doctrines of 
Che Guevara’s foco theory (which, to quote Jeremy Varon, called for “small, semi-autonomous 
cells guided by a central leadership” – itself a more cellular form of organization) to the remains 
of the SDS’s hierarchical bureaucracy.521  At this time, there were Weathermen collectives based 
in Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, and Seattle (and 
possibly more locations).522  The sizes of these collectives varied wildly (Varon writes that they 
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ranged from “one to several dozen members”), and the overall strength of the Weathermen at this 
time is estimated to have been more than 500 people.523  
Despite the group’s geographic distribution, the Weatherbureau exerted a strong degree 
of control over the behavior of the collectives, attempting to mold it according to a mix of Maoist 
discipline and counterculture ideals.  Among the policies pursued by the Weatherbureau were the 
shipping of members away from their home locations to other collectives (“to encourage 
individual political development and… separate people from the comforts of their previous 
‘bourgeois’ life,” according to Dan Berger), a “smash monogamy” campaign that sought to 
separate couples and promote sexual experimentation (which, critics have since argued, also 
facilitated sexual exploitation of female members), and “criticism/self-criticism” sessions that 
enforced discipline and eroded individual identities through battering individual members with 
hours of accusations about their alleged counterrevolutionary beliefs.524  The chief purpose of the 
collectives at this time was to mobilize working class youth for the violent October 8-11, 1969 
demonstration in Chicago (“the Days of Rage”).525  This mobilization effort was not successful 
and only an estimated 600 people participated in the Days of Rage demonstration.526   
Following the group’s decision to go underground after the Flint, Michigan “War 
Council” meeting in late December 1969, the Weathermen underwent a change in both 
organizational structure and membership.527  The group shrunk to approximately 150 members 
(following a series of purges) and reorganized into three collectives based, respectively, in the 
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East Coast, the West Coast, and the Midwest.528  In his memoir of his experiences, Larry 
Grathwohl, an FBI informant who spent seven months in the Weather Underground and had 
access to members of the top leadership, claims that as of early 1970, the group had three-to-six-
person cells “in New York, Buffalo, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Denver, 
San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley, and Seattle.”529 
Varon describes the general scope of the new organizational structure in the following 
terms:   
Collectives based in San Francisco, New York City, and Chicago and Detroit 
were to experiment more or less autonomously in devising underground 
strategies.  Members of the West Coast collective, headed by Dohrn and Jones, 
spent time in Berkeley and San Francisco’s Haight-Ashbury district, but avoided 
public political activities and quietly plotted bombings.  The Midwest collective, 
headed by Ayers, built an arms cache and fabricated crude bombs with 
Grathwohl’s help…. The New York collective was the most militant.  Its leaders, 
J.J. [John Jacobs] and Terry Robbins, thought that whites would move in a 
revolutionary direction only through the prompting of dramatic acts of violence, 
and they were dead set on providing the drama.  The collective was headquartered 
in the fashionable Greenwich Village townhouse of Cathy Wilkerson’s father…. 
Though not technically underground, members of the collective virtually 
disappeared from public life and built a large stockpile of dynamite, purchased by 
Weathermen using false names from demolition supply companies in New 
England.530 
 
Based on what information is available, the March 6, 1970 destruction of Wilkerson’s 
townhouse, and the deaths of three of the members of the New York collective, appears to have 
beheaded this initial East Coast branch of the Weathermen (the New York collective’s leader, 
J.J., was ejected from the group in a subsequent meeting of its leadership – which also decided to 
shrink its numbers and change its name to “the Central Committee”).531  According to 
Grathwohl’s account, this led to yet another shift in the Weather Underground’s organization, 
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with the Midwest branch being largely dissolved and dispatched to take over the East Coast 
(specifically, he writes that the plan was to move most of the Midwest’s leadership and cells to 
New York, only leaving behind cells in Chicago and possibly Denver).532  Arguably, Grathwohl 
was forced to exit the group before this plan could come to full fruition (his cover being blown 
on April 15, 1970), but the Weather Underground did have enough capacity to carry out 
operations on the East Coast throughout the rest of its existence: in Albany (September 17, 
1971), Boston (October 1971), New York (in June 10, 1970; October 9, 1970; May 18, 1973; 
September 28, 1973; March 14, 1974; and June 16, 1975), and Washington, D.C. (February 28, 
1971; May 19, 1972; and January 28, 1975).533  Toward the end of its existence, the Weather 
Underground was composed of a few dozen members arranged in collectives on the East and 
West Coasts, with control over the organization being exercised through regular communication 
among the members of its Central Committee.534 
 
Safe Haven Conditions  
Based on all available evidence, the Weathermen/Weather Underground never held a 
domestic or foreign safe haven.  During the period when the group was above ground, it was 
geographically distributed among major metropolitan areas with its central leadership based in 
Chicago – and after it went underground, Dan Berger claims that the group relied on a network 
of supporters among the radical left to help hide the identities of the group’s members from the 
authorities and on its own cautious tradecraft.535  
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Furthermore, it does not appear that the group received much in the way of foreign 
support (although whether it received any at all is contested).  Despite a concerned effort by the 
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation to find evidence that the group was being supported by 
foreign governments, the most prominent international connections that they uncovered were 
that, before and after joining the Weather Underground, some of the group’s members undertook 
brief trips abroad to Cambodia, Canada, Cuba, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.536  Of these trips, the 
most notable were when Dohrn and other members of the pre-Weatherman SDS briefly met 
North Vietnamese officials in Bratislava, Yugoslavia in September of 1968, and when members 
of the Weatherman leadership met with North Vietnamese and Cuban officials in Havana, Cuba 
in July of 1969.537  In all cases, these trips consisted of propaganda presentations by the North 
Vietnamese and/or Cubans to persuade the young Americans to pressure their government to end 
the war effort, rather than any more substantive aid.538   
However, FBI informant Larry Grathwohl and former CIA counterintelligence operative 
Frank Rafalko have, respectively, claimed that individual members of the Weather Underground 
received some training in guerrilla tactics while in Cuba on “Venceremos Brigade” trips (trips 
sponsored by the Cuban government to promote support for the Cuban revolution among young 
Americans).539  In both cases, though, the evidence to support this claim is not very strong.   
For his part, Grathwohl says that his direct superior in the Weather Underground and 
then-girlfriend Naomi Jaffe received weapons and explosives training while in Cuba and North 
Vietnam (note that in Grathwohl’s 1974 U.S. Senate testimony, he names both countries; his 
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1976 autobiography, however, names only Cuba).540  Rafalko, meanwhile, draws the inference 
that Mark Rudd and 19 other SDS members received guerrilla training when they spent four 
weeks in Cuba in February 1968 at the Cuban Institute for Friendship between Peoples (which he 
argues is a school for guerrilla fighters, without providing further substantiation).541  In addition, 
Rafalko provides a statement before Congress by Charles Siragusa, chief inspector of the Illinois 
Crime Commission, who claimed that “most of the 692 Americans who had traveled to Cuba 
under SDS auspices received guerrilla warfare instruction.”542  Further research into this 
statement, though, reveals that while Siragusa did make it as part of his testimony before the U.S. 
Senate, his claim was based on a Detroit News article reprinted in the Chicago Sun-Times that, 
in turn, said the information originated from “classified reports of several free-world consulates 
in Havana” and an anonymous, “high-ranking Canadian government source.”543  In other words, 
Siragusa’s claim relies on unattributed, hearsay evidence.   
While it is possible that members of the Weather Underground did receive some amount 
of guerrilla training from Cuba, it is worth noting that, given the group’s early record of 
profoundly clumsy, crude, and amateurish attempts at violence (fighting the Chicago police with 
improvised clubs in the Days of Rage, using lit cigarettes as bomb fuses, the 1970 townhouse 
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explosion, etc.), such training could not have amounted to much.544  Grathwohl, whose tenure in 
the Weather Underground owed much to the fact that he had been a soldier in the U.S. Army 
and, hence, was thought to be an expert on explosives, confirmed the group’s paucity of training 
in his 1974 Senate testimony: “There were people in the Weathermen who told me that they had 
been trained in various kinds of guerrilla-type activities in other countries, but none to the extent 
– well, I will put it this way, as far as military knowledge and ability, I had more than any one of 
them, any 10 of them.”545  Berger, based on his interviews with the members of the Weather 
Underground, claims that what training the members received came from publicly available texts 
such as Abbie Hoffman’s Steal This Book; the writings of Régis Debray, Che Guevara, and 
Carlos Marighella; and U.S. Army training manuals.546 
In addition to claiming that the Weather Underground received training from Cuba, 
Rafalko also states that they received some degree of funding as well – although the evidentiary 
basis for this assertion is even weaker.  The 1976 FBI report Foreign Influence – Weather 
Underground Organization, one of Rafalko’s sources, implies that the Weather Underground 
received money through the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York – but does so 
merely on the basis of an October 1970 column from the Chicago Daily News, which itself states 
only that the Mission was funding radical groups in general, and provides no named sources for 
its information.547  Another citation of Rafalko’s is an undated, unattributed “Declassified U.S. 
Government Intelligence” document that allegedly came from the 1980 trial of former top FBI 
officials W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller (they had been accused, and later convicted, of 
ordering illegal searches against the friends and family of Weather Underground members) – a 
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document that Rafalko acquired through a right-wing conspiracy theory website.548  For his part, 
Grathwohl does not say that the Weather Underground received foreign funds in either his 
testimony before the U.S. Senate or in his autobiography – instead, he states that the money 
came from mix of larceny and fraud (for example: selling stolen goods, having male-female pairs 
of members marry to get wedding gifts from family members, tricking donors believing that they 
were giving to a non-violent anti-war group, etc.).549  Again, the statement from the members of 
the Weather Underground themselves (channeled through Berger) is that they financed their 
operations through donations from supporters and their own personal funds.550 
In summary, not only did the Weather Underground lack a safe haven, it also lacked 
much in the way of foreign support.  And making the political environment even more hostile 
was the fact that, for the group’s early years, it was confronted by an aggressive, nation-wide 
effort by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to monitor and disrupt all groups in the New Left 
(both violent and non-violent).  The COINTELPRO-New Left program established in 1968 was 
the fifth such program created since 1956 – the others being directed against the U.S. Communist 
Party, the Socialist Workers’ Party, white extremist groups (such as the Ku Klux Klan), and 
black extremist groups (such as the Black Panthers).551  As described by the 1975 Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (called the 
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“Church Committee” after its chairman, Idaho Senator Frank Church), the CONTELPRO 
programs comprised a range of tactics, including: 
• Anonymously attacking the political beliefs of targets in order to induce 
their employers to fire them; 
• Anonymously mailing letters to the spouses of intelligence targets for the 
purpose of destroying their marriages;  
• Obtaining from the IRS the tax returns of a target and then attempting to 
provoke an IRS investigation for the express purpose of deterring a protest 
leader from attending the Democratic National Convention;  
• "Falsely and anonymously labeling as Government informants members 
of groups known to be violent, thereby exposing the falsely labeled 
member to expulsion or physical attack; "' 
• Pursuant to instructions to use "misinformation" to disrupt demonstrations, 
employing such means as broadcasting fake orders on the same citizens 
band radio frequency used by demonstration marshals to attempt to control 
demonstrations and duplicating and falsely filling out forms soliciting 
housing for persons coming to a demonstration, thereby causing "long and 
useless journeys to locate these addresses." 
• Sending an anonymous letter to the leader of a Chicago street gang 
(described as "violence-prone") stating that the Black Panthers were 
supposed to have "a hit out for you." The letter was suggested because it 
"may intensify… animosity" and cause the street gang leader to "take 
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retaliatory action."552 
The Church Committee report goes on to say that, beyond COINTELLPRO, other illegal 
counterintelligence measures were employed during this period, such as the indiscriminate 
opening of mail, the interception of telegrams, warrantless break-ins and surveillance, blackmail, 
and informants engaged in violent criminal activity.553 
COINTELPRO was brought to an end in 1971, after the program’s memos were exposed 
to the press following the burglary of an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania by a group called 
“The Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI.”554  But citing claims by Weather 
Underground members and the autobiography of an FBI whistleblower, Dan Berger argues that 
the FBI continued an intense pursuit of the Weather Underground that included warrantless 
wiretaps, break-ins, mail openings, and both threatened and actual violence against the members’ 
friends, family, and acquaintances.555 
As well as the FBI’s efforts, starting in 1967, the CIA was tasked with examining 
whether dissidents within the United States were being influenced by foreign powers.556  Dubbed 
“Operation CHAOS,” this project both monitored the activities of American targets abroad and 
domestically (in violation of the agency’s mandate).557  According to the Church Committee 
report, this resulted in the collection of 13,000 files, 7,200 of which were on American 
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citizens.558  Operation CHAOS was finally ended in March 1974 due to steadily mounting 
opposition within the CIA itself.559   
The FBI’s anti-New Left efforts, meanwhile, were brought to an end in 1973-1974 as 
mounting fallout from the Watergate scandal embroiled the administration of President Richard 
Nixon, the Bureau, and the Justice Department.560  After 1974, the federal government’s pursuit 
of the Weather Underground substantially softened – but as noted earlier, this ironically helped 
feed into the group’s 1975 collapse as one of the several arguments between its members became 
whether or not there was any point to remaining underground.561 
 
Alternative Factors 
In the case of the Weather Underground, the most difficult question to answer is whether, 
had it maintained the more hierarchical structure of its Days of Rage period into its descent 
underground, would this have impacted its longevity?  This is, of course, a counterfactual 
question and, thus, can never be definitively answered.  However, the account by FBI informer 
Larry Grathwohl of his time in the Weather Underground seems to indicate that such a structure 
would have only made the group more vulnerable.  Despite a lack of any sort of undercover 
police training or tradecraft, Grathwohl survived the group’s membership purges in early 1970, 
including passing an LSD-fueled loyalty test through the simple ruse of only pretending to take 
his allotted acid capsule.562  From there, he rose to be an advisor to leading members Bill Ayers 
and Naomi Jaffe in the Midwest collective and was poised to be a critical member of the 
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reconstituted East Coast collective when his cover was blown – not by discovery by his fellow 
members, but by his mishandling by police during the arrest of two fellow members (the other 
members observed that the police shrugged off the discovery of Grathwohl’s Weather 
Underground-provided false identification papers rather than questioning him about them).563  
Despite Berger’s assertion that the Weather Underground was protected by the loyalty of its 
leftist supporters and allies, the extent of the FBI’s penetration via its work with Grathwohl 
indicates that had it not been for the group’s good fortune in being active during the Watergate 
scandal – and, possibly, had it not been for the Weather Underground’s decision, after the 
townhouse explosion, not to inflict casualties – the group’s longevity would have been far 
shorter.564 
Another complication regarding the Weather Underground’s history is the question of 
how the group’s organizational structure relates to its effectiveness – specifically in regards to 
the mobilization of support for its cause.  During the period from June to December 1969, when 
the group was at its most hierarchical and could draw upon the remaining above-ground 
resources of the SDS, its effort to mobilize supporters for the Chicago Days of Rage 
demonstration was a miserable failure – and yet, after the group had gone underground and 
adopted a more cellular organizational structure, its actions led to the successful creation of the 
Prairie Fire Organizing Committee, which survived for decades after the demise of the Weather 
Underground itself.565  Taken merely in terms of whether the Weather Underground was able to 
get others to take action in support of its beliefs, this would seem to run contrary to the 
prediction of the hypothesis that hierarchical groups will be more successful in mobilizing 
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supporters – but in comparing these two instances from the group’s history, the question of what 
the supporters were being asked to do makes for a critical difference.  In the period leading up to 
the Days of Rage, The Weather Underground asked potential supporters to engage in open, hand-
to-hand combat against a well-armed, professionally-trained metropolitan police force that had 
been accused of brutality in responding to a similar demonstration only one year earlier – this 
was largely regarded as suicidal not just by the non-politicized youth that the group was trying to 
recruit, but by its allies in other New Left organizations.566  Meanwhile, the PFOC merely asked 
its members to engage in political activism through non-violent, above-ground channels – and, in 
fact, took pains to conceal and deny the direct connections between its leadership and the 
Weather Underground (it is also notable that, by the time of PFOC’s creation, the Weather 
Underground had an established record of carrying out its bombings without causing 
casualties).567   
Again, all this leads to a counterfactual question:  What if the Weather Underground had 
not made such extreme demands of its potential supporters before the Days of Rage?  What if, 
rather than asking recruits to fight the cops directly, it had asked for them to carry out bombings 
or provide logistical support?  The group’s success with organizing PFOC provides a hint that its 
efforts would have been more successful – and an even better indicator is the support that it 
received in the years in between, from 1970-1974, when support from other leftist collectives 
helped the group evade arrest by the authorities.568  
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Conclusion and Notes 
While complicated by the Weather Underground’s shift to a more cellular organizational 
structure, and by an increase in its environmental security as a result of the Watergate scandal, 
this case conforms to the hypothesis’ predicted results.  The Weather Underground’s initial 
hierarchical structure and lack of a safe haven made it vulnerable to monitoring and infiltration 
by the authorities, while its shift to a less hierarchical structure, followed by an exogenous 
increase in its environmental security, extended the group’s lifespan and helped provide it with 
time enough to build a modest mobilization effort (after its previous effort as a hierarchy had 
been derailed by wildly unrealistic expectations).  In short, the Weather Underground moved 
from a “bad fit” to a “better fit” between its organizational structure and political environment.   
In the analysis that will follow, the individual cases will be placed into two dyads 
according to their condition variable (the security of the political environment) and subjected to a 
controlled comparison to see how they differ in terms of their dependent variables (their 
longevity and effectiveness).  More specifically, the two dyads to be compared will be the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Red Army Faction (both of which possessed safe 
havens), and the Red Brigades and Weather Underground (neither of which possessed safe 
havens). 
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Chapter 7: Cross-Case Analyses 
Dyad I: Groups with Access to Safe Havens 
The first cases to be compared in this chapter are the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA) and the Red Army Faction (RAF).  Both groups faced a low risk of government 
interference in that they were in possession of safe havens to which they could escape from the 
authorities and prepare their operations.  For PIRA, from 1970 to 1972, these safe havens 
consisted of Catholic neighborhoods in Northern Ireland designated as “no-go” areas for the 
British Army (in an attempt to avoid casting the conflict as anti-Catholic) and of the Republic of 
Ireland (the government of which was restrained from taking action against PIRA by the group’s 
level of support among the public).569  Even after 1972, when British forces took over the “no-
go” areas and the Republic of Ireland began to cooperate with the British government against 
PIRA, the group was able to take shelter among staunchly republican communities in Northern 
Ireland, whose populations viewed the group as necessary for protection against loyalist 
paramilitaries.570  For the RAF, from its foundation in 1970 until German reunification in 1990, 
the group was able to utilize East Germany as a safe haven through which it could escape the 
West German authorities and travel to other Soviet-aligned countries – and, for a brief period in 
1980-1981, in which it was armed and trained by the East German Stasi.571 
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Organizational Structures 
The organizational structures employed by PIRA and the RAF, respectively, could hardly 
have been more different.  From 1970 to 1976, PIRA had a formal, centralized, hierarchical 
structure based on a military model:  orders traveled down from the Army Council (headed by 
the Chief of Staff) to the functionally-differentiated departments of the General Headquarters, 
and from there to the brigades, battalions, and companies.572  Much of this hierarchical structure 
remained even after PIRA’s reorganization in 1977, when the leadership was divided into 
Northern and Southern Commands, and the group shifted from employing localized 
battalions/companies to cellular active service units (ASUs).573 
The RAF, on the other hand, was centralized in as much as it had a few key leaders 
(Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof, and Jan-Carl Raspe for 1970-1977; Brigitte 
Mohnhaupt and Christian Klar for 1977-1982; and Wolfgang Grams and Birgit Hogefeld for 
1984-1993), but it had a far more cellular and far less formal structure than PIRA.574  Structured 
mainly upon the social connections between its members, and the exigencies of any given time, 
the RAF consisted of a core leadership cell that would spin off smaller cells (called 
“commandos”) to carry out operations on an ad hoc basis, or would split to help evade capture.575  
These full-time RAF cells were, in turn, supported by mostly-autonomous local cells of above-
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ground supporters (called “illegal militants”).576  This structure would see some minor variations 
(most notably, the simultaneous existence of an imprisoned official leadership and an active 
unofficial leadership in 1977, a largely fanciful attempt at formal organization in 1982, and 
periods when the group lacked clear leadership), but it held true largely throughout the RAF’s 
existence.577 
 
Effectiveness 
Survival.  PIRA and the RAF were each active for just short of 28 years (December 1969 
to July 1997 for PIRA, May 1970 to April 1998 for the RAF), and both ended their campaigns by 
choosing to disband – but of the two, the RAF undoubtedly came closer to dissolution by the 
authorities.   
Estimates on the number of PIRA members killed ranges from 276 to 294, and journalists 
Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie have reported that 8,000 to 10,000 members were arrested in 
the period from 1969 to 1987.578  Figures for the numerical strength of PIRA are scarce, but 
Bishop and Mallie write that in 1969 the group started with an estimated 120 operatives and 500 
supporters, while post-1977 estimates of its annual membership range from 900 to 1,500 
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members (of which, O’Leary writes, 300-500 were full-time operatives).579  Former PIRA Chief 
of Staff Martin McGuinness has claimed that 10,000 people were members of the group at some 
point or another in the course of its 28-year lifespan.580   
The RAF, meanwhile, saw 25 members killed, including its imprisoned leaders’ 
suicides.581  According to a former head of the German Federal Criminal Police Office cited by 
Assaf Moghadam, “517 [people] were sentenced for membership [in the RAF] and 917 for 
supporting the RAF” – a number which includes 46 arrests of the group’s full-time members and 
all three generations of its leadership.582  But the numbers of these losses are smaller in absolute 
terms than those of PIRA, they represent a far greater portion of the RAF membership – it having 
been estimated to have consisted of 15 to 40 full-time operatives depending on the time period, 
with around 200 part-time operatives and 400 supporters.583  It should be noted, then, that while 
PIRA and the RAF survived for the same amount of time, the latter suffered losses of a far 
greater severity – and, given the differences in recruitment (discussed below), would likely not 
have survived long were it not for the availability of its safe haven in East Germany.   
Attacks.  The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) attributes 2,636 incidents to PIRA for the period 
from 1970 to 1997 – a tally that almost certainly falls short of the actual number of incidents 
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carried out by PIRA due to the loss of the GTD’s records for the year 1993.584  Out of these 
incidents, the GTD reports that PIRA committed 1,134 bombings, 859 assassinations, 289 
facility/infrastructure attacks, 288 armed assaults, 40 kidnappings, 8 barricade hostage-taking 
events, and three hijackings.  And according to the University of Ulster’s Conflict Archive on the 
Internet (CAIN), PIRA was responsible for 1,706 deaths over the course of the conflict in 
Northern Ireland.585 
For the RAF and Baader-Meinhof Group (from 1970 to 1998, again without 1993), the 
GTD contains 123 incidents, of which there are 60 bombings, 20 assassinations, 27 
facility/infrastructure attacks, eight armed assaults, two barricade hostage-taking events, and one 
hijacking.  In the course of these operations, the RAF was responsible for 34 deaths.586 
Taken on a per-capita basis (using a mean estimate of 400 full-time PIRA operatives and 
27.5 full-time RAF operatives), the number of GTD incidents attributed to PIRA is almost 50 
percent greater than that of the RAF (at 6.59 incidents per full-time operative vs. 4.47 per full-
time operative), and the per-capita number of deaths attributed to PIRA is over three times higher 
(4.27 deaths per operative vs. 1.24 deaths per operative).  Taken on an annual basis, the 
estimated numbers of attacks are 94.14 attacks per year for PIRA and 4.39 attacks per year for 
the RAF. 
In terms of the quality of their attacks, both groups underwent a similar evolution from 
conducting simple bombings and shootings to carrying out highly complex operations.  
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Examples of sophisticated PIRA operations include the bombing of 21 locations in one 75-
minute period on Friday, July 21, 1972 (called “Bloody Friday”), which resulted in nine deaths, 
and the conduct of an extensive campaign of bombings and attacks on the British mainland from 
1973 to 1975.587  For the RAF, a clear example of the group’s sophistication is the second 
generation’s “German Autumn” campaign of 1977, in which the kidnapping of West German 
Employers’ Federation President Hanns-Martin Schleyer on September 6 was timed to 
coordinate with the October 13 hijacking of Lufthansa Flight 181 by the People’s Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine.588 
Recruitment.  Although the estimates for PIRA strength vary (as seen in the “Survival” 
discussion above), there is no doubt that the group’s success at mobilizing supporters far 
outstripped that of the RAF.  From attacks to casualties to arrests, the PIRA numbers are 
consistently more than ten times greater than the RAF’s, indicating a much larger organization.  
It is also notable that, while PIRA began its existence with a larger membership base than the 
RAF, its estimated number of full-time operatives increased 750-1250 percent, while the latter’s 
number of full time operatives increased only 200 percent.   
 
Summary 
While the possession of safe havens helped aid the survival of both PIRA and the RAF, 
the former’s hierarchical structure gave it a substantial advantage in recruitment.  This, in turn, 
allowed PIRA to mount a higher absolute volume of attacks and absorb higher absolute (but 
lower per capita) losses.  In addition, while both groups were capable of sophisticated operations, 
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PIRA’s hierarchical structure allowed it to mount a higher per capita number of attacks with a 
much higher fatality rate. 
 
Dyad II: Groups without Access to Safe Havens 
The next cases to be compared in this chapter are the Red Brigades and the Weather 
Underground.  Both groups faced a high risk of government interference due to the fact that 
neither held a safe haven (of the two, the Weather Underground was able to rely on some modest 
cover from its supporters in the counter-cultural community, but for most of this period the group 
was no longer a subject of serious pursuit by the authorities).589   
 
Organizational Structures 
The Red Brigades originated in 1970 as a collection of localized, autonomous cells – first 
in Milan, then in Turin, the Veneto, Rome, and Genoa.590  In 1974, the group’s leaders created a 
centralized, overarching structure to coordinate the cells’ activities according to location (their 
“column”) and function (their “front,” or whether they provided logics and support or 
recruitment and intelligence).591  The two heads of each local column were responsible for 
carrying out attacks with support from the cells under them.592  At the top of this structure was 
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the Executive Committee, who also carried out the group’s most sensitive operations.593  Starting 
in September of 1974 and continuing into 1975, the loss of much of the group’s top members 
concentrated its leadership under Mario Moretti, resulting in a more centralized organization (at 
least, until the group began to suffer from internal splits and defections in 1979).594 
In contrast to the Red Brigades, the Weather Underground began with a highly 
centralized, hierarchical structure, and shifted to a less-centralized, cellular structure.  Starting 
with the Weatherman faction’s takeover of the Students for a Democratic Society in 1969, the 
group used the hierarchical bureaucracy inherited from the SDS – including its headquarters, 
records, and publication -- to coordinate local cells based on Che Guevera’s foco concept.595  
Following the group’s violent, but less-than-revolutionary Days of Rage protest in October 1969, 
the Weather Underground purged much of its membership and shifted into a cellular-network 
structure with three relatively autonomous, geographically-based branches (in the Midwest, East 
Coast, and West Coast).596  This number of branches was reduced to two in 1970 when, 
following an accidental explosion, the then-East Coast branch collapsed and was replaced with 
the members and leadership of the Midwest Branch.597 
 
Effectiveness 
Survival.  The Red Brigades survived for about 13 years (August 1970 to early 1983), 
while the Weather Underground lasted for only seven years (June 1969 to February 1976).  Of 
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the two, the Red Brigades were undone by a combination of government action and internal 
division, while internal division alone brought down the Weather Underground.   
In the course of the conflict, 61 Red Brigades members were killed (as a result of 
encounters with police, accidents, or suicide) and 911 were prosecuted.598  The estimates for the 
group’s numerical strength, however, vary widely according to time period and source.  Robert 
Meade writes that, as of 1976, the number of Red Brigades regulars was down to an estimated 15 
militants (with another 23 jailed).599  By contrast, an oft-cited May 17, 1978 article by New York 
Times reporter Henry Tanner claims “the Red Brigades consists of 400 to 500 full-time members 
who are on the payroll of the organization” as well as “up to 1,000” part-time, above-ground 
members.600  The most credible estimate, though, comes from a November 1984 report to the 
U.S. Senate, which described not just the Red Brigades’ size, but also the fluctuation of that size:  
“50 militants when organized; 1,000 at the point of maximum expansion in 1978-79, plus some 
2,000 external supporters; 100 at the end of 1982/beginning of 1983, plus 200 external 
supporters.”601 
The Weather Underground, meanwhile, only had three members killed (by the accidental 
detonation of a bomb that they were constructing on March 6, 1970).602  And while the group 
had 287 members arrested in the October 1969 Days of Rage protest, it only had 22 members 
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arrested after going underground.603  The numerical strength of the Weather Underground has 
been estimated to have been about 500 members at the time of the Days of Rage protest, 150 
members at the start of its underground period (early 1970), and a few dozen members by the 
time of its dissolution.604  Of the two groups, then, the Red Brigades suffered more losses of 
members and of leaders, yet still managed to survive for a longer duration due to its greater 
success in recruitment (see below).  This comparison is complicated, however, by the fact that 
the rise of the Watergate and COINTELPRO scandals led the Justice Department and the FBI to 
drop their pursuit of the Weather Underground, and by the fact that the Red Brigades’ attacks on 
persons generated greater public support for the Italian authorities’ efforts to crack down on the 
group.  
Attacks.  The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) attributes 211 incidents to the Red 
Brigades for the period 1970-1983, of which there were 35 bombings, 56 assassinations, 19 
facility/infrastructure attacks, 76 armed assaults, 13 kidnappings, nine barricade hostage-taking 
events, and no hijackings.  In addition, according to the Domestic Terrorism Victims (DTV) 
dataset developed by Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (which purports to be the 
most accurate dataset on fatalities in Western Europe due to terrorism for the period 1965-2005), 
the Red Brigades were responsible for 77 deaths.605 
The GTD attributes 45 incidents to the Weather Underground for the period 1970-1976, 
of which there were 41 bombings, two armed assaults, and two facility/infrastructure attacks.  
                                                 
603
 Days of Rage arrests reported by Varon, 82; Post-underground arrests calculated from 
Berger, 132, 156-157 and United States. U.S. Senate. Weather Underground: Report of the 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws. Washington: GPO, January 1975, 46-116. 
604
 Varon, 57, 172; Berger, 130, 154. 
605
 Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “The Quantity and Quality of 
Terrorism: The DTV Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research, 48:1 (2011): 53. 
  
 
172
There were no deaths as per a deliberate policy undertaken by the group’s leadership following 
the townhouse explosion of 1970.606 
Estimating an average of 400 Red Brigades operatives (a number consistent with both the 
mean of the Senate report’s figures and those cited by Henry Tanner), the group’s per capita 
number of incidents stands at 0.53.  While lower than the per capita estimates of attacks for the 
groups with safe havens (discussed above), it is still higher than the Weather Underground’s 
number if based on the estimate of 150 members in 1970 (0.27).607  
Also, in regards to the quality of attacks, the Red Brigades’ demonstrated greater 
sophistication.  The clearest example of this is the group’s kidnapping of former Italian 
president, Aldo Moro, and the assassination of his five bodyguards (two carabinieri and three 
police officers) on March 16, 1978.608  By contrast, the Weather Underground’s attacks consisted 
exclusively of planting time bombs – an endeavor for which the group conducted careful 
planning and intelligence-gathering (so as to avoid causing any deaths), but which required little 
coordination outside of any individual cell.609 
Recruitment.  Again, the estimated numerical strength of each group (from the above 
“Survival” section) shows that the Red Brigades were more effective at recruitment than the 
Weather Underground.  This contrast is best seen in the early years of each group.  From 1970 to 
1974, the Red Brigades grew from one cell in Milan to multiple cells spread across five different 
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cities – and did so by complementing the group’s attacks with active recruiting and propaganda 
efforts in factories where the group’s cells were based.610  The Weather Underground, on the 
other hand, inherited a significant portion of the membership and resources of the formerly 
100,000-strong Students for a Democratic Society in June 1969 – but, by the time of the October 
1969 Days of Rage protest, only managed to mobilize around 600 activists to take part.611  From 
there, the Weather Underground and its number of supporters only proceeded to shrink, although 
it had a brief and limited period of success in 1974-1976 following the publication of its book 
Prairie Fire: The Politics of Revolutionary Anti-Imperialism (in as much as the Prairie Fire 
Organizing Committee formed to support the book’s ideas – this group, however, was 
independent from the Weather Underground itself).612  
 
Summary 
In the comparison between the Red Brigades and the Weather Underground, the former 
had greater success in all three of the measures above: it lasted for more years, carried out more 
attacks per member, and had more members.  Based on the numbers above, the key to explaining 
this result is the differences between the groups in terms of mobilization.  Starting as a small cell 
from the beginning, the Red Brigades’ combination of attacks with propaganda and recruitment 
allowed the group to grow despite the restrictions of its cellular-network structure and lack of a 
safe haven.  The Weather Underground, by contrast, began as a large, public hierarchy that 
quickly attracted the attention of the authorities – by the time the group had switched to a 
cellular-network organizational structure, it was already the subject of serious pursuit, and 
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became even more so after the 1970 townhouse explosion.613  The result was that the Weather 
Underground was too pressed to recruit new members – and, by the time the authorities eased 
their chase (due to the Watergate scandal), the group was facing a new mobilization challenge 
thanks to the U.S.-Vietnam ceasefire removing its most obvious raison d’être.614   
  
Conclusion and Notes 
As seen in Figures 6 and 7 (below), comparisons between PIRA and the RAF, and 
between the Red Brigades and Weather Underground, reveal that the combinations of 
organizational structure and environment fall into a rank order that ranges from most conducive 
to terrorist activities to least conducive.  Of these, the situation most favorable to terrorist groups 
is to possess both a safe haven and a hierarchical organizational structure – this provides security 
from disruption by the authorities, while enhancing a group’s ability to carry out attacks and 
mobilize supporters.  The next most favorable is to possess a safe haven and a cellular-network 
structure – while this structure reduces a group’s ability to mobilize supporters, the protection it 
provides from the authorities both extends the life of the group and aids its ability to carry out 
attacks.  The next most favorable is to possess a cellular-network structure without a safe haven 
– while this organizational structure limits the group’s ability to mobilize supporters or carry out 
attacks, it nevertheless extends its lifespan.  Finally, the least favorable combination is that of a 
hierarchical organizational structure without a safe haven – in this case, the authorities can move 
quickly to disrupt a group, threatening its survival and reducing its ability to carry out attacks or 
mobilize supporters.   
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The following chapter combines these findings with those of the previous four case 
studies to both provide a more in-depth analysis and examine the possible theoretical 
implications. 
 
Figure 6: Measures of Effectiveness According to Terrorist Group, Part 1 
Terrorist 
Group 
Years 
Survived Estimated Size Members Killed 
Members 
Arrested 
PIRA 28 
120 operatives, 
500 supporters 
(1970); 300-500 
operatives, 400-
1,200 supporters 
(1977) 276-294 8,000-10,000 
RAF 28 
15-40 full-time 
operatives, 200-
400 supporters 25 
46 full-time 
members, 517-917 
others 
Red Brigades 13 
50 militants 
(1970); 1,000 
militants, 2,000 
external 
supporters (1979); 
100 militants, 200 61 911 
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external 
supporters (1982-
1983) 
Weather 
Underground 7 
500 (1969); 150 
(1970); few dozen 
(1976) 3 
287 (1969); 22 
(1970-1976) 
 
Figure 7: Measures of Effectiveness According to Terrorist Group, Part 2 
Terrorist 
Group Incidents 
Deaths 
Caused 
Estimated 
Per Capita 
Incidents 
Estimated 
Per Capita 
Deaths 
Incidents Per 
Year 
PIRA 2,636 1,706 6.59 4.27 94.14 
RAF 123 34 4.47 1.24 4.39 
Red Brigades 211 77 0.53 0.19 16.23 
Weather 
Underground 45 0 0.27 0 6.43 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Overview of Findings 
Both the individual histories of the four cases examined in this dissertation, and the 
comparison between them, indicate that a terrorist group’s organizational structure interacts with 
its access to a safe haven to affect its ability to survive, carry out attacks, and mobilize 
supporters.  However, they also demonstrate the limitations of the organizational 
structure/presence of safe haven model and point to the need for further research.  This chapter 
will provide brief summaries of the results for each of the four cases before discussing the 
potential directions for future studies, and then will discuss the theoretical and policy 
implications of this dissertation’s findings. 
 
Provisional Irish Republican Army 
One of the two longest-surviving groups examined in this dissertation, the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army also grew to be the largest and the deadliest thanks to its combination of 
a hierarchical organizational structure and access to safe havens.  During the 1970-1972 period, 
when the group could rely upon shelter in both “no go” areas in Northern Ireland and in the 
Republic of Ireland, it unleashed a wave of attacks that made 1972 the bloodiest year of the 
conflict and pushed the British government to dissolve Northern Ireland’s parliament and 
institute direct rule.615  The importance of the interaction between PIRA’s environment and its 
                                                 
615
 Peter R. Neumann,Britain’s Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland 
Conflict, 1969-98 (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 56; Kevin Kelley, The Longest 
War: Northern Ireland and the IRA (Dingle, Co. Kerry, Ireland: Brandon Book Publishers, Ltd., 
1982), 209; Brendan O’Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin, 2nd ed (Syracuse, NY: 
  
 
178
organizational structure is further illustrated by the progression of events that followed after the 
British government abolished these “no go” areas and the Republic of Ireland started to crack 
down on the group.  After losing these safe havens, PIRA faced mounting arrests and a reduced 
ability to carry out attacks, so in 1977 it responded by shifting to a more cellular-network-based 
organizational structure.616  This reorganization reduced the volume of attacks that that the group 
could carry out, and restricted its mobilization efforts, but successfully stemmed its losses – the 
result being that PIRA remained active for another two decades, and only ceased its attacks as 
part of a negotiated peace process.617  
 
The Red Brigades 
 The longest-surviving, largest, and most active of the two groups in this dissertation 
without safe havens, the Red Brigades successfully overcame an early loss of much of their 
leadership due to their cellular-network structure – but were ultimately brought down by 
vulnerabilities due to increasing centralization.  Starting in Milan before mobilizing cells in other 
cities, the Red Brigades carried out bombings and kidnappings (without casualties) from 1970 to 
1974, until most of their founding leadership was arrested (with yet another of the founding 
leaders killed in 1975).618  However, the few members remaining at large managed to quickly 
rebuild the group up to a numerical strength far in excess of the Red Brigades’ pre-1974 size.619  
But the new leadership also sought to exercise tighter and more centralized control, and while 
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this allowed the Red Brigades to carry out more sophisticated attacks, it also made the group 
vulnerable.620  The 1980 arrest of a high-ranking member, who agreed to provide information on 
the group in exchange for leniency, led to the capture of many other members and the exposure 
of their operations.621  At the same time, other high-ranking members, resenting their loss of 
autonomy and disagreeing with the core leadership’s tactics, began to split off and form their 
own groups.622  The result was that, by 1983, most of the Red Brigades’ members had 
surrendered, been captured, or deserted, and the remainder had split into two competing 
factions.623    
 
The Red Army Faction 
A cellular-network-based group founded with relatively little thought as to its 
organization, the Red Army Faction’s longevity and operational sophistication were in large part 
due to its access to East Germany as a safe haven and as a gateway to resources around the 
world.624  But while this combination of a cellular-network structure and a safe haven shielded 
the RAF, and helped it reconstitute despite twice losing nearly its entire leadership to arrests, it 
limited the group’s ability to mobilize supporters – with the result being that the RAF had the 
smallest number of full-time members of the four groups in this dissertation, and remained small 
throughout its existence.625  With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, 
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the group’s Marxist-Leninist ideology suffered a heavy blow, and its members and former 
members in the East were arrested or killed.626  After years of inaction, the few free, remaining 
members announced the group’s dissolution.627 
 
The Weather Underground 
Originally organized as an amalgam of the hierarchical Students for a Democratic Society 
and the cellular revolutionary units advocated by Che Guevara, the Weather Underground (then 
called “Weatherman”) began as a largely hierarchical group without a safe haven.628  Due to this 
combination of organizational structure and political environment, it quickly ran into difficulty.  
The group’s central leadership had dispatched cells to cities around the country with the intent 
that they would mobilize white, working-class youth for a violent protest in Chicago that was to 
be the makings of a revolutionary army.629  This effort failed to attract many recruits – and, 
instead, the violence of the protest merely motivated the authorities to pursue the Weather 
Underground’s leadership.630  The leaders of the group responded to these developments by 
purging much of its membership (who were seen as potential informers) and shifting to a 
cellular-network organizational structure.631  However, while this structure helped prevent the 
group from being disrupted, it also hampered any efforts to mobilize new supporters – and an 
accidental explosion at a New York City townhouse in 1970 both reduced the Weather 
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Underground’s membership and intensified the pursuit by the authorities.632  In 1973, this pursuit 
slackened due to the fallout from the Watergate scandal – but this development in the Weather 
Underground’s favor occurred at the same time as the signing of the U.S.-Vietnam ceasefire, 
costing the group one of its major motivating factors.633  Despite the popularity of its self-
published book, Prairie Fire, in activist circles, the group was unable to mobilize further support 
and collapsed due to internal fracturing.634 
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Study 
While the results of the above cases support some predictions of the organizational 
structure/presence of safe haven model, they also reveal some important limitations.  Chief 
among these is the performance of the RAF relative to that of the Red Brigades.  While the 
results for PIRA and the Weather Underground conform to the predictions of the model across 
all three of the indicators of effectiveness – that is, PIRA dramatically outperforms the Weather 
Underground in terms of survival, quantity and quality of attacks, and mobilization – the results 
for the RAF and the Red Brigades run counter to the model in two of the three categories.  
While, as predicted, the Red Brigades demonstrated greater success in mobilizing supporters 
than the RAF, the RAF nevertheless survived for considerably longer and carried out a higher 
number of attacks relative to its membership.  Based on the case histories, this result is due in 
large part to advantage that the latter had due to its safe haven in East Germany, which provided 
an equivalent of life support to the RAF for more than a decade after its defeat and the suicides 
of its original leaders in 1977.  Throughout the 1980s, the few remaining, active members of the 
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RAF would occasionally emerge from their safe haven in East Germany, carry out an attack, and 
return again, with little achievement in terms of building greater support or advancing the 
group’s cause.  On the other hand, while the original organization of the Red Brigades was 
decimated and split by the mid-1980s, its splinter factions remained intermittently active all the 
way up to 2003 – albeit, with only 19 incidents recorded by the Global Terrorism Database over 
the period from 1983 to 2003, compared to 53 incidents for the RAF in the period from 1983 to 
1991.635  This rather muddy result calls into question a number of aspects of the model that will 
need to be explored through further research.  These directions for future study are described 
below.  
 
Re-defining Effectiveness   
The case of the RAF, in particular, shows the need to develop a more powerful and 
nuanced measurement for group effectiveness.  Despite the group’s ability to evade the 
authorities and stage deadly, sophisticated attacks, its dramatic weakness in mobilizing 
supporters and its isolation within its East German safe haven made it utterly ineffectual at 
influencing West German politics or public opinion.  During its existence, the group’s statements 
became well known for being incoherent to anyone except those most steeped in Marxist 
theoretical jargon.636  Furthermore, the group was most effective at mobilizing supporters and 
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influencing public opinion during the 1972-1977 period when its imprisoned leadership turned to 
hunger strikes rather than bombings or assassinations.637  Hunger strikes in the early 1980’s 
likewise provided PIRA with its most politically influential period since the crushing of its 
Northern Ireland safe havens in 1972.638  And, for a brief period, the Weather Underground too 
saw its greatest boost in popularity through the legal, non-destructive publication of its Prairie 
Fire manifesto rather than its (non-violent) bombings.639  All these examples point to a gap 
between the amount and sophistication of a group’s attacks and its ability to exert political 
influence. 
In order to more robustly examine the effectiveness of terrorist groups, then, it will be 
necessary to abandon the parsimony of measures such as years of survival, numbers of attacks 
carried out, and group size, in favor of a messier but more robust measure that takes into account 
groups’ stated strategic and ultimate goals and whether these are being furthered by their actions.  
This will require taking into account variations such as they breadth or narrowness of a group’s 
goals, the existence of competing goals within a group, its (or rather its leaders’) perception of its 
intended audiences and opposition, and the extent to which these serve to influence its 
organizational structure in turn. 
 
State Counterterrorism Policies and Public Support 
The need to take on a longer-term, more strategic view of terrorist group goals in 
evaluating effectiveness highlights another limitation in the model employed by this dissertation:  
the treatment of government counterterrorism policy as fixed, rather than the product of an 
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adaptive process of interaction between terrorist groups and the government that they oppose.  
The four cases studied in this dissertation all exhibit examples of shifts in government policy that 
served to raise or lower the level of risk in a group’s environment.  For PIRA, the decision of the 
British government to abolish its “no go” areas in 1972 helped to force the group to undergo a 
change in organizational structure, while its eventual moves to both engage the Republic of 
Ireland, to improve the state of civil rights in Northern Ireland, and to bring Northern Irish 
Republicans into the political mainstream all helped lead to the end of the conflict. The Red 
Brigades, on the other hand, suffered its major losses in the early 1980s thanks, in part, to the 
Italian government’s adoption of its pentiti policy – that is, considerably reduced prison 
sentences for Red Brigades members who surrendered to the authorities and provided 
information on the organization.640  For the RAF, the capture of its original leadership and its 
defeat in 1977 were aided by the German government’s adoption of tougher and more 
technologically-advanced counterterrorism tactics – in particular, the creation of the GSG-9 
commando unit and the use of computerized data analysis to predict the locations of RAF safe 
houses.641  And finally, the Weather Underground saw its level of risk decrease as the Justice 
Department and FBI dropped their pursuit of the group as they came under pressure for abusing 
their powers in the wake of the COINTELPRO and Watergate scandals.  All of these indicate 
that a new model is needed in which a terrorist group does not merely adjust its organizational 
structure to the level of risk, but also in which the level of risk also adjusts in response to the 
effectiveness of the terrorist group. 
A key trigger for the authorities’ adjustment to the level of terrorist effectiveness would 
appear to be the state of public opinion regarding the group.  Across all four of the cases, 
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particularly violent and/or high profile incidents provided the authorities with the public’s 
permission to adopt more aggressive counterterrorism policies – incidents such as such as 
PIRA’s July 21, 1972 wave of bombings in Belfast and its 1976 assassination of the British 
ambassador to Ireland in Dublin, the Red Brigades’ 1978 abduction and killing of Aldo Moro, 
the RAF’s 1977 abduction and killing of Hanns-Martin Schleyer, and the Weather 
Underground’s townhouse explosion of 1970 were all met with crackdowns.  At the same time, 
incidents in which terrorist members were perceived as victims, such as PIRA’s and the RAF’s 
hunger strikes, and COINTELPRO’s revelations about the FBI’s pursuit of leftist and civil rights 
groups, created public pressure against the use of aggressive counterterrorism policies.   
The potential role of public support in encouraging and limiting state counterterrorism 
policies has recently been addressed in an article by Bart Schuurman, whose findings support the 
connection in both the cases of PIRA and the Red Brigades, as well as with Canada’s Front de 
Libération du Québec.642  Although, the fact that Schuurman is able to cite relatively few public 
opinion polls in his three cases also highlights the potential difficulty in developing a model that 
includes public opinion as a spur to changing government counterterrorism policies.  
Nevertheless, the value of a model that managed to incorporate the interactions between terrorist 
organizational structure, government counterterrorism policy, and public opinion would make 
the effort a worthy endeavor. 
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Domestic vs. Foreign Safe Havens 
One more limitation on this dissertation that could yield future material for study is the 
potential differences between domestic and foreign safe havens.  In the organizational 
structure/presence of safe haven model, these two types of safe havens have been combined due 
to the shared limit they impose on government efforts to infiltrate or disrupt terrorist groups – but 
an issue that has not been addressed is their potential difference in terms of mobilization.  A 
domestic safe haven could exist because it is in a weak state whose government is unable to exert 
full control over its territory – but much more likely for the types of states under analysis in this 
dissertation (and certainly the case for PIRA), it is due to sizeable, territorially-defined 
populations of supporters.  These supporters do not merely block the authorities from intervening 
in the terrorist groups’ activities within their territories, they also provide a pool of recruits and 
resources – thus enhancing not just a group’s survival potential, but its ability to mobilize and 
carry out attacks as well. 
Meanwhile, while a foreign safe haven could, on some occasions, serve as a source of 
recruitment and resources – in the case of refugee camps, for example – it is more likely to exist 
because the host government has agreed to shelter the group as a tool for use against the target 
government.  This, then, means that while the safe haven adds security, it does not provide a 
bonus to mobilization – although the group’s ability to carry out attacks might be bolstered by 
host government support (as was the case of the RAF).  A future avenue of research, then, will 
be incorporating these delineations between safe havens into the model – most likely by 
broadening the selection of cases under examination – and observing whether the type of safe 
haven available encourages a group to be more or less hierarchical due to the potential gains for 
its mobilization and ability to carry out attacks. 
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Theoretical Significance 
The findings in this dissertation clearly support the argument put forward by Morselli, 
Giguère, and Petit that the organizational structures of terrorist groups are shaped by the 
dilemma posed by the conflicting needs of security and efficiency – much more so than they do 
the claims that group structure is determined by technology or historical and cultural context.643  
Despite the fact that all four of the groups shared the same technological background, similar 
cultural and ideological beliefs, and the same collection of historical precedents, they exhibited 
surprising variation in terms of organizational structure.  Furthermore, behaviors such as PIRA’s 
and the Weather Underground’s organizational shifts to more cellular forms, as well as the 
Weather Underground’s and Red Brigades’ strict control over the behavior of their members, 
demonstrate a strong preoccupation with achieving this balance.644 
In addition, the variation and change in organizational structures seen across the four 
groups in this dissertation fit with a growing trend in the terrorism literature to move away from 
sweeping generalizations about the organizational form of terrorist groups and to a recognition 
not only of heterogeneity of these organizations but also their deviation away from strict 
organizational types.  That is, rather than being purely hierarchical or purely cellular-network 
based, terrorist groups fall into a spectrum between these two poles.  The cases in this study 
include a hierarchical organization that adopted cellular structures in response to its loss of its 
save havens (PIRA), a cellular-network organization that adopted hierarchical structures to 
achieve greater coordination (the Red Brigades), an organization that went from being a mainly 
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hierarchical hybrid to being a cellular-network (the Weather Underground), and a group made up 
of a single cell that would absorb and spin off other cells (the RAF).  This finding that terrorist 
group structures fall along a spectrum between hierarchy and cellular-network is supported by 
the differences in cellular structures among the Palestinian suicide groups studied by Pedahzur 
and Perliger; the centralized record-keeping among a far-reaching number of groups studied by 
Helfstein and by Shapiro and Siegel (respectively); Brams, Mutlu, and Ramirez’s discovery of 
the degree of hierarchical centralization within the 9/11 network; Kilberg’s attempt to categorize 
terrorist groups into a four-type system; and Eccarius-Kelly’s findings regarding the 
organizational structures of FARC and the PKK.645     
This dissertation also provides provisional, albeit incomplete evidence that terrorist 
groups’ political environments might influence their organizational structures, as predicted 
through contingency theory.  In both the PIRA and Weather Underground cases, the groups 
responded to heightened levels of risk by shifting from hierarchical organizational structures to 
cellular-network structures, even though this cost each of them in terms of their ability to 
mobilize supporters.  Meanwhile, in the Red Brigades case, the group adopted increasingly 
hierarchical organizational conditions despite a growing level of risk from the authorities, and 
ultimately paid the price for it.  And, lastly, despite possessing a safe haven, the RAF adopted a 
cellular-network form, with the result being that the group stayed limited to just a few dozen full-
time operatives despite its longevity and resources.   
Once again, this evidence comes with the caveat that it does not fully conform to the 
predictions of the organizational structure/presence of safe haven model, as the “bad fit” RAF 
was found to survive longer and carry out more attacks than the “good fit” Red Brigades.  The 
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finding, instead, is that the groups fell into a rank order of threat, with the most dangerous, PIRA 
(hierarchy/safe haven), having high scores on the survival, attack, and mobilization measures; 
the second-most dangerous, the RAF (cellular/safe haven) having the next-highest scores on 
survival and attack, but a low score on mobilization; the third-most dangerous, the Red Brigades 
(cellular/no safe haven) having lower scores on survival and attack than the RAF, but a higher 
score on mobilization; and the least dangerous, the Weather Underground (hierarchy/no safe 
haven), having the lowest scores on all three categories.  Also, as mentioned previously, the 
argument that organizational structure is shaped by environment will need to be further 
examined in comparison to a number of alternative explanations, including the possibilities that 
structure is shaped by the nature of the groups’ goals, state counterterrorism policies and public 
opinion, and the nature of the safe haven available to a group.     
 
Policy Significance 
Denial of Safe Havens 
The results of this dissertation provide yet more evidence for why it is important that, if 
all possible, terrorist groups are denied safe havens from which to operate.  As is seen in 
comparing PIRA with the three other cases, a group with a safe haven can utilize a hierarchical 
organizational structure that significantly increases the volume and deadliness of its attacks, and 
that provides a greater ability to mobilize supporters.  Furthermore, as is seen in the case of the 
RAF, a safe haven increases the quantity and quality of a group’s attacks even when the group 
lacks a hierarchical structure.  How best the denial of a safe haven should be achieved, however, 
is a question that will need to be addressed through a closer examination of the types of safe 
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havens available to groups – for example, the degree to which coercive action needs to be 
balanced against the addressing of popular grievances and development of political institutions.   
 
Tailored Response 
Despite coming from the same time period, the same cultural background, and having 
similar ideological beliefs, the four groups in this dissertation show a high degree of variation in 
their organizational structures.  This demands that, in crafting a counterterrorism strategy, careful 
attention must be paid to the individual strengths and weaknesses of a group’s organization.  In 
both the cases for PIRA and the RAF, it was only through drying up their safe havens that the 
groups’ activities could be fully ceased.  In the case of PIRA, this came through a political 
process that answered the concerns of the aggrieved population that supported the group; and in 
the case of the RAF, it came through an exogenous event (the collapse of East Germany) – 
although the latter group had been considerably limited through its isolation in the East.  For the 
Red Brigades, the answer came in exploiting the weaknesses created by the group’s increasing 
centralization – namely by offering captured and surrendered members leniency in exchange for 
information on a group whose cells were no longer effectively compartmentalized or 
autonomous.  (The Weather Underground, however does not offer much in the way of tips for 
counterterrorism, as the group collapsed entirely due to internal divisions and little was done on 
the part of the authorities to pursue it after 1973.)   
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Final Note 
These four cases represent just a small sample of terrorist groups from one region in one 
time period – and yet even in such a modest grouping, the variation and mutability observed 
across their organizational structures point toward the need for closer and more sophisticated 
research into terrorist organizational forms.  For all the tremendous difficulty of getting fine-
grained information on the structure and workings of terrorist organizations, this dissertation 
indicates the need for such micro-level approaches and cautions against the use of hasty 
generalizations in attempting to understand these increasingly dangerous actors. 
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